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 Insurance markets in the United States are highly concentrated, which has 
ambiguous policy implications. Concentrated insurers negotiate lower payment rates with 
healthcare providers, but may not pass savings on to consumers via lower premiums. 
Given this ambiguity, this dissertation explores the relationship between insurance 
market concentration and two important outcomes, healthcare utilization and quality. 
In Paper 1, I estimate longitudinal models predicting changes in inpatient 
utilization as a function of changes in insurer, hospital, and physician concentration. I 
estimate separate models for a set of highly acute, price-insensitive services and a set of 
more discretionary services for which demand should be more responsive to changes in 
price. I find that insurer concentration increases inpatient utilization, driven by more 
discretionary services, consistent with movement down the demand curve as concentrated 
insurers negotiate lower prices. The clinical benefit of this higher utilization is unclear, as 
I do not detect an effect on the likelihood of unplanned readmission. 
In Paper 2, I use inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment to compare 
the effect of insurer concentration on imaging utilization between the patients of 
orthopedists, neurologists, and urologists who own their own imaging equipment and 
patients of those specialist physicians who do not own imaging equipment and have a 
weaker financial incentive to order imaging. I find that the effect of insurer concentration 
is significantly larger among the patients of orthopedist owners compared to the patients 
of orthopedist non-owners, with no significant differences across the patients of 





more care contribute to the positive relationship between insurer concentration and 
utilization. 
In Paper 3, I estimate longitudinal models predicting changes in hospital patients’ 
experience of care as a function of changes in insurer and hospital concentration. I find 
that insurer concentration improves, while hospital concentration worsens, patient 
experience. 
These results suggest that insurer concentration leads to higher levels of 
healthcare utilization, driven by both patient demand and the physician’s financial 
incentive to provide more care. The effect on quality is mixed, with insurer concentration 
improving hospital patients’ experience of care, but not significantly decreasing the 
likelihood of readmission. 
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Health insurance and healthcare provider markets in the United States are 
characterized by high levels of market concentration. The combined national market 
share of the four largest insurers, for example, was 83% in 2014 (Dafny 2015). In 2016, 
90% of metropolitan areas had highly concentrated hospital markets, while 65% had 
highly concentrated specialist physician markets (Fulton 2017). These high levels of 
market concentration have implications for patients in terms of cost, quality, access to 
care, and utilization. On the provider side, a large literature indicates that high levels of 
hospital and physician market concentration are associated with higher healthcare 
payment rates (Gaynor, Ho and Town 2015, Baker et al. 2014, Schneider et al. 2008). A 
large literature also explores the effect of hospital market concentration on healthcare 
quality, with less clear results. The evidence suggests that hospital market competition 
improves quality in settings with an administered price (like Medicare), but findings in 
settings with negotiated prices are more mixed (Gaynor, Ho and Town 2015). 
The policy implications of insurer concentration are particularly complex. Just as 
concentrated providers are able to negotiate higher prices, concentrated insurers 
aggregate the buying power of employers and individuals, giving them greater bargaining 





(Moriya et al. 2010, McKellar et al. 2014, Melnick et al. 2011, Halbersma et al. 2011, 
Trish and Herring 2015). However, concentrated insurers also have greater leverage as 
sellers of health plans and may charge higher premiums, or may not pass the savings 
from the lower negotiated prices on to patients in the form of lower premiums (Trish and 
Herring 2015, Dafny, Duggan and Ramanarayanan 2012 and Dafny, Gruber and Ody 
2015). In light of the ambiguity around the benefits and harms to patients of insurer 
consolidation, an understanding of the effect of insurance market concentration on other 
outcomes important to patients is all the more important. This research therefore explores 
how insurer concentration affects the utilization of healthcare services and healthcare 
quality. 
Prior research suggests that insurer concentration and utilization are positively 
related (Bates and Santerre 2008 and McKellar et al. 2014). These findings have been 
interpreted in the context of a theoretical model outlined by Pauly (1998), in which 
insurers exercise monopoly-busting market power by negotiating lower payment rates 
with hospitals and physicians, moving the price closer to the competitive price. 
Movement down the demand curve would lead, in turn, to patients demanding higher 
quantities of care. This explanation suggests that insurer concentration may facilitate 
access to care among the insured, but little work has been done to explore whether the 
empirical evidence is consistent with key features of this model. As it relates to quality, 
there is little theoretical or empirical work about how insurer concentration impacts 
quality. However, much as hospitals compete with each other on quality in some 
contexts, it is possible that insurer concentration places competitive pressure on 





In Paper 1, I extend the literature on insurer concentration and utilization by 
considering whether the empirical evidence about their relationship is consistent with the 
economic theory of patients demanding more healthcare services as insurers negotiate 
lower payment rates. I consider first whether the effect of insurer concentration on 
inpatient utilization is larger for healthcare services for which demand is more elastic, 
compared to a set of acute services for which the patient’s demand should be less 
responsive to price. This question is motivated by the idea that movement down the 
demand curve as insurers negotiate lower rates should result in a larger change in 
utilization for more price-sensitive services. Second, I consider whether the effect is 
larger in more concentrated physician markets, where physicians are more able to elevate 
prices above marginal cost, and in less concentrated insurer markets, where insurers are 
less able to use managed care techniques and other plan design tools to constrain 
utilization. Finally, I consider whether insurer concentration is associated with improved 
clinical outcomes, measured through 30-day unplanned readmission after an inpatient 
admission. I explore these questions using longitudinal, market-level models of inpatient 
utilization for 2013 through 2015, which are identified by within-market variation over 
time in insurer, physician, and hospital market concentration. I construct measures of 
inpatient utilization on the extensive margin as the probability of having an admission 
and on the intensive margin as the price-adjusted spending on professional services 
during an admission using the Truven Health MarketScan Database of Commercial 
Claims. Measures of insurer concentration are constructed from HealthLeaders-





measures of hospital concentration are constructed from American Hospital Association 
data. 
In Paper 2, I consider an alternate explanation for why research suggests that 
insurer concentration and utilization are positively related, physicians inducing demand 
to maintain a higher income in the face of lower negotiated payments. I explore this 
question by focusing on a subset of healthcare services for which different physicians 
have different financial incentives to provide more care: diagnostic imaging. Non-
radiologists who own imaging equipment and can bill for the scan have a strong financial 
incentive to order imaging services for their patients, compared to non-radiologists who 
refer a patient to a radiologist for imaging. I use Truven Health MarketScan data to 
classify orthopedists, neurologists, and urologists as owners or non-owners of imaging 
equipment on the basis of whether they bill for the technical component of an MRI or 
CT. I construct measures of the MRI and CT utilization of their patients in the 30 days 
following an office visit over 2015. I then test whether the effect of insurer concentration 
on the probability of receiving a scan varies significantly across the two groups. If it is 
true that demand inducement contributes to the positive relationship between insurer 
concentration and utilization, the effect of insurer concentration should be larger amongst 
the owner physicians, who have a stronger financial incentive to order imaging. I use 
inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment to achieve covariate balance on 
observable characteristics across patients who visited physician owners of imaging 
equipment and patients who visited non-owners.  
In Paper 3, with co-authors Bradley Herring and Erin Trish, I extend Paper 1’s 





on hospital patients’ experience of care. Using patient experience data from Hospital 
Compare, we estimate hospital/year-level regression models predicting each hospital’s 
patient experience measure over 2008-2015 as a function of insurance and hospital 
market concentration and hospital fixed effects. The model is identified by longitudinal 
variation in insurance and hospital concentration. We also consider how the effect of 
insurer concentration varies with the type of hospital (public, nonprofit independent, 
nonprofit part of a system, and for-profit), and how it varies with the level of insurance 
and hospital concentration. 
I conclude by synthesizing the results of the three papers and highlighting future 
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2. Paper 1: How Does Insurance Market Concentration Affect Inpatient 










Health insurance and provider markets in the United States are highly 
concentrated, which affects cost, quality, and access to care. There is prior evidence that 
insurer concentration increases utilization, which is consistent with insurers exercising 
countervailing bargaining power against concentrated hospitals/physicians and 
negotiating lower prices that, through downward-sloping demand, result in higher 
utilization. There is also the potential that, if insurers are concentrated enough, they 
exercise monopsonistic market power and constrain utilization. I explore whether more-
recent empirical evidence is consistent with two aspects of theoretical economic 
behavior. First, is the effect of insurer concentration on utilization larger for services for 
which downward-sloping demand is more elastic? Second, is the effect of insurer market 
concentration larger in more concentrated physician markets, where physicians are more 
able to elevate prices above marginal cost, and in less concentrated insurer markets, 





whether higher utilization associated with insurer concentration improves clinical 
outcomes to assess the key policy question of whether insurer price negotiation is 
increasing patient access to care or unintentionally exacerbating inefficient use of costly 
services. 
I explore these questions using longitudinal, market-level models of inpatient 
utilization for 2013 through 2015, which are identified by within-market variation over 
time in insurer, physician, and hospital market concentration. I construct measures of the 
likelihood of an inpatient admission (i.e., the extensive margin) and the price-adjusted 
spending on professional services during an admission (i.e., the intensive margin), each 
adjusted for individual characteristics, using Truven Health MarketScan data. Measures 
of insurer concentration are constructed from HealthLeaders-InterStudy data, measures of 
physician concentration are constructed from CMS data, and measures of hospital 
concentration are constructed from American Hospital Association data. To explore 
whether demand elasticity modifies the effect of insurer concentration, I estimate separate 
models for one set of more price-sensitive planned admissions and a second set of less 
price-sensitive acute admissions. To explore the role of relative market power between 
insurers and physicians, I compare the effect of insurer concentration on utilization 
between high and low baseline levels of concentration in physician and insurance 
markets. Finally, I estimate models predicting unplanned 30-day readmission rates to 
explore the net effect on clinical outcomes. 
Overall, a 1,000-point increase in insurer concentration increases the likelihood of 
an inpatient admission by 0.09 percentage points (p=0.04) and increases price-adjusted 





expectations linked to insurer negotiation of provider prices, insurer concentration does 
not affect treatment intensity of more price-inelastic acute admissions, but increases 
price-adjusted spending on more price-elastic planned admissions by $200.53 (p=0.005), 
or 3.4% of the mean. For the results dependent on baseline levels of market 
concentration, the findings are mixed. The effect of insurer concentration on price-
adjusted spending is, as expected, driven by markets that had relatively unconcentrated 
insurance markets, but is, contrary to expectation, also driven by relatively 
unconcentrated physician markets. Lastly, insurer concentration does not decrease the 
patient’s likelihood of a readmission. These results are consistent with concentrated 
insurers negotiating lower provider prices and, in turn, higher patient utilization of non-





Both health insurance and healthcare provider markets in the United States have a 
high degree of concentration and have become more concentrated over time. The 
combined national market share of the four largest insurers, for example, was 83% in 
2014, and the average hospital and physician market is moderately or highly concentrated 
(Dafny 2015, Baker et. al 2014, Health Care Cost Institute 2015). A large literature is 
dedicated to what concentrated markets mean for patients, in terms of costs, quality, and 
access to care. Particularly for insurance markets, the theoretical predictions surrounding 
concentration and outcomes are often ambiguous. On one hand, insurers in concentrated 
markets may be able to negotiate lower prices with providers, which could be welfare 
increasing for consumers. At the same time, these insurers may not pass these savings on 
to consumers and may instead use their market power to charge higher premiums. 
Likewise, the effect of insurer market concentration on volume is theoretically 
ambiguous, as volume might either increase or decrease if the purchaser of a good or 
service (in this case, an insurer) has more market power. Given this broad theoretical 
uncertainty about the effects of insurer concentration, additional analysis is needed to 
understand the ways in which insurer concentration affects volume, and how that varies 
by market. 
Pauly (1998) presents a conceptual framework for the effect of a managed care 
organization’s (MCO) buying power on healthcare prices and volume. In a provider-
market (hospital or physician) monopoly, a concentrated MCO can exercise monopoly-
busting power, moving the market closer to a competitive outcome with lower healthcare 





provider-market is competitive, a concentrated MCO may hypothetically exercise 
monopsony power, limiting quantity and pushing price down the supply curve, resulting 
in both prices and quantity that are below the competitive equilibrium. Their ability to 
limit quantity may depend on the exercise of monopoly power as sellers of health plans, 
using tools like covered benefits, claims review, and high cost-sharing. In both cases, 
concentrated MCO markets put downward pressure on healthcare prices, but because the 
effect on quantity is divergent, Pauly argued that the observed relationship between 
insurance concentration and volume could serve as a test of whether MCOs in a given 
market provide countervailing bargaining power (i.e., higher volume through lower 
healthcare prices) or exercise monopsonistic market power (i.e., lower volume through 
managed care). Bates and Santerre (2008) and McKellar et al. (2014) provide empirical 
evidence of a positive relationship between insurer concentration and volume, suggesting 
that insurer concentration plays a role by pushing healthcare markets towards a 
competitive outcome. 
Because insurance shields patients from the full cost of healthcare, the 
competitive outcome may nevertheless contribute to inefficiently high spending. The 
U.S. healthcare system is known for having high levels of spending that are 
incommensurate with its relatively poor outcomes. For example, the United States has the 
highest per-capita utilization of costly diagnostic imaging services (Squires and Anderson 
2015, Emanuel and Fuchs 2008). One study on waste in the U.S. healthcare system 
estimates that overtreatment accounted for between $158 and $226 billion in unnecessary 
spending in 2011 (Berwick and Hackbarth 2012). In light of this, understanding the role 





translates to improvements in clinical outcomes is an important concern for policy-
makers, particularly antitrust regulators. 
Using data from HealthLeaders-InterStudy, Truven Health MarketScan, the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the American Hospital 
Association, this paper estimates longitudinal, market-level models of inpatient 
healthcare utilization as a function of insurer concentration, measured using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and other confounders. The models are identified by 
within-market changes in concentration from 2013 to 2015, with market fixed effects 
controlling for time-invariant confounding factors that might correlate with both market 
concentration and healthcare utilization. Market-level healthcare utilization is measured 
on both the extensive margin, as the probability of having an admission, and on the 
intensive margin, as the intensity of physician and other professional services provided 
during an inpatient admission, each adjusted for individual characteristics. I find that a 
1,000-point increase in insurer HHI increases both utilization measures by approximately 
2%. Further, this paper distinguishes between admissions that are likely planned in 
advance versus those that are acute. For the former, demand is (on average) more 
downward-sloping, and hence the Pauly (1998) model predicts relatively larger effects; 
the latter acute admissions are (on average) highly insensitive to healthcare price. 
Consistent with expectations, I find no effect of insurance concentration on acute 
utilization, but that a 1,000-point increase in insurer concentration increases intensive 
utilization for planned admissions by approximately 3.4%. 
This paper also explores whether the effect of insurer concentration depends on 





which an insurer is able to exercise monopoly-busting (or monopsonistic) market power 
presumably depends on the level of insurer and physician concentration. In particular, I 
estimate stratified models to test whether the effect is higher in concentrated physician 
markets, where physicians are presumably able to exercise market power to hold 
healthcare prices farther above marginal cost, and hence where the exercise of 
countervailing bargaining power by insurers to lower these prices would increase 
utilization. And I also test whether the effect is larger in less concentrated insurer 
markets, where sufficient competition from other insurers for patients might prevent 
insurers from exercising marginal increases in (monopsonistic) market power to constrain 
demand for healthcare services. While I indeed detect a larger effect of insurer 
concentration among less concentrated insurer markets, I instead find, contrary to 
expectations, a larger effect of insurer concentration within less concentrated physician 
markets; this suggests that physicians may exercise market power even in relatively 
unconcentrated markets, and perhaps that marginal increases in insurer concentration are 
more impactful when providers are less concentrated. Finally, this paper explores the 
effect of insurance concentration on hospital readmissions, in order to help discern 
whether higher utilization associated with insurer consolidation translates to improved 
clinical outcomes due to improved access to care, but finds no beneficial effect.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
This paper builds on a large literature exploring the effect of market concentration 
on patients. Both health insurance and provider markets in the United States have a high 





Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the sum of the squared market shares of all 
competitors in a market, which equals 10,000 in a perfectly monopolistic and approaches 
0 in a perfectly competitive market (Department of Justice 2018). The Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission generally consider markets with an HHI of 
between 1,500 and 2,500 to be moderately concentrated and markets with an HHI greater 
than 2,500 to be highly concentrated. Data from 2014 indicates that the average HHI for 
health insurance markets across states was 4,497 in the large group market, 3,860 in the 
small group market, and 4,226 in the individual market (The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2018). Moreover, the combined market share of the four largest insurers is 
estimated to have grown from an already high level of 74% in 2006 to 83% in 2014 
(Dafny 2015). On the provider side, a Health Care Cost Institute (2015) study reports a 
mean CBSA-level hospital HHI of 1,885 in 2013 (where CBSA stands for Core-Based 
Statistical Area). Baker et al. (2014) report mean specialty-specific physician HHIs 
ranging from 1,744 in the least concentrated specialty (internal medicine) to 4,648 in the 
most concentrated specialty (urology) in 2010. Hence, even in the physician specialties 
with relatively low barriers to entry, the average market is moderately concentrated. 
The degree of concentration in healthcare markets has been shown to influence a 
number of outcomes, with a large literature focusing on the relationship between market 
concentration and healthcare price and quality, predominantly focusing on hospital 
markets. Gaynor, Ho and Town (2015) provide a recent review of this literature, and 
Gaynor and Town (2011) provide an older but more thorough review. Across a range of 
methodological approaches, including studies that attempt to instrument for hospital HHI 





mergers to control hospitals, the evidence suggests that hospital market concentration 
pushes prices upward. The relationship between hospital concentration and quality (also 
reviewed by Gaynor and Town 2011 and Gaynor, Ho and Town 2015) is less conclusive, 
with most studies in an administered price setting (like Medicare in the U.S. and the 
National Health Service in England) finding that hospital consolidation is harmful to 
quality, but studies in commercial settings finding evidence in both directions. 
Due mainly to data limitations, the literature on both physician markets and 
insurance markets is smaller and more recent. The few studies of physician markets have 
similarly found a positive relationship between provider market concentration and price. 
For example, Schneider et al. (2008) examine the effect of health plan and physician 
organization HHI on prices in California and find no effect for health plan HHI but, for 
most categories studied, a positive relationship between price and physician HHI. Baker 
et al. (2014) examine the relationship between physician HHI and a county-level price 
index for office visits separately for 10 specialties and find that prices were between 
8.3% and 16.1% higher in the counties in the 90th percentile of the HHI distribution 
compared to the 10th percentile. Focusing on cardiologists and orthopedists, Dunn and 
Shapiro (2014) also find that physician market concentration leads to higher physician 
prices. 
Additionally, several studies have documented that insurance market 
concentration puts downward pressure on provider prices. Moriya et al. (2010) use a 
longitudinal design with market fixed effects to find that insurer HHI decreases hospital 
price, while hospital HHI does not have a significant effect. McKellar et al. (2014) use a 





Melnick et al. (2011) also find that health plan concentration decreases hospital prices, 
but find, consistent with much of the rest of the literature, that hospital market 
concentration increases prices as well. Likewise, in a study based on the Netherlands, in a 
specification based on a Structure-Conduct-Performance model, Halbersma et al. (2011) 
find that the hospital concentration increases prices, while insurer concentration 
decreases prices. While Trish and Herring (2015) focus their analysis on insurance 
premiums rather than service prices, they find that an insurer HHI measure more relevant 
to the negotiation between insurers and hospitals is associated with a decrease in 
premiums, presumably a result of lower negotiated prices, while a hospital HHI measure 
is associated with an increase in premiums, presumably a result of higher negotiated 
prices. (For an alternative insurer HHI measure more relevant to the negotiation between 
insurers and employers, insurer concentration is associated with increases in premiums, 
likely a function of concentrated insurers claiming more profits).1  
Conversely, however, Ho and Lee (2017) find that healthcare prices may increase 
or decrease when an insurer exits the market, depending on whether hospitals are able to 
extract price increases from the higher premium charged to patients, or whether the 
remaining insurers are able to negotiate lower prices. In their studies of physician 
markets, both Schneider et al. (2008) and Dunn and Shapiro (2014) find a largely null 
relationship between insurer or health plan HHI and provider price. While the results 
across these studies are not entirely consistent, with some studies reporting null findings 
on either provider or insurer HHI, the balance of evidence suggests a positive relationship 
                                                        
1 Other studies have also documented a positive relationship between insurer HHI and premiums or 






between price and provider HHI and a negative relationship between price and insurer 
HHI. 
A few studies have explored the relationship between insurance or provider 
market characteristics and volume. Regarding insurance market concentration and 
volume, Bates and Santerre (2008) use firm-size and the number of firms to instrument 
for insurer concentration and find that hospital volume rises with insurer concentration. 
McKellar et al. (2014) find a negative relationship between insurer market concentration 
and commercial healthcare price and a positive relationship with utilization, with a 
negative net relationship on spending. They observe no effect for hospital market 
concentration. In terms of health plan generosity, Pelech (2018) provides evidence from 
Medicare Advantage that market exit by insurers results in reduced generosity of the 
health plans remaining on the market. 
Regarding provider market concentration and volume, Dunn and Shapiro (2017) 
analyze physician market competition’s effect on volume and find that more intensive 
treatment for myocardial infarction patients was provided by cardiologists in more 
concentrated cardiology markets, and that there were fewer readmissions. Because they 
focus on emergent treatment for which the patient’s demand is inelastic and treatment 
decisions are likely made solely by providers, their results suggest that physicians 
respond to financial incentives by providing more services when payments are higher. 
This research makes several key contributions to this literature. First, it adds 
evidence related to the impact of insurer concentration on utilization using longitudinal 
models with recent data. It incorporates measures of physician concentration, and 





the effect of insurance concentration on utilization. It distinguishes between the effect of 
insurance concentration on utilization for categories of admissions for which demand is 
more and less price-sensitive. Finally, it adds to an emerging literature on the relationship 
between insurance concentration and quality (Hanson, Herring and Trish 2018). 
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
As previously noted, Pauly (1998) provides a useful framework for thinking about 
health insurance market power and how utilization can (theoretically) be used to 
distinguish between a concentrated MCO busting the exercise of market pricing power by 
healthcare providers versus a concentrated MCO exercising its own (monopsonistic) 
market power. In the remainder of this section, I summarize the model and highlight 
some of its key implications. ln the following section, I provide an overview of the key 
empirical analyses I conduct and relate them to this conceptual framework.  
The intuition of Pauly’s model is easiest understood in the case of a single 
monopoly seller of health services (i.e., a hospital system or physician practice) and a 
single monopsony buyer (an MCO). Note that this refers to the market interaction 
between insurers and healthcare providers; a monopsonist insurer may be a monopoly 
seller of MCO products to employers and individuals, if the geographic markets for 
health plans and health services are comparable. If both markets are competitive, or if 
they exert comparable levels of countervailing bargaining power against each other, the 
outcome is determined by the intersection of supply and demand. If instead the hospital 
system is a monopolist and insurers have no market power, the hospital provides the 





curve and sets the price at the willingness-to-pay implied by the demand curve. And if the 
insurer is a monopsonist and hospitals have no market power, the insurer purchases the 
quantity determined by the intersection of market demand and the marginal factor curve, 
which lies above the competitive market supply curve, and sets the price at the lowest 
price at which providers will supply that quantity.2 
Hence, Pauly notes that relative to the scenario with a single provider exerting 
monopoly power, the competitive outcome has a lower healthcare price. Likewise, 
relative to the competitive outcome, the scenario with a single insurer exerting 
monopsony power has an even lower price. In both cases, the concentrated insurance 
market puts downward pressure on prices. However, the effect on quantity in these two 
situations is opposite. Moving towards the competitive outcome from a provider 
monopoly outcome increases the quantity (due to insurer pressure on prices indirectly 
affecting quantity), while moving away from the competitive outcome towards an insurer 
monopsony outcome decreases the quantity (due to insurer pressure directly on quantity). 
In practice, there are very few, if any, markets characterized by a single buyer or 
seller. However, the framework can still be used to conceptualize the exercise of market 
power that, on the one hand, leads closer to a competitive outcome, or on the other, closer 
to a monopsony outcome. While this framework was proposed in the context of managed 
care HMOs in the 1990s, when MCOs are assumed to have tighter control over quantity 
than is likely true of most health plans in the United States today, insurers still have tools 
                                                        
2 The marginal factor curve lies above the supply curve because, if the monopsonistic insurer purchases an 
additional unit, as the sole purchaser, the insurer pays a higher rate for that additional unit and for all the 
units up to that unit. This is parallel logic to the more familiar monopolist case, where marginal revenue 
lies below demand because if the monopolist chooses to sell an additional (lower-price) unit, the price of all 





like covered benefits, cost-sharing, claims review, and in some plan types, gatekeeping, 
to constrain quantity. Their ability to utilize these tools, which are unpopular with 
patients, presumably depends on the extent to which insurers have market power as 
sellers of health plans. 
One implication of Pauly’s model, which assumes that demand slopes downward, 
is that the elasticity of the demand curve determines how large the effect of insurer 
concentration on utilization will be.3 If the quantity demanded is not related to healthcare 
price, changes in the negotiated price would not affect utilization. Past research indicates 
that the demand for healthcare is on average downward sloping, with the Rand Health 
Insurance Experiment suggesting a price elasticity of -0.2 (Manning et al. 1987). 
However, evidence suggests the demand for some services (like appendectomy) is almost 
perfectly inelastic, while the demand for more elective services is somewhat sensitive to 
price (see, e.g., Duarte (2012) and Kowalski (2016)). 
While it is generally true that a competitive outcome is more efficient than a 
monopoly outcome, in healthcare the competitive outcome is not necessarily efficient. 
Because of moral hazard, lower healthcare prices may translate to inefficiently high 
levels of utilization. As insured patients are shielded from the full cost of care, as long as 
the marginal benefit to them is greater than their out-of-pocket cost, they are incentivized 
to consume beyond the point at which their marginal benefit equals the total cost of care. 
Pauly (1968) described this as a prisoner’s dilemma, because even if an individual 
recognizes that high levels of utilization push up health insurance premiums and that 
everyone would be better off by reducing utilization, the individual’s incentive is still to 
                                                        





overutilize. High provider prices resulting from high provider concentration may 
paradoxically lead to reductions in inefficient overutilization.  
The Pauly (1998) model for MCO market concentration is also complicated by 
the unique nature of healthcare, in which the physician’s expertise enables him or her to 
affect the patient’s demand for services. Physicians may act as a perfect agent for the 
patient, but more likely, they are motivated by both altruism and by their own financial 
self-interest. For example, McGuire and Pauly (1991) present a mathematical model of 
physician behavior under different fees, in which physicians may respond to a fee change 
by inducing demand for their services and/or by substituting the volume of services 
provided across their mix of patients, balancing the marginal utility of treating patients 
with the higher profit margin with the disutility of inducement. Dunn and Shapiro (2017) 
provide empirical evidence related to this, with cardiologists in more concentrated 
markets, presumably with higher prices, providing more intensive treatment.  
 
2.4 Overview of Empirical Analyses 
 In order to estimate how insurer concentration affects utilization and whether the 
empirical evidence offers support for Pauly’s model for MCO concentration, this paper’s 
analyses makes two important distinctions between the types of utilization. One 
distinguishes between the extensive and intensive margin by creating separate measures 
of the likelihood of having an admission and of the intensity of services provided during 
an admission. The second distinction explores whether the effect of insurer concentration 
on utilization varies across admissions for which demand is more and less inelastic, as 





concentration on utilization compares across markets where healthcare providers and 
insurers have varying levels of market power. Finally, it explores how higher utilization 
affects clinical outcomes, measured as readmission. The motivation and framework for 
these analyses is described immediately below, while a detailed description of the data 
sources and construction of the variables follows in Section 2.5 and a description of the 
statistical models examining insurance concentration’s effect on utilization follows in 
Section 2.6. 
 
2.4.1 Overall Utilization on the Extensive and Intensive Margin 
Broadly speaking, there are two means by which insurer concentration may affect 
inpatient utilization. First, an enrollee may become more or less likely to have an 
inpatient admission. Second, conditional on having an admission, a patient may be 
provided with more or fewer services. In order to capture both of these mechanisms, two 
measures of volume are constructed, one capturing the extensive margin, as the 
probability of having any inpatient admission, and one capturing the intensive margin, as 
the intensity-weighted volume of services provided in an admission. The conceptual 
model predicts that the exercise of monopoly-busting power should cause utilization to 
increase with increases in insurer concentration, but does not suggest whether one or both 
of these mechanisms underlie the relationship. Moreover, measuring utilization on both 
margins is important to account for the possibility that more concentrated insurers may be 
better able to target less complex cases to the (cheaper) outpatient setting (decreasing 
extensive utilization), leaving more complex, higher-need patients in the inpatient setting 





Before proceeding, it is important to note that this research focuses on interactions 
between insurers and physicians (not hospitals), but focuses on utilization provided in an 
inpatient setting. This is because, for both of these measures of utilization, the physician 
is arguably more important in determining the level of utilization than the hospital 
facility. For the extensive margin of an admission, the physician is generally either 
deciding to admit, or for more discretionary services, helping the patient decide; and for 
the intensive margin of service-intensity for an admission, the physicians is likewise 
deciding what services to provide, or advising the patient on the appropriate services. For 
example, Pauly and Redisch (1973) treat the non-profit hospital as a physician 
cooperative organized to maximize physicians’ net income. Ellis and McGuire (1986) 
posit a theory of physician behavior in which physicians make treatment decisions, 
maximizing their own utility as a function of benefits to the patient and profit to the 
hospital. Empirically, there is a large literature exploring how physicians respond to 
financial incentives in an inpatient context (see, e.g., Dunn and Shapiro (2017), Grant 
(2009), Yip (1998)). Because clinicians play a large role in patient decision-making (and 
may fully supplant patient decision-making for some types of acute treatments), perhaps 
to the extent of inducing demand, professional service utilization is arguably the most 
appropriate measure on the intensive side. Moreover, a physician’s decision-making 
about appropriate medical care presumably serves as the trigger for many types of facility 
fees. 
For the intensive measure of service intensity, therefore, this analysis focuses on 
the services provided by healthcare professionals, referred to as professional services, 





laboratory and imaging equipment, and medical/surgical supplies. While it is true that 
facility services make up the majority of total spending in an inpatient admission, there is 
another reason to prefer a measure based on professional services (beyond the importance 
of physician decision-making). The revenue codes used for facility billing vary greatly in 
specificity in claims data, making it difficult to credibly measure intensity across 
hospitals.4 Moreover, the degree of specificity in the codes used may depend on how the 
insurer compensates the hospital, whether it is on a fee-for-service basis, with a per-diem, 
or with an episode-based payment (as in Medicare’s Diagnostic Related Group payment 
system). By contrast, professional services are based on the more standardized Current 
Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes, which is the basis for how most individual 
providers are paid, under both Medicare and private insurance, meaning there should be 
coding consistency across hospitals.  
 
2.4.2 Planned versus Acute Treatments 
The analyses also explore how differences in the elasticity of demand affect the 
relationship between insurance concentration and utilization, by identifying a set of 
admissions for acute diagnoses generally requiring immediate treatment and a set of 
admissions for diagnoses likely to have been scheduled in advance. Planned treatments 
may permit price-shopping between providers, a comparison between alternate 
treatments, research on the likely risks/benefits, and other types of strategic decision-
                                                        
4 For example, in some cases, the claim simply lists a facility revenue code of “total charge.” Similarly, 
room and board can be coded as either a general, all-inclusive rate, or be broken into subcategories of room 
type (i.e., private, 2-beds, 3-beds) by department (i.e., pediatric, oncology). There are also concerns about 
the completeness of the revenue codes reported in the data. The MarketScan User Guide notes the 
following of the revenue codes assigned to facility fees: “UB04 revenue codes are retained in the 






making. By contrast, treatment for acute diagnoses requiring immediate treatment offers 
few of these opportunities and patients are likely to defer to their physician. The 
monopoly-busting model of a concentrated insurer predicts an effect on volume only if 
the demand curve is downward-sloping, implying that there should be a larger effect of 
insurance concentration on volume for planned treatments (for which demand is more 
elastic) than for acute treatments.5 
The method to identify acute and planned conditions is loosely based on Card, 
Dobkin, and Maestas (2009), which identified acute conditions as a set of diagnosis codes 
for which admission through the Emergency Department was as likely on a Saturday or 
Sunday as on a weekday (or, in other words, diagnoses for which the share of weekend 
admissions through the Emergency Department was statistically equal to 2/7 or 0.286). 
Following the intuition that conditions requiring immediate treatment should not be less 
likely to occur on the weekend, the set of DRGs with a share of weekend admissions of 
0.25 or higher are classified as acute. Conversely, the set of DRGs with a share of 
weekend admissions of 0.15 or below are classified as planned. Appendix Table 2.1 lists 
the DRGs assigned to each category. The list of planned conditions includes Cesarean 
section, joint replacement, spinal fusion, and obesity procedures, among others. The list 
of acute conditions includes septicemia, hemorrhage, pneumonia, poisoning, and 
myocardial infarction. While planned utilization should not in general be thought of as 
unnecessary utilization or overutilization, there is evidence that some of these planned 
                                                        
5 To the extent that there is a meaningful volume effect for acute conditions, it may be driven by reverse 
causality. Insurers may make consolidation decisions in response to high levels of utilization, and would 
presumably due so in response to both planned and acute utilization. It may also be driven by physician-
driven responses to payment incentives, with physicians inducing demand when prices are lower, which 
Dunn and Shapiro (2017) suggests is possible even in acute settings (though they find evidence of higher 





conditions are related to overuse, including unnecessary joint replacement surgery in the 
United States for patients with mild loss of mobility (Lam, Teutsch, and Fielding 2018), 
and high rates of C-Section, which are compensated above vaginal delivery (Teleki 
2017).  
I use this classification for acute versus planned admissions based on DRG to 
construct additional market-level measures of both extensive and intensive utilization; 
i.e., acute extensive utilization, planned extensive utilization, acute intensive utilization, 
and planned intensive utilization. As the 0.25 and 0.15 thresholds for identifying acute 
and planned admissions are somewhat arbitrary, I test the sensitivity to using alternate cut 
points. 
 
2.4.3 Market Stratifications 
Additionally, the Pauly model for MCO concentration implies that the effect of 
changes in insurance concentration may depend on the level of provider and insurer 
concentration. First, the idea of insurers counteracting market power pre-supposes that 
providers were exercising market power to begin with. Though market concentration is 
not a perfect measure of market power, Pauly’s model suggests that increases in insurer 
concentration should have a larger effect in provider markets that were initially 
concentrated, and hence where providers were likely able to hold healthcare prices farther 
above marginal cost at baseline.  
Pauly’s model also implies that the effect of a change in insurance concentration 
depends on the baseline level of insurer concentration. From the insurer’s perspective, if 





insurers have an incentive to dampen utilization via, for example, claims review, changes 
in covered benefits, or cost-sharing. At the (hypothetical) extreme, a monopsonist insurer 
could constrain demand to impose the decreases in utilization hypothesized in the Pauly 
model. By contrast, an insurer may be less able to dampen utilization in an 
unconcentrated insurance market, where competition from other health plans increases 
the pressure to provide more generous insurance. Though the commercially-insured 
beneficiaries in this analysis primarily receive coverage through a self-insured employer, 
and hence the insurer negotiating lower prices does not typically bear the risk, several of 
these mechanisms are still applicable. For example, the insurer providing third-party 
administrator services likely does not distinguish between fully- and self-insured claims 
when it conducts claims review. 
 In order to explore how the level of provider and insurer market concentration 
affects the relationship between insurer concentration and utilization, I estimate stratified 
models of intensive and extensive utilization (and acute vs. planned utilization) based on 
the degree of market concentration in the baseline year. As the analysis focuses on 
professional fees, I treat physician concentration as the primary measure of provider 
concentration for the purposes of market stratifications. 
 
2.4.4 Readmissions 
To the extent that insurance market concentration increases utilization, a natural 
question is whether those increases translate into quality improvements. On one hand, the 
insurer’s bargaining power might reduce healthcare prices and improve access to high-





for provider prices, as previously noted, may be inefficient because the patient does not 
typically face the full cost of care. To explore this issue surrounding consumer welfare, I 
conduct additional analyses exploring the effect of insurer concentration on a relatively 
narrow measure of quality, namely unplanned 30-day readmissions after a discharge. 
Readmissions are, of course, related to utilization, and so another way of framing this 
issue is whether higher intensive utilization decreases the probability of (additional) 
extensive utilization. 
 
2.5 Data Measures for Market Concentration and Utilization 
 In order to explore the questions outlined above, this paper’s analyses use a 
longitudinal study design, with the effect of insurer concentration on utilization identified 
by variation within a market over time. I construct measures of insurer, physician, and 
hospital concentration from HealthLeaders-InterStudy, Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) publicly available files, and American Hospital Association 
(AHA) Annual Survey data, respectively. I use individual-level data on healthcare 
utilization for the commercially-insured population from the Truven Health MarketScan 
Database of Commercial Claims to construct several market-level measures of utilization 
(i.e., extensive vs. intensive, planned vs. acute) that control for variation in individual 
characteristics, including age, gender, plan type, and comorbidities. Additional data on 
market-level confounders comes from a variety of publicly available sources. A detailed 
description of data sources, variable measurement, and construction of the analytic 
sample follows. (The description of the statistical models and sensitivity analyses is 





2.5.1 Measurement of Market Concentration 
As noted previously, a standard measure of market concentration is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Measuring the HHI requires defining the relevant 
geographic and product market. The measures of insurance market concentration relevant 
to negotiated provider prices were developed by Trish and Herring (2015) using 
HealthLeaders-InterStudy data. The product market was defined as enrollment across all 
self-insured and fully-insured private plans and the geographic market is defined as Core-
Based Statistical Areas. For the 11 largest CBSAs, which are further divided into smaller 
metropolitan divisions, these smaller areas were used. As these markets are based on 
commuting patterns, and hence economic activity, they represent a reasonable geographic 
area for insurers to compete within. (As previously noted, CBSAs have also been used in 
previous literature). Core-Based Statistical Areas generally line up with the Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas used in the Truven Health MarketScan data, but as necessary, 
geographic areas are aggregated by taking an average weighted by population. 
Measures of physician market concentration derive from archived CMS Physician 
Compare data from March 2014, April 2015, and April 2016 and the Medicare Physician 
and Other Supplier Data for 2013-2015, both publicly available data sources.6 The 
Physician Compare data includes physician-level data on specialty, credential, practice 
locations, and critically, a group practice identifier that can be used to link physicians 
operating under the same practice. (It is not possible to measure physician concentration 
using the Truven Health MarketScan data, as the data does not contain any information 
about affiliations between physicians.) The CMS Supplier Public Use Files (PUFs) 
                                                        
6 Physician Compare data available here: https://data.medicare.gov/data/archives/physician-compare. 





include physician-level data on the total Medicare allowed amounts paid to each 
physician each year, which is the product market in my measures of market share. 
Because the appropriate geographic market likely varies with the type of service being 
provided, with the geographic market for primary care physicians smaller than for 
specialist physicians, the geographic market for family practice physicians is defined as 
the county. For all other specialties, the geographic market is defined as the CBSA and 
the metropolitan divisions therein. For all specialties, however, concentration measures 
are aggregated to the Truven MSA level, weighted by population. 
Because these physician concentration measures are specialty-specific, I combine 
them into a single summary physician concentration measure that aggregates across the 
10 largest physician specialties that are measurable in the CMS data. (Pediatrics and 
obstetrics/gynecology cannot be measured, but the sample is limited to adults, and the 
findings are robust to constructing utilization measures that exclude obstetric or 
gynecologic admissions.) Each specialty receives a weight based on the proportion of 
procedures attributed to that specialty for the set of DRGs used in the intensive volume 
analysis (described below). As a sensitivity analysis, I calculate these weights separately 
by market, so that each market receives its own combination of weights (but these 
weights were held constant over time). These measures are weighted towards physicians 
in internal medicine, cardiology, and family practice. A detailed explanation of how I use 
these files to create measures of physician concentration is available in Appendix 2A.  
For hospital market concentration, the product market is inpatient days. The 
market shares of hospitals in hospital systems are summed for these calculations. 





divisions described above. 
 
2.5.2 Individual-Level Sample Definition 
As noted previously, I use commercial claims from Truven Health MarketScan to 
construct measures of market-level utilization. This population primarily consists of 
beneficiaries receiving insurance from a self-insured employer or from smaller health 
plans, and covers a broad but not nationally representative geographic area. The sample 
of beneficiaries used to create the yearly utilization measures for 2013-2015 excludes 
those enrolled for a partial year. In other words, someone enrolled from July 2013-
January 2015 contributes data to the 2014, but not 2013 or 2015 utilization measure. The 
analysis is limited to adults aged 18 or above and aged 64 or below. Enrollees in Puerto 
Rico, with a geographic location of Nation (region unknown), and in non-metro areas are 
dropped from the analysis. For the extensive measures of having any inpatient utilization, 
I restrict the sample to enrollees who were never enrolled in an HMO or capitated plan 
during the course of a year. For the intensive measures of the intensity of inpatient 
utilization, I restrict the sample to enrollees who never had a capitated claim during that 
year. Claims with no health plan type listed are dropped. The primary sample restricts to 
full-year enrollees, but sensitivity analyses include a sample enrolled for a year prior to 
the observation year (without restrictions on the observation year enrollment) and a 








2.5.3 Measurement of Individual-Level Utilization 
 For the individual-level data, I measure utilization on the extensive margin as 
simply a binary indicator for having any inpatient admission over the course of a year. 
Measurement for the intensive margin is more complex. Adapting the general method 
that has been used in several papers (see, e.g., Dunn, Shapiro, and Liebman (2013) and 
McKellar et al. (2014), I create a utilization index that re-prices professional services 
using the mean for that billing code across the entire sample and then sums an 
individual’s spending on these re-priced services over the period of an inpatient 
admission. Specifically, if !̅
#
 is defined as the mean price for service s administered 
during an admission a to a patient living in market i in year t, the price-adjusted 
professional spending for that individual’s admission, $
%&'









This value can be interpreted as the dollar value of the intensity of services provided in an 
admission. Mean prices are calculated for each CPT code based on the sum of all covered 
payments (inclusive of the insurer’s payment and the patient’s out-of-pocket expenses) 
for inpatient services. This method therefore removes price variation from the measure 
but captures the variation in the types and intensity of services across markets, assigning 









2.5.4 Measurement of Individual-Level Readmissions 
In order to measure clinical quality, I construct a measure of 30-day all-cause 
unexplained readmissions using the Truven Health MarketScan data in order to test for 
the effect of insurance market concentration on quality of care. The measure follows the 
CMS method for identifying all-cause unplanned hospital readmissions (YNHHS/CORE 
2012), supplemented by a revision to account for updates to diagnostic and procedural 
coding systems (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2017). Following the CMS 
method, certain inpatient admissions are dropped from the sample of index admissions 
(i.e., admissions that ended in discharge against medical advice), and admissions for 
CMS-designated planned procedures (i.e., pregnancy) are not counted as readmissions.7 
CMS identifies 5 patient cohorts with broadly similar readmission patterns, and this 
analysis uses the same approach to constructing cohorts. 
 
2.5.5 Individual-Level Control Variables 
The Truven Health MarketScan data includes limited demographic information, 
including sex and age. I use the pre-coded categorical age variables of 18-34, 35-44, 45-
54, and 55-64 in this analysis. After removing enrollees with capitated claims, Truven 
Health MarketScan includes indicators for the following health plan types: 
comprehensive, exclusive provider organization (EPO), point of service (POS), preferred 
provider organization (PPO), consumer-directed health plan (CDHP), and high-
deductible health plan (HDHP). Most models include binary indicators for the enrollee’s 
health plan at the time of the encounter. However, for the models used to construct the 
                                                        
7 Note this CMS definition of “planned” does not correspond to the definition of “planned” used in the 





measures of extensive utilization, where the outcome is measured over a year rather than 
a single admission, plan type enters the analysis as a continuous variable measuring the 
share of the year that the enrollee spent in each plan. 
Adjustments to individual-level utilization based on health status use Version 22 
of Medicare’s Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCC), a set of 79 health condition 
indicators mapped from ICD diagnosis codes.8 I assign yearly HCC codes to enrollees 
based on all the diagnoses appearing on any of their claims over a year. This method 
accounts for both pre-existing conditions and for diagnoses following from their health 
care encounter. While age, gender, and health status are the only individual-level data 
available in the MarketScan data, additional market-level demographic and 
socioeconomic variables, described below, are included in the market-level outcome 
models. 
 
2.5.6 Construction of Market-Level Utilization Measures 
For each of the three sets of individual-level outcomes described above – 
extensive volume, intensive volume, and readmissions – I use the same basic strategy to 
create measures of market-level extensive and intensive utilization and readmissions, 
adapted from McKellar et al. (2014). The goal of this strategy is to use as much data 
about the individual and the type of admission as possible to explain the observed 
utilization and readmission, so that the component of utilization that is unexplainable at 
                                                        
8 As the switchover from the ICD-9 to ICD-10 coding system occurred over the study period, both coding 
systems are present in the data and the HCC mappings were based on the appropriate coding system. 
Crosswalks between the appropriate ICD and CC version were accessed here: 
http://www.nber.org/data/icd-hcc-crosswalk-icd-rxhcc-crosswalk.html. Code on imposing hierarchies was 





the individual level can then be used in a market-level model and explained by market-
level factors. In brief, the individual-level measures are regressed on all of the available 
individual demographic, health, and plan controls, discussed in detail above, and the 
residuals from these models by year and market are used to construct the market-level 
measures used in this analysis. This approach allows the creation of a market-level unit of 
observation, while also making use of all available micro-level data. 
More specifically, in the following specification, $
%&'
 is the individual-level 
outcome measure – either an indicator for an enrollee a having an admission, the measure 
of price-adjusted professional spending over admission a constructed in equation [1], or 







 represent a vector of coefficients corresponding to age group, plan 
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of coefficients corresponding to interactions between sex and age group, plan type and 












































For each outcome, the mean of the residuals C
%&'
 from equation [2] is taken by 
market and year to create a measure of annual market-level utilization left unexplained by 

















This mean residual for the market then serves as the dependent variable in the market-
level models predicting utilization or readmissions as a function of insurance 
concentration. 
While the construction of a market-level measure follows the same basic strategy 
for all outcomes, there are a few details specific to each type of measure. For the 
extensive margin (which measures the likelihood of having an admission) I estimate 
equation [2] with a linear probability model (and logistic regression in a sensitivity 
analysis). The mean residual is then the probability of beneficiaries in a market and year 
having an inpatient admission that could not be explained by their individual 
characteristics. (For ease of interpretation, I multiply these average residuals by 100). As 
noted above, rather than a binary plan type indicator, plan type enters these extensive 
models as the percentage of a year the enrollee belonged to each plan. 
For the intensive utilization measure, I estimate equation [2] separately for the set 
of admissions assigned to each diagnosis related group (DRG) using ordinary linear 
regression. Rather than estimating a single model of inpatient intensive utilization, 
estimating a series of DRG-specific models allows the model to better account for the 
fact that different types of admissions have different mean levels of spending (captured 
via the intercept term), and to account for the fact that the control variables, particularly 
the HCC codes, will predict a different impact on the price-adjusted spending depending 
on the type of admission. I estimate models on the set of DRGs with at least 5,000 
admissions in the sample, which captures over 70% of admissions. This threshold was 
selected based on a statistical power analysis for multiple regression using the G*Power 





100 predictors. The residuals are then aggregated across all models, and the mean by 
market and year reflects unexplained utilization for patients being treated for a broadly 
similar set of diagnoses. Because the residuals are taken from DRG-specific models, a 
market having an above average mean is a function of patients receiving more services 
for the same type of admission, rather than by the market having an above average 
number of admissions with high average spending.  
For the readmissions measure, like that for extensive utilization, I estimate a 
linear probability model. Risk adjustment is based on HCC codes, though unlike the risk 
adjustment in the utilization models, it is based on diagnoses codes from inpatient 
admissions up to a year prior to the index admission, and does not risk adjust for 
diagnoses codes from the index admission that may be a complication of care. In order to 
guarantee a year of risk adjustment data, I restrict the sample to enrollees with two 
continuous years of enrollment, rather than the one year used in the main utilization 
models. I estimate models following the form of equation [2] separately for each of the 
patient cohorts identified in the CMS methodology. Then the mean residual across all 
cohort models is taken by market and year (multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation), 
and so the market-level measure reflects the percentage of patients with an eligible 
admission who then had a readmission within 30-days that could not be explained by 
individual characteristics. 
 
2.5.7 Market-Level Control Variables 
 The analysis of market-level utilization incorporates several market-level control 





socioeconomic information that might correlate with both utilization and insurer 
concentration and which are not available at the individual level. These variables include 
the median real income and percent in poverty from the Census Small Area Income and 
Poverty Estimates (SAIPE), the percent uninsured from the Census Small Area Health 
Insurance Estimates (SAHIE), the unemployment rate from Bureau of Labor Statistic 
Local Area Unemployment Statistics (BLS LAUS), and the percent nonwhite and percent 
with a bachelor’s degree from the Area Health Resource File (AHRF). The market-level 
control variables also include healthcare supply variables that might confound the 
relationship between insurer and provider concentration and utilization, including the 
total number of beds, the number of doctors per 1,000 residents and Medicare Advantage 
penetration, each from the AHRF. Most variables were aggregated from the county to the 
market level using an average weighted by the county population from the AHRF. The 
total number of beds was simply summed. 
 
2.6 Statistical Models for Insurance Concentration’s Effect on Market-
Level Utilization 
The measures of annual market-level utilization (D
&'
) for market i in year t from 
equation [3], for both extensive and intensive utilization, are then used as the dependent 
variable in a model as a function of market concentration and other market confounders 
described above, with market fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobservable 









































 are measures of insurer, physician, and hospital 
concentration, respectively. Marketit is the vector of time-variant market-level control 
variables described above, and R
&
 is a market fixed effect. D5=:
'
 is a set of year indicators. 
The identifying assumption is that the factors confounding the relationship between 
insurance market concentration and healthcare utilization are time invariant from 2013 
through 2015. The parameter of primary interest is J
3
, which measures the effect of an 
increase in insurer HHI on either: for the extensive margin, the percentage of 
beneficiaries with an unexplained inpatient admission; or for the intensive margin, the 
unexplained price-adjusted professional spending on inpatient services. These regressions 
are weighted by the number of observations that generated the mean residual, in order to 
assign more weight to markets for which the outcome could be measured with more 
precision. In all models, I cluster standard errors at the market level. I also estimate 
models in the form of equation [4] for extensive and intensive planned and acute 
utilization. Likewise, models in the form of equation [4] estimate whether insurer HHI 
affects unplanned 30-day readmissions. 
In order to explore whether the effect of insurer HHI on utilization is modified by 
the initial level of market concentration, I estimate stratified models. In particular, I 
estimate Equation [4] separately for markets with low/moderate versus high physician 
market concentration at baseline (2013), and for markets with low/moderate versus high 
insurance market concentration at baseline, with the HHI cutoffs for moderate versus 
high defined at the DOJ level of 2,500. I then estimate these models for each pairwise 
combination of low/moderate versus high physician and insurer concentration at baseline. 





stratified models are conducted using the seemingly unrelated estimation (suest) post-
estimation command in Stata.9 These stratified models by provider and insurer 




As noted above, the effect of insurer concentration on utilization is identified by 
within-market changes in insurer concentration, which over the study period was driven 
by insurers entering and exiting markets, changes in the distribution of market shares of 
existing insurers, and a few small mergers.10 Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the 
changes in insurer HHI over the study period, separately by the baseline level of insurer 
and physician HHI. There are comparable levels of variation across the market 
stratifications, suggesting that null findings across market stratifications are driven by a 
null effect rather than a lack of identifying variation. 
Drawing a causal conclusion from this study depends on the assumption that 
unobservable factors confounding the relationship are constant over the study period. Of 
course, insurer decisions about where to operate and which products to offer are not 
                                                        
9 An alternative approach to test for effect modification is to include interaction terms between the HHI 
measures and binary indicators for the baseline concentration measures. However, this would introduce a 
high degree of correlation between terms.  
10 For example, Medical Mutual exited South Carolina markets and greatly decreased its presence in 
Indiana and Georgia between 2013 and 2014 (“Medical Mutual”). MVP Health Care exited New 
Hampshire markets and increased its presence in several Vermont and New York counties. (“MVP to 
pull”). Aetna and United exited the individual markets in California, though their presence was already 
small (“United HealthCare to Stop”), and Health Care Service Corporation expanded its presence in several 
Montana counties in 2014, perhaps following from its merger with Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Montana in 
2013 (“Blue Cross of Montana”). Between 2013 and 2014, 46 states experienced a decrease in the number 
of insurers in the individual market, with fewer states experiencing a decrease in the small and large group 
market, and 123 insurers, mostly very small, entered a market (“ACA Round-up”). There were no large 





random. They depend, for example, on the level of physician and hospital market 
concentration, which affects their ability to negotiate lower rates. To the extent possible, 
these time-variant factors (such as provider market concentration) are controlled for in 
the model. 
However, there are a few specific threats to this identification strategy that this 
research attempts to rule out. Of particular importance to this research is how the level of 
utilization in a market relates to an insurer’s expectations about their profit margin, and 
hence, their decision about whether to enter/exit a market or pursue a merger. Insurers 
may pursue a merger in or exit markets with exogenously high utilization, in which case 
the causal pathway moves from volume to insurer concentration, rather than from insurer 
concentration to volume. This threat is arguably tested by the analysis of the effect on 
acute utilization. If it is true that insurers consolidate in response to increasing utilization, 
that should be true for any type of utilization, including for acute treatments unlikely to 
be affected by patient demand (but affected by changes in underlying health status or 
potentially by provider behavior). 
Along these same lines, it is possible that changes in the (unobserved) health or 
insurance status of the underlying population are related to both insurer consolidation and 
utilization. For example, insurers may exit a market where a sicker population narrows 
their profit margin, or enter markets where they expect a healthier patient pool. I explore 
this threat by conducting sensitivity analysis on a sample of beneficiaries that were 
continuously enrolled over the study period. This sample restriction roughly holds 
constant the health of the sample in order to rule out the possibility that the results are 





related changes in the commercially insured population more broadly) that are correlated 
with changes in insurer concentration. It also precludes the possibility of the changes 
being driven by previously uninsured beneficiaries entering the sample with different 
utilization patterns. 
 
2.6.2 Sensitivity Analyses 
In addition to conducting analyses that add credibility to the identification 
strategy, I make several efforts to test the robustness of the results, many of them already 
mentioned. First, I (further) explore the sensitivity to the sample definition, as inclusion 
in the primary sample requires a full year of enrollment, which may bias the sample 
towards beneficiaries that experienced fewer (and less fatal) health shocks and little 
employment churn. I therefore estimate the main model for intensive utilization, and the 
acute and planned intensity models, on a sample that was enrolled for a full year prior to 
the study period, but with no restriction on the observation year’s enrollment. In order to 
use a full year of data for risk adjustment, the hierarchical condition categories are also 
based on the prior year, and so this analysis serves the secondary purpose of testing the 
sensitivity to risk adjusting based on conditions recorded in the year prior to the 
observation period. (Models for extensive utilization are not estimated on this alternative 
sample, as that outcome is measured over a year rather than an admission, making full-
year enrollment a necessary restriction.) 
I also estimate the main models with the alternate summary physician 
concentration measure, mentioned above, which assigns specialty weights specific to 





account for the fact that physician specialists may have more bargaining power in some 
markets than others based on how frequently their services are utilized. Additionally, I 
use two different sets of alternate thresholds to distinguish between acute and planned 
conditions, one defining the groups more broadly and one more restrictively. Acute 
conditions are defined alternately as DRGs with a weekend share of admissions of at least 
0.20 and as DRGs with a weekend share of admissions between 0.26 and 0.31. Likewise, 
planned conditions are defined as those with a weekend share of below 0.20, and as those 
with a weekend share below 0.08. 
Given the skewness in healthcare spending with a long right tail in the distribution 
of individual-level utilization (and, correspondingly, a left tail in the distribution of 
market-level residuals), I use two approaches to remove the influence of outliers. First, I 
obtain the residuals from the DRG-specific models of equation [2] and then divide by the 
standard error of the residuals (i.e., studentize). I then drop observations resulting in an 
absolute value studentized residual of above three as outlying observations, and re-
estimate the DRG-specific models on the subset of non-outlying observations to create an 
alternate measure of unexplained utilization. Second, I estimate models using the full 
individual-level sample to construct an average market-level residual, but then truncate 
the left tail of the distribution these average residuals, dropping markets with outlying 
mean residuals from the sample. 
Finally, I test sensitivity to different methods of constructing the outcome. For the 
extensive margin measures of utilization, I estimate the individual-level models using 
logistic regression instead of linear probability models, and for the intensive margin 





(instead of ordinary least squares). Additionally, I estimate market-level models that use 
the median (rather than mean) residual as the outcome. 
 
2.7 Results 
2.7.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 describes the characteristics of the individual-level Truven-MarketScan 
population used to construct the market-level measures of utilization. The first column 
presents summary statistics for models estimating extensive volume (where the unit of 
observation is a beneficiary enrolled for a year). The second column presents summary 
statistics for the sample of all inpatient admissions in DRGs with at least 5,000 
admissions (where the unit of observation is a beneficiary’s inpatient admission), while 
the third and fourth column describe the sample of the subset of planned and acute 
admissions, respectively. The final column presents the sample corresponding to the set 
of index admissions used in constructing readmissions. (The extensive acute and planned 
samples are the same as the overall extensive sample). 
Over the 2013-2015 period, there were 44,445,328 beneficiary-years of 
enrollment in the extensive sample, with about 4.59% of those observations resulting in 
an inpatient admission that year. From that pool, there were 1,816,817 admissions in the 
intensive sample for the set of DRGs with at least 5,000 admissions. The average price-
adjusted professional spending (intensive utilization) for those admissions is $3,604.72. 
Price-adjusted professional spending is, on average, higher for planned than acute 
admissions. About 8.12% of eligible admissions result in an unplanned readmission 





extensive and intensive sample, the beneficiaries with an inpatient admission are more 
likely to be female and younger (likely due to obstetric admissions) or older than the 
sample of all enrollees.  
Figure 2.2 illustrates the distribution of mean residuals by market (metropolitan 
area) and year for the main outcome measures. To demonstrate how these residuals are 
produced, Appendix Table 2.2 reports the parameter estimates from the underlying 
models for the extensive sample predicting any admission. As I estimate the intensive 
models separately by DRG, it is not practical to show all of those results, but I report 
results for the largest non-obstetric DRG (Major joint replacement without major 
complication or comorbidity). 
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics describing the markets used in the analysis 
for the main extensive and intensive outcomes. As these summary statistics are weighted 
by the number of observations that generated the volume measure, there are small 
differences between the intensive and extensive samples (and because the differences are 
small, summary statistics are not provided for each iteration of the outcome measures). 
On average, insurance markets are just over the threshold for high concentration (i.e., an 
HHI of 2,500), while hospital markets are well above that threshold. Physician markets, 
on average, fall just under the threshold for moderate concentration (i.e., an HHI of 
1,500). 
 
2.7.2 Main Results 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the distribution in the difference of the mean residuals for 





separately for markets that experienced a decrease in insurer HHI of at least 250 points, 
for markets that experienced an increase in insurer HHI of at least 250 points, and for 
markets that experienced changes of less than 250 points. While the probability of having 
any admission (adjusted for beneficiary characteristics) generally decreased over time for 
all three groups, in markets where the insurer HHI decreased the decrease was larger in 
magnitude, and in markets with no changes or an increase in insurer HHI the decrease in 
admissions was smaller in magnitude. The change in intensive utilization is centered 
around zero for markets where insurer HHI decreased and more positive for markets 
where insurer HHI increased or did not change. Both of these patterns in this figure are 
consistent with increasing insurer concentration increasing utilization. 
To formalize these descriptive findings, Table 2.3 reports the results of estimating 
equation [4], with models predicting the unexplained percentage having any inpatient 
admission and the unexplained price-adjusted professional spending of inpatient 
admissions (in DRGs with adequate sample size) presented in columns 1 and 2, 
respectively. Insurer concentration increases utilization on the extensive margin, with a 
1,000-point increase in HHI translating to a 0.09 percentage point increase (95% CI: 
0.003, 0.19) in the probability of having an admission. This magnitude can be understood 
in the context of the percentage with an admission (4.59%, reported in Table 2.1). A 
1,000-point change in insurer HHI therefore explains about 2.1% of the mean admission 
rate. Likewise, insurer concentration increases utilization on the intensive margin, with a 
1,000-point increase in HHI causing price-adjusted professional spending to increase by 





Somewhat unexpectedly, hospital and physician concentration do not significantly 
affect utilization. Moreover, most of the other market-level covariates are not significant 
in either model. (The individual-level covariates were highly significant in the individual-
level models.) In the intensive model, the percent uninsured is the only significant 
variable besides insurer HHI, perhaps due to the fairly large changes in the rate over the 
study period due to ACA-related insurance expansions, and it has a large effect. When 
the uninsured rate decreases, price-adjusted utilization increases, which could be due to 
previously uninsured people entering the sample and “catching up” on healthcare 
services. In the extensive models, increases in the total number of beds decrease the 
probability of having an admission. (As many of these sets of covariates are highly 
correlated and statistical insignificance may be driven by variance inflation, sensitivity to 
using a subset is tested, in results not shown; most covariates remain insignificant.) 
Columns 3-6 of Table 2.3 present the results of estimating the effect on the set of 
admissions identified as planned and acute. Insurer concentration does not significantly 
affect the probability of having an admission designated as planned, which is somewhat 
surprising. It does, however, significantly affect intensive utilization for these admissions, 
with a 1,000-point increase in insurance HHI increasing price-adjusted spending by 
around $201 (95% CI: 60.5, 340.6), about 3.4% of the average for planned admissions 
($5,830). By contrast, insurance HHI does not significantly affect either the likelihood of 
experiencing or the intensity of professional services provided during an acute admission; 
these insignificant findings for acute utilization were expected. The general pattern of 





through downward-sloping demand. Percent uninsured remains the most significant other 
predictor in these models. 
 
2.7.3 Market Stratifications 
The results of estimating the models separately by the level of insurer and 
physician market concentration at baseline are presented in Table 2.4, which shows the 
coefficients and standard errors of the effect of insurance market concentration on overall 
extensive (Panel A) and intensive (Panel B) utilization (see Appendices Tables 2.3-2.4 
for the full set of regression coefficients). The stratified p-value reports the result of a 
two-sided test of equality of the coefficients. The effect in physician markets with an HHI 
above 2,500 is tested against physician markets with an HHI below 2,500. Likewise, the 
effect in insurance markets with an HHI above 2,500 is tested against insurance markets 
with an HHI below 2,500. And the effect in markets with low physician and high insurer 
concentration, with high physician and low insurer concentration, and with high 
physician and high insurer concentration are each tested against markets with low 
physician and insurer concentration. 
On the extensive margin, there are no significant differences in the effect of 
insurer concentration by market stratification, though the significant finding in the main 
model appears to be driven by the effect in competitive physician markets. On the 
intensive margin, however, there are (borderline) significant differences by physician 
stratification (p=0.08), with no effect of insurer concentration in highly concentrated 
physician markets, and a 1,000-point increase in insurer HHI in a low/moderate 





261.5). A similar, though statistically weaker, dynamic is observed in low/moderate 
concentration insurance markets compared to highly concentrated insurance markets 
(p=0.13), with a 1,000-point increase in insurer HHI in less concentrated insurer markets 
increasing intensive utilization by $196 (p=0.07, 95% CI: -17.4, 410.1), but no significant 
effect in highly concentrated insurance markets. Finally, the point estimate is largest 
when both insurer and physician markets are less concentrated and smallest (negative) 
when both are highly concentrated, though neither the estimates nor the difference in the 
estimates are statistically significant. 
Appendix Table 2.5 reports the stratified results for acute and planned extensive 
utilization, which, like the overall extensive results (with the exception of a borderline 
significant impact on acute admissions in competitive provider markets), are not affected 
by insurer concentration. Table 2.5 shows the coefficients and standard errors of the 
effect of insurance market concentration on acute (Panel A) and planned (Panel B) 
intensive utilization, with the full set of regression coefficients in Appendices 2.6-2.7. On 
the intensive margin for planned utilization, the variation in effects by market 
stratification follows a similar pattern as that observed for overall intensive utilization, 
with a 1,000-point increase in insurance HHI increasing price-adjusted professional 
spending by roughly $300 (95% CI: 82.2, 517.5) in less concentrated physician markets 
and $407 (95% CI: 41.9, 772.4) in less concentrated insurance markets. (The differences 
in coefficients between low and high concentration physician and high and low 
concentration insurance markets fall just short of significance at the 10% level.) A large 





markets are less concentrated, though it is not significantly different from the effect when 
both are competitive (p=0.63). 
 
2.7.4 Readmissions 
Appendix Table 2.8 presents the results predicting unexplained readmissions. In 
the overall model, neither physician nor insurer concentration significantly affects 
readmissions, though both are negatively signed. Notably, hospital market concentration 
increases readmissions, consistent with much of the prior literature related to hospital 
concentration and quality. Because hospital and physician market concentration are 
correlated, I re-estimate these models without hospital market concentration (Column 2) 
in order to determine whether the coefficient on physician concentration is positively 
signed when it is the only provider concentration measure. It remains insignificant. 
In stratified models (Columns 3-6), the effect of insurance market concentration 
remains insignificant. Moreover, the correlation between the readmission residual and the 
utilization residual is virtually zero. To the extent that downward-sloping demand 
explains the increases in utilization observed in these analyses, on this measure they do 
not improve the patient’s outcome. It is also worth noting that physician market 
concentration decreases readmissions in concentrated insurance markets. While this 
research does not replicate the finding of Dunn and Shapiro (2017) that physician 
concentration increases treatment intensity, it does support their finding that physician 







2.7.5 Results for Continuously Enrolled Sample 
In order to test the possibility that the results are driven by unobserved changes in 
the health status of the underlying population, potentially correlated with both utilization 
and insurer concentration, I replicate the full set of analyses on a sample of beneficiaries 
continuously enrolled for all three years. Table 2.6 indicates that the major findings are 
largely robust to using this sample. (See Appendix Tables 2.9 and 2.10 for summary 
statistics and full model results, respectively.) As in the primary sample (of people 
continuously enrolled for at least one year), there is a comparatively large effect on 
treatment intensity in low/moderate physician and insurance markets and for planned 
admissions. Contrary to the results for main sample, I detect no effect on overall 
extensive utilization, though the result is qualitatively similar. Also unlike in the primary 
sample, there is a significant negative effect on readmissions in this continuously-
enrolled sample. As shown in Appendix Table 2.11, this effect for readmissions is fairly 
constant across markets, and not limited to (or larger in) the markets where the effect of 
insurer concentration is positive. It is also worth noting that the uninsured rate is not 
significant in these models, which would be consistent with an explanation of previously 
uninsured people catching up on services in the main sample. 
 
2.7.6 Sensitivity Analyses 
Table 2.7 presents the results of the sensitivity analyses. The findings are robust 
to including the observations of beneficiaries who were enrolled for only a partial year 
(though fully enrolled in the prior year), for whom risk adjustment was based on 





measure of physician concentration (and in results not shown, to stratifying using this 
physician concentration measure). The finding that there is a large effect of insurer 
concentration on intensive utilization for planned but not acute admissions is robust to 
using different thresholds of the weekend share of admissions to categorize admissions. 
On the extensive margin, there is one borderline significant effect on acute utilization for 
one of the alternate thresholds, but as it is negatively signed, it works against the 
hypothesis of reverse causality.  
The main source of sensitivity is related to model specification and construction 
of the market-level measure, particularly to approaches to address the skew in the 
distribution of intensive utilization. The findings are largely robust to using two different 
approaches to removing outlying measures of intensive utilization, one that identified 
individual-level outliers and one that identified market-level outliers. However, while the 
findings related to extensive utilization are robust to estimating equation [2] with logistic 
regression rather than a linear probability, the intensive utilization findings are not robust 
to using a gamma-log model, nor to defining the outcome as the median rather than mean 
residual. In results not shown, the effect is positive and significant at each quartile of the 
residual distribution in models that rely on cross-sectional variation, which may suggest 
that because there is less variation in the median, it is harder to detect an effect in models 
that include market fixed effects. It is also possible that there is no effect on the median, 









This research finds that a 1,000-point increase in insurer HHI increases overall 
utilization by roughly 2% on both the intensive and extensive margin, with a larger effect 
(3.4%) on the intensity of planned admissions. The overall positive (rather than negative) 
relationship between insurer concentration and utilization provides suggestive evidence 
of insurers playing, on average, a monopoly-busting role as opposed to exercising 
monopsony power against physicians. The larger effect for planned admissions, and the 
null effect for acute admissions, further suggests that the relationship is driven by higher 
demand when prices fall for the subset of relatively more price-elastic services, consistent 
with the exercise of countervailing bargaining power against more concentrated 
providers. 
The findings related to the market stratifications are more difficult to reconcile 
with the conceptual model, but offer suggestive evidence related to the market 
interactions between insurers and providers, and between insurers and patients. The effect 
of insurance concentration is larger in insurance markets that were relatively 
unconcentrated at baseline, which may suggest that if insurer consolidation enables 
insurers to negotiate larger price discounts across all markets, insurers in more 
concentrated markets have a stronger ability to constrain the higher demand for 
healthcare services corresponding to those lower prices. On the provider side, an effect 
driven by downward-sloping demand would presumably be larger in the markets where 
providers were able to exercise market power and elevate price farther above marginal 
cost at baseline. However, the effect is larger in physician markets that were relatively 





One possible explanation for this finding is that, even in low/moderate physician 
concentration markets, the prices at baseline were high enough above marginal cost that 
there was still room for more concentrated insurers to negotiate price discounts. If that is 
true, then it is perhaps unsurprising that an increase in insurer concentration would have a 
larger effect in less concentrated physician markets. In more concentrated physician 
markets, providers may be more able to resist the countervailing bargaining power that 
insurers acquire when insurer concentration increases, compared to in less concentrated 
physician markets. 
To put the magnitude of the findings of this analysis in context, the average 
increase in insurance concentration over the study period was only 49 points. In 2015, 
there were over 177 million people with employer or non-group commercial coverage. If 
the baseline utilization and the effect on the broader commercially insured population 
was comparable to the effect in the Truven Health MarketScan sample, that 49-point 
change translates to an estimated 8,197 additional beneficiaries with an inpatient 
admission that year. If the effect on the admissions in DRGs with fewer than 5,000 
admissions is comparable to the effect on the admissions used in this analysis, price-
adjusted professional spending increased by an estimated $29.6 million in new 
admissions and $33.7 million in more intensive admissions. Presumably there is some 
spillover effect onto facility utilization, which would increase this amount by several 
multiples. 
Relative to the scale of healthcare spending in the United States, these numbers 
are fairly small. It is notable, however, that this analysis is based on a period with limited 





and Cigna indicate that insurers would pursue greater levels of consolidation if the 
regulatory environment permitted it (“Aetna and Humana” 2017, “Judge Blocks” 2017). 
If the average insurance HHI had instead increased by 500-points, the estimated effect on 
utilization would be between $2 and $5 billion. It is clear, therefore, that insurer 
consolidation has the potential to lead to large increases in utilization, and that, in terms 
of total spending, these increases partially offset the effect of negotiating lower prices. It 
is possible that increases in utilization contribute to the premium growth associated with 
insurer consolidation.  
It is important to emphasize that this research did not measure overutilization, and 
that increases in utilization associated with insurer consolidation may be good or bad for 
consumers. The average level of utilization is not necessarily the clinically appropriate 
level of utilization, and increases in utilization are driven both by average/high utilizers 
becoming higher utilizers, and by low utilizers becoming average utilizers. While it is 
likely that some of the observed effect is due to overuse, it is also likely partly because of 
greater access to needed health services. Having said that, on the one measure of 
consumer welfare explored in this study (readmissions), there was no evidence that 
higher utilization translated to improved outcomes. Moreover, this research finds a fairly 
large effect on intensive utilization for the types of treatments that are (typically) planned 
in advance. Some of those treatments are discretionary and generally associated with 
overuse. By contrast, there was no significant impact on the types of acute events for 
which demand is presumably highly inelastic, indicating that treatment decisions for 
urgently needed medical interventions in the commercially insured population are not 





Heterogeneity in the effect of insurer consolidation by the level of provider and 
insurer concentration provides important information for regulators trying to estimate the 
likely impact of a merger or acquisition in a given market. This research suggests that the 
utilization effect will be much larger if either the insurance market or the physician 
market is relatively unconcentrated. In some markets, if there is relatively poor access to 
healthcare, regulators and/or policymakers may view a large utilization effect as pro-
competitive; and conversely, in markets with indicators of overuse, policymakers may 
view large expected utilization increases as an argument against insurer consolidation, 
alongside other concerns such as the effect on premium growth. 
Finally, this research attempts to exclude the possibility that the positive 
relationship between insurer concentration and utilization is primarily about insurer 
consolidation in markets where utilization is already high, or about changes in the risk 
pool causing both utilization and insurance concentration to change. If high overall 
utilization drives insurer consolidation, then high acute utilization should also drive 
insurer consolidation; but the analysis finds no significant relationship between insurance 
concentration and acute utilization. Moreover, the consistency in the findings between the 
underlying sample in the main models (which required only full-year enrollment) and the 
sample that was continuously-enrolled for the full study period, a sample restriction that 
approximately holds constant the health characteristics of the pool of beneficiaries, 









 This research makes several contributions. It extends the literature on the 
relationship between insurer concentration and utilization using a different methodology 
with updated data, incorporates measures of physician concentration, explores the 
interaction between insurer consolidation and baseline levels of physician and insurer 
concentration, explores the effect on services for which demand is more and less price 
elastic, and includes a measure of hospital quality. Nevertheless, there are several 
important limitations to note. 
The most important limitation of the analysis is that causal inferences depend on 
the assumption that, conditional on the observable control variables, confounding factors 
are time invariant over the study period. While this research has found suggestive 
evidence against reverse causality, and has sought to control for several time-variant 
confounding variables like provider concentration and the uninsured rate, it is possible 
that there is an unobserved confounder correlated with both changes in insurer 
concentration and utilization that explains the observed relationship between changes in 
utilization and changes in insurance market concentration. On that note, there is limited 
individual-level information available to use as control variables, and the market-level 
controls are not based on the same population as the sample in the Truven Health 
MarketScan data, which limits their ability to control for changes in the underlying 
population. 
Moreover, the Pauly (1998) model provides a useful framework for thinking 
about how insurer and provider market concentration and healthcare utilization interact, 





between the empirical findings and the theoretical predictions are only suggestive. For 
example, the monopsony framework, where insurers exercise market power to constrain 
utilization, provides an explanation for why lower prices negotiated by insurers might not 
translate to higher utilization. The fact that the evidence suggests that there is a positive 
and significant effect on utilization in low/moderate, but not high concentration, 
insurance markets is interpreted in light of that framework; more concentrated insurers, 
facing less competition from other insurers, may be more able to utilize the tools that 
allow them to limit utilization. However, this research did not attempt to tease out the 
underlying mechanism, and so this is only a hypothesis and further developing the 
evidence is an area for future research. For example, another potential pathway is that 
when insurers have market power selling administrative services to employers, employers 
may decrease the generosity of benefits for their employees to offset higher 
administrative markups. 
Another limitation of the research is the inability to account for vertical 
integration between insurers and healthcare providers. This work is based on a model of 
insurers and physicians as distinct entities with opposing interests in price negotiations, 
and is not translatable to a context where they are part of a larger system with aligned 
incentives. Relatedly, the research also does not fully account for vertical integration 
between physicians and hospitals. To the extent that hospital and physician integration 
results in horizontal integration between physicians (by introducing affiliations between 
the physician practices that become acquired by a hospital system) the physician 





hospital affiliation may confer bargaining power to a physician practice, even holding 
constant the physician HHI. 
Related to physician concentration more broadly, the measure is based on a 
Medicare population, prohibiting the measure of certain specialties not frequently used by 
an aged population, and the best way to aggregate across physician specialties is not 
clear. This may explain why the research finds physician concentration as a significant 
effect modifier (based on a dichotomous, cross-sectional measure, which presumably 
carries a fairly strong signal), and not as significant on its own in models that rely on 
longitudinal variation (and where issues of measurement error are exacerbated). 
Additionally, the analysis is limited to a commercially-insured population 
receiving coverage from either self-insured firms or small health plans. It does not assess 
spillovers onto publicly-insured patients, such as Traditional Medicare or Medicaid 
beneficiaries, and nor does it explore the effect on commercially-insured patients 
receiving coverage through Medicare Advantage, Medicaid HMO plans, or on the Health 
Insurance Exchanges. It is also somewhat limited in geographic scope. It focuses on non-
rural areas and includes only the metropolitan areas available in the Truven Health 
MarketScan database, which has broad but not nationally representative geographic 
coverage. 
Finally, readmissions are an important, but narrow measure of consumer welfare. 
It is possible that on other measures insurer consolidation’s impact on utilization may 
result in quality improvements. Hanson, Herring and Trish (2018) provide early evidence 





Further research is needed to better understand the welfare-increasing and welfare-
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Percent with Any Admission 4.59 (20.93)     
Percent with a Planned Admission 1.32 (11.41)     
Percent with an Acute Admission 0.40 (6.35)     
Percent with a Readmission (30-days)     8.12 (27.32) 
Price-Adjusted Professional Spending  3,604.72 (3,660.02) 5,829.86 (4,791.11) 2,446.71 (2,193.69)  
Fraction Male 0.48 (0.50) 0.29 (0.45) 0.25 (0.43) 0.49 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48) 
Fraction Female 0.52 (0.50) 0.71 (0.45) 0.75 (0.43) 0.51 (0.50) 0.65 (0.48) 
Fraction Aged 18-34 0.32 (0.47) 0.39 (0.49) 0.30 (0.46) 0.15 (0.36) 0.30 (0.46) 
Fraction Aged 35-44 0.21 (0.41) 0.18 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) 0.15 (0.36) 0.18 (0.38) 
Fraction Aged 45-54 0.25 (0.43) 0.18 (0.38) 0.19 (0.40) 0.28 (0.45) 0.21 (0.41) 
Fraction Aged 55-64 0.22 (0.41) 0.25 (0.43) 0.30 (0.46) 0.41 (0.49) 0.32 (0.47) 
Fraction in Comprehensive Plan 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.16) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.19) 
Fraction in EPO Plan 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 
Fraction in POS Plan 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28) 
Fraction in PPO Plan 0.70 (0.46) 0.71 (0.45) 0.71 (0.45) 0.70 (0.46) 0.70 (0.46) 
Fraction in CDHP Plan 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.30) 
Fraction in HDHP Plan 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24) 
Notes: Data comes from the Truven Health MarketScan Database of Commercial Claim, 2013-2015. The measure of price-adjusted spending reprices services 
using the mean payment rate observed in the data and sums over all professional services provided in an admission. The intensive sample includes the set of 
diagnosis-related-groups (DRGs) with at least 5,000 admissions. For the extensive sample, the fraction in a plan is the average fraction of a year that enrollees 
spent in each plan. For the intensive sample, it is the fraction of the sample enrolled in that plan at the point of admission. Acute admissions are the set of DRGs 
with at least 5,000 admissions with a weekend share of admissions above 25%, while planned admissions have weekend admission shares of below 15%.  
 
 66 






Number of Observations: 
1,166 
Intensive Utilization Sample: 
Price-Adjusted Professional 
Spending 
Number of Observations: 
1,166 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Insurance Market HHI (1000s) 2.58 0.81 2.61 0.82 
Hospital Market HHI (1000s) 3.20 2.18 3.22 2.16 
Physician Market HHI (1000s) 1.44 1.25 1.44 1.25 
Percent Uninsured 13.58 4.88 13.61 4.89 
Median Real Income 59.96 12.33 59.56 12.16 
Percent Unemployed 6.36 1.66 6.36 1.62 
Percent in Poverty 14.95 3.67 14.98 3.65 
Percent Nonwhite 38.09 16.84 37.50 16.57 
Percent with Bachelor's Degree 32.03 7.36 31.71 7.23 
Total Beds 688.26 1,040.04 675.78 1,032.87 
MDs per 1,000 2.76 1.00 2.75 0.99 
Medicare Advantage Penetration 31.16 12.20 31.02 12.08 
 
Notes: All market concentration measures are HHIs. Measures of insurance market concentration are based 
on shares of fully- and self-insured commercial enrollment from the HealthLeaders-InterStudy data. 
Hospital market concentration is based on shares of inpatient days from the American Hospital Association 
Annual Survey. Physician market concentration is based on shares of allowed amounts from CMS 
Physician Compare Data and the Physician and Other Supplier Data (PUF). Other variables come from the 
Census SAIPE, Census SAHIE, BLS LAUS, and the AHRF. Small differences in the summary statistics 






Table 2.3: Full Regression Results, Extensive and Intensive Utilization 
 


























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Insurance Market    
HHI (1,000s) 
0.0941** 84.22** 0.00983 200.5*** 0.0134 17.89 
(0.0465) (38.83) (0.0281) (71.23) (0.0103) (54.34) 
Hospital Market  
HHI (1,000s) 
-0.0133 -27.29 -0.00526 -32.02 0.00196 -6.961 
(0.0343) (26.02) (0.0169) (41.72) (0.00803) (32.77) 
Physician Market 
HHI (1,000s) 
-0.0136 -9.275 -0.0303* -20.48 0.00369 12.07 
(0.0363) (27.68) (0.0163) (52.26) (0.00863) (46.57) 
Percent 
Uninsured 
-0.0183 -23.35*** -0.00733* -37.03*** -0.00180 -19.67 
(0.0112) (7.234) (0.00427) (13.46) (0.00230) (12.25) 
Median Real 
Income 
0.0176* 3.792 0.00553 6.875 0.00318** -3.977 
(0.00927) (6.455) (0.00407) (12.81) (0.00161) (9.288) 
Percent 
Unemployed 
-9.7e-05 20.68 0.00109 34.85 0.00206 8.730 
(0.0222) (21.65) (0.0115) (43.48) (0.00398) (21.63) 
Percent in 
Poverty 
0.0122 -9.821 0.00368 -24.73 -0.000213 -18.17 
(0.0125) (11.54) (0.00595) (21.08) (0.00254) (13.86) 
Percent Non- 
White 
0.0239 8.303 0.0207 9.478 -0.00834 39.54 
(0.0555) (47.13) (0.0216) (88.22) (0.0110) (50.83) 
Percent 
Bachelor's 
-0.00755 -19.75 0.00190 -69.60 0.00290 -18.80 
(0.0347) (38.65) (0.0159) (70.79) (0.00809) (42.52) 
Total Beds -1.2e-04*** -0.0323 -6.0e-05*** -0.0188 -1.1e-05** -0.0488* 
 (2.01e-05) (0.0331) (9.58e-06) (0.0602) (4.47e-06) (0.0286) 
MDs per 1,000 -0.484** -192.8 -0.158 -395.8 -0.0282 104.6 
 (0.244) (224.2) (0.146) (454.9) (0.0506) (299.9) 
Medicare Adv. 
Penetration 
-0.00657 -0.978 -0.000960 -4.713 -0.000790 -3.695 
(0.00634) (7.569) (0.00317) (12.69) (0.00138) (8.705) 
Year = 2014 -0.401*** 78.83 -0.107*** 111.4 -0.0420*** 65.79 
 (0.0486) (49.69) (0.0202) (89.72) (0.0110) (49.75) 
Year = 2015 -0.703*** 68.29 -0.276*** 87.23 -0.0728*** 126.6 
 (0.0924) (88.18) (0.0377) (159.6) (0.0193) (93.28) 
Constant 0.121 839.1 -0.487 2,878 0.147 -393.7 
 (2.564) (2,015) (1.056) (3,757) (0.485) (2,151) 
Observations 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,165 










Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. The outcome in each model is the mean residual by market 
and year from models predicting having any admission (extensive). price-adjusted professional spending 
(intensive), or readmission as a function of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between those 
variables, and hierarchical conditional categories estimated using the samples in Table 2.1. For intensive 
utilization, separate models are estimated for each DRG. Acute admissions are the set of DRGs with at least 
5,000 admissions for which the share of weekend admissions was above 25%, while planned admissions 
have weekend admission shares of below 15%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 





Table 2.4: Effect of Insurance Market Concentration on Utilization, Stratified by 
Physician and Insurer Concentration 
 
Panel A: Extensive Utilization (Any Admission) 
Unadjusted Mean: 4.59 
 All Physician Markets Physician HHI <2,500 Physician HHI > 2,500 
All Insurance 
Markets Beta (SE)= 0.09** (0.05) Beta (SE)= 0.13* (0.06) Beta (SE)= 0.04 (0.07) 
 N= 1,166 N= 538 N= 584 
   Stratified P-value=0.34 
Insurance HHI 
<2,500 Beta (SE)= 0.06 (0.07) Beta (SE)= 0.09 (0.09) Beta (SE)= -0.00 (0.10) 
 N= 475 N= 288 N= 187 
   Stratified P-value= 0.35 
Insurance HHI 
>2,500 Beta (SE)= 0.08 (0.06) Beta (SE)= 0.09 (0.09) Beta (SE)= 0.04 (0.08) 
 N= 647 N= 250 N= 397 
 Stratified P-value= 0.77 Stratified P-value= 0.99 Stratified P-value= 0.72 
 
Panel B: Intensive Utilization (Price-Adjusted Professional Spending) 
Unadjusted Mean: 3,604.72 
 All Physician Markets Physician HHI <2,500 Physician HHI > 2,500 
All Insurance 
Markets 
Beta (SE)= 84.22** 
(38.83) 
Beta (SE)= 142.1** 
(60.49) Beta (SE)= -6.716 (45.46) 
 N= 1,166 N= 538 N= 584 
   Stratified P-value=0.08 
Insurance HHI 
<2,500 Beta (SE)= 196.4* (108.2) Beta (SE)= 211.7 (133.9) Beta (SE)= 163.3 (126.7) 
 N= 475 N= 288 N= 187 
   Stratified P-value= 0.76 
Insurance HHI 
>2,500 Beta (SE)= 22.92 (35.39) Beta (SE)= 52.40 (56.94) Beta (SE)= -35.67 (46.29) 
 N= 647 N= 250 N= 397 
 Stratified P-value= 0.13 Stratified P-value= 0.2 Stratified P-value= 0.23 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. Full model results in Appendix Tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual by market and year from models predicting 
having any admission (extensive) and price-adjusted professional spending (intensive) as a function 
of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between those variables, and hierarchical conditional 
categories estimated using the sample in Table 2.1. For intensive utilization, separate models are 
estimated for each DRG. Stratified p-values report the results of a test of the equality of coefficients 
between market stratifications, with the effect in concentrated physician (insurance) markets tested 
against competitive physician (insurance) markets, and high/low, low/high, and high/high 
concentration physician/insurance markets tested against low/low concentration physician/insurance 





Table 2.5: Effect of Insurance Market Concentration on Acute and Planned 
Intensive Utilization, Stratified by Physician and Insurer Concentration 
 
Panel A: Acute Intensive Utilization (Price-Adjusted Professional Spending) 
Unadjusted Mean: 2,446.71 
 All Physician Markets Physician HHI <2,500 Physician HHI > 2,500 
All Insurance 
Markets 
Beta (SE)= 17.89  
(54.34) 
Beta (SE)= 40.12  
(75.08) 
Beta (SE)= -38.98 
(86.56) 
 N= 1,165 N= 538 N= 584 
   Stratified P-value=0.46 
Insurance HHI 
<2,500 
Beta (SE)= -37.36 
(134.8) 
Beta (SE)= 6.290 
 (170.4) 
Beta (SE)= -201.0 
(193.0) 
 N= 475 N= 288 N= 187 
   Stratified P-value= 0.31 
Insurance HHI 
>2,500 
Beta (SE)= 6.817  
(54.33) 
Beta (SE)= -1.631 
(65.83) 
Beta (SE)= -8.214 
(97.03) 
 N= 647 N= 250 N= 397 
 Stratified P-value= 0.76 Stratified P-value= 0.96 Stratified P-value= 0.96 
 
Panel B: Planned Intensive Utilization (Price-Adjusted Professional Spending) 
Unadjusted Mean: 5,829.86 
 All Physician Markets Physician HHI <2,500 Physician HHI > 2,500 
All Insurance 
Markets 
Beta (SE)= 200.5*** 
(71.23) 
Beta (SE)= 299.8*** 
(110.3) 
Beta (SE)= 54.44  
(82.76) 
 N= 1,166 N= 538 N= 584 
   Stratified P-value=0.12 
Insurance HHI 
<2,500 
Beta (SE)= 407.2** 
(184.9) 
Beta (SE)= 396.4* 
(223.3) 
Beta (SE)= 525.4** 
(225.4) 
 N= 475 N= 288 N= 187 
   Stratified P-value= 0.63 
Insurance HHI 
>2,500 
Beta (SE)= 91.44  
(65.90) 
Beta (SE)= 157.1  
(113.4) 
Beta (SE)= -23.81 
(81.71) 
 N= 647 N= 250 N= 397 
 Stratified P-value= 0.11 Stratified P-value= 0.26 Stratified P-value= 0.22 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. Full model results in Appendix Tables 2.6 and 2.7. The 
outcome variable in each model is the mean residual by market and year from models predicting having 
any admission (extensive) and price-adjusted professional spending (intensive) as a function of age, sex, 
plan type, the pairwise interactions between those variables, and hierarchical conditional categories 
estimated using the sample in Table 2.1. For intensive utilization, separate models are estimated for each 
DRG. Acute admissions are defined as the set of DRGs with at least 5,000 admissions for which the share 
of weekend admissions was above 25%, while planned admissions have weekend admission shares of 
below 15%. Stratified p-values report the results of a test of the equality of coefficients between market 
stratifications, with the effect in concentrated physician (insurance) markets tested against competitive 
physician (insurance) markets, and high/low, low/high, and high/high concentration physician/insurance 
markets tested against low/low concentration physician/insurance markets. Robust standard errors in 





Table 2.6: Effect of Insurance Market Concentration, Continuously Enrolled 
Sample 
 
  Beta SE 
Overall Utilization   
Extensive: Any Admission 0.0628 (0.0583) 
Intensive: All Utilization 127.2** (52.73) 
Market Stratifications   
Intensive: Physician HHI<2500 195.2* (81.51) 
Intensive: Physician HHI>2500 43.08 (58.15) 
Intensive: Insurance HHI<2500 344.2* (128.5) 
Intensive Insurance HHI>2500 23.23 (51.31) 
Acute versus Planned   
Extensive: Acute Utilization 0.00297 (0.00906) 
Extensive: Planned Utilization -0.0188 (0.0294) 
Intensive: Acute Utilization -5.634 (61.72) 
Intensive: Planned Utilization 194.9** (87.17) 
Readmissions   







Notes: This analysis was restricted to a sample continuously enrolled from 2013 through 2015. The unit of 
observation is a market-year. The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual by market and year 
from models predicting having any admission (extensive), price-adjusted professional spending (intensive), 
and readmissions as a function of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between those variables, and 
hierarchical conditional categories estimated using the sample in Appendix Table 2.9, with full model 
results in Appendix Table 2.10. For intensive utilization, separate models are estimated for each DRG. 
Planned admissions are defined as the set of DRGs with at least 5,000 admissions for which the share of 







Table 2.7: Coefficients on Insurance Market Concentration, Sensitivity Analyses 
 
  Beta SE 
Alternate Sample: Partial Year Enrollment   
Intensive: All Utilization 121.6*** (42.96) 
Intensive: Acute Utilization 17.21 (47.93) 
Intensive: Planned Utilization 229.7*** (81.23) 
Alternate Physician Concentration   
Extensive: Any Admission 0.0943** (0.0465) 
Intensive: All Utilization 84.32** (38.76) 
Alternate Definitions of Acute/Planned   
Acute Extensive: Weekend Share>=.20 0.0260 (0.0320) 
Acute Extensive: Weekend Share Between .26 and .31 -0.00919* (0.00539) 
Planned Extensive: Weekend Share<.20 0.0164 (0.0309) 
Planned Extensive: Weekend Share<=.08 0.00338 (0.0208) 
Acute Intensive: Weekend Share>=.20 5.892 (38.40) 
Acute Intensive: Weekend Share Between .26 and .31 57.71 (60.51) 
Planned Intensive: Weekend Share<.20 161.9*** (57.59) 
Planned Intensive: Weekend Share<=.08 240.6*** (92.07) 
Alternate Approaches to Outliers   
Intensive: Drop Individual-Level Outliers (via Studentized Residual) 55.97* (33.69) 
Intensive: Drop Market-Level Outliers (Mean Residuals <-1,000) 60.89* (34.83) 
Alternate Construction of Market-Level Utilization   
Extensive: Logistic Regression 0.0943** (0.0446) 
Intensive: Median Residual 6.511 (24.54) 
Intensive: Gamma-Log GLM 22.72 (29.42) 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual 
by market and year from models predicting having any admission (extensive), price-adjusted professional 
spending (intensive), and readmissions as a function of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions 
between those variables, and hierarchical conditional categories estimated using the sample in Table 2.1, 
unless otherwise specified. For intensive utilization, separate models are estimated for each DRG. Robust 







Figure 2.1: Distribution of the Change in Insurer Concentration from 2013 to 2015, 
by Baseline Level of Insurer and Physician Market Concentration 
 
Notes: Measures of HHI are based on shares of fully- and self-insured enrollment from the HealthLeaders-
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Figure 2.2: Kernel Density of Market-Level Measures of Utilization 
 
Notes: Mean residuals by market and year are plotted from models predicting having any admission 
(extensive) and price-adjusted professional spending (intensive) as a function of age, sex, plan type, the 
pairwise interactions between those variables, and hierarchical conditional categories estimated using the 
sample in Table 2.1. For intensive utilization, separate models are estimated for each DRG. Acute 
admissions are defined as the set of DRGs with at least 5,000 admissions for which the share of weekend 












































Notes: The change in mean residuals from 2013 to 2015 by market are plotted from models predicting 
having any admission (extensive) and price-adjusted professional spending (intensive) as a function of age, 
sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between those variables, and hierarchical conditional categories 
estimated using the sample in Table 2.1. For intensive utilization, separate models are estimated for each 
DRG. Markets are identified as either having an insurer HHI that decreased by at least 250-points, 






































Appendix 2A: Constructing Physician Concentration 
 
Yearly specialty-specific physician concentration measures were created using 
archived Physician Compare data from March 2014, April 2015, and April 2016 and the 
Medicare Physician and Other Supplier Data for 2013-2015. These files were linked by 
National Provider Identifier and year, with the quality of the match between the Physician 
Compare and Part B files suggesting that the March 2014 Physician Compare data is 
most reflective of the 2013 Calendar Year (compared to the 2014 Calendar Year), and so 
on. 
Because both Physician Compare and the Supplier Data include information on 
non-physician healthcare providers, the first step was to narrow the data to physicians. 
Providers were identified as non-physicians, either by having a non-doctoral degree listed 
in Physician Compare or by being listed under a non-physician provider type (i.e., CRNA 
or Licensed Clinical Social Worker) in either Physician Compare or the Supplier Data.  
The physician’s total allowed amounts were evenly divided between the practice 
locations listed in Physician Compare. (Allowed charges are the unit of service that the 
FTC and DOJ uses in monitoring ACOs and which have been implemented in several 
past studies.)11 Practice Locations were assigned to a County and a CBSA first on the 
basis of zip code from Physician Compare, then on zip code from the Supplier PUF, and 
lastly from the city listed in either file.12 As some zip codes and cities map to multiple 
counties, weights were assigned to each match based on the portion of the addresses in 
each zip code or city that belong to each county (i.e., a practice in a zip code that crosses 
a county line, where 95% of the address in the zip code belong to County 1 and 5% 
belong to county 2, is assigned to both counties with weights of .95 and .05, 
respectively). If a physician had multiple practice locations, and each practice location 
mapped to multiple counties, then that physician’s allowed amounts were evenly divided 
between practices, and then each county was assigned a share of that practice’s allowed 
amounts based on the weight. 
Some physicians were in one but not both databases. All physicians appearing in 
either database were included in the concentration calculations. Physicians that were not 
identified in Physician Compare were assumed to operate in a solo practice at the location 
listed in the Supplier PUF. Physicians that were not identified in the Supplier data were 
assigned the average allowed amount by for that specialty in that geographic area 
(County or CBSA). 
Physician concentration measures were constructed first defining the geographic 
market as a County and then as a CBSA. For physicians in group practices, the allowed 
                                                        
11 “FTC-DOJ Enforcement Policy Statement Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating In 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program | Federal Trade Commission,” accessed April 5, 2017, 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/federal-register-notices/ftc-doj-enforcement-policy-statement-regarding-
accountable-care; Baker et al., “Physician Practice Competition and Prices Paid by Private Insurers for 
Office Visits.” 
12 The crosswalk between zip code and county was accessed here: 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/usps_crosswalk.html#codebook. The crosswalk between city and 





amounts were aggregated onto the Organizational PAC ID. If no Organizational PAC ID 
was listed, the physician was assumed to work as a solo practitioner. Allowed amounts 
were summed by specialty, year, and geographic market, and market shares were 
calculated for each organizational ID or NPI. These market shares were used to construct 
specialty-specific physician HHIs. 
The specialty-specific physician HHIs were then aggregated into a single 
summary physician concentration measure. The first step in this aggregation was to 
assign a weight to each specialty. These weights were constructed from the set of 
inpatient admissions in the Truven Health MarketScan data over 2013-2015 that 
contributed to the intensive volume measure (and hence, that had at least 5,000 
admissions). The weights were the share of procedures performed by physicians in the 10 
largest physician specialties over those admissions. As a sensitivity analysis, these 
specialty weights were assigned separately for each market. 
This method of constructing physician concentration, which relies solely on 
publicly available data, has not, to my knowledge, been used before. In order to validate 
the measure, it was compared against others methods of constructing physician 
concentration using a 20% sample of Medicare claims data for 2015. First, the method 
was replicated as closely as possible using claims data, defining the geographic market as 
a County and as a CBSA, assigning physicians to practices using a tax identification 
number, and using allowed amounts to define market shares. The correlation between the 
specialty-specific measures using these two approaches was .93. This confirms that using 
publicly available data captures a comparable number of physicians and assigns them to 
group practices in a similar way. 
A more rigorous method uses patient flows and allows the geographic market 
served by each practice to vary based on the zip codes of its patients, assigns each 
practice an HHI based on the other practices serving those zip codes, and aggregates up 
to some larger geographic level (see, principally, Baker et al. (2014)). 13 The correlation 
between a specialty-specific patient-flow based measure and the specialty-specific 
measure feasible with publicly available data is .73. 
There are weaknesses to this approach to measuring physician concentration, 
primarily that it does not use patient flow data in order to construct a geographic market. 
Only the location of the physician is known, not the location of the beneficiaries treated 
by that physician. However, because this measure can be constructed with publicly 
available data, because it is available for three years instead of one, and because it has a 
high degree of correlation with more rigorous measures, it is the appropriate approach for 
this study. 
  
                                                        
13 Laurence C. Baker et al., “Physician Practice Competition and Prices Paid by Private Insurers for Office 
Visits,” JAMA 312, no. 16 (October 22, 2014): 1653–62, https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2014.10921. A 
summary of the patient flow method is as follows: Practices are identified as a group of physicians with the 
same specialty billing under the same tax identification number. The product market is defined as all 
services provided by the physicians within a relevant specialty, measured using allowed charges. Each 
practice’s service area is defined as the set of zip codes from which the practice draws 75% of its total 
allowed charges. For each zip code, an HHI is calculated based on the market shares of the practices for 
whom that zip code is in their 75% service area. The HHI faced by each practice is then the mean of the zip 
code level HHIs from their service area.  These HHIs are then averaged over a county, to create a county-
level, specialty-specific measure of HHI. 
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Appendix Table 2.1: DRG Codes Categorized as Planned vs. Acute 
 DRG Codes Categorized as Planned 
766 CESAREAN SECTION W/O CC/MCC 
470 MAJOR JOINT REPLACEMENT OR REATTACHMENT OF LOWER 
EXTREMITY W/O MCC 765 CESAREAN SECTION W CC/MCC 
743 UTERINE & ADNEXA PROC FOR NON-MALIGNANCY W/O CC/MCC 
621 O.R. PROCEDURES FOR OBESITY W/O CC/MCC 
460 SPINAL FUSION EXCEPT CERVICAL W/O MCC 
330 MAJOR SMALL & LARGE BOWEL PROCEDURES W CC 
945 REHABILITATION W CC/MCC 
473 CERVICAL SPINAL FUSION W/O CC/MCC 
742 UTERINE & ADNEXA PROC FOR NON-MALIGNANCY W CC/MCC 
331 MAJOR SMALL & LARGE BOWEL PROCEDURES W/O CC/MCC 
708 MAJOR MALE PELVIC PROCEDURES W/O CC/MCC 
847 CHEMOTHERAPY W/O ACUTE LEUKEMIA AS SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS W 
CC 472 ERVICAL SPINAL FUSION W CC 
620 O.R. PROCEDURES FOR OBESITY W CC 
25 CRANIOTOMY & ENDOVASCULAR INTRACRANIAL PROCEDURES W MCC 
234 CORONARY BYPASS W CARDIAC CATH W/O MCC 
164 MAJOR CHEST PROCEDURES W CC 
462 BILATERAL OR MULTIPLE MAJOR JOINT PROCS OF LOWER EXTREMITY 
W/O MCC 581 OTHER SKIN, SUBCUT TISS & BREAST PROC W/O CC/MCC 
520 BACK & NECK PROC EXC SPINAL FUSION W/O CC/MCC 
251 PERC CARDIOVASC PROC W/O CORONARY ARTERY STENT W/O MCC 
327 STOMACH, ESOPHAGEAL & DUODENAL PROC W CC 
580 OTHER SKIN, SUBCUT TISS & BREAST PROC W CC 
982 EXTENSIVE O.R. PROCEDURE UNRELATED TO PRINCIPAL DIAGNOSIS W 
CC  
 DRG Codes Categorized as Acute 
871 SEPTICEMIA OR SEVERE SEPSIS W/O MV 96+ HOURS W MCC  
872 SEPTICEMIA OR SEVERE SEPSIS W/O MV 96+ HOURS W/O MCC 
418 LAPAROSCOPIC CHOLECYSTECTOMY W/O C.D.E. W CC 
439 DISORDERS OF PANCREAS EXCEPT MALIGNANCY W CC 
65 INTRACRANIAL HEMORRHAGE OR CEREBRAL INFARCTION W CC OR TPA 
IN 24 HRS 
249 PERC CARDIOVASC PROC W NON-DRUG-ELUTING STENT W/O MCC 
193 SIMPLE PNEUMONIA & PLEURISY W MCC 
440 DISORDERS OF PANCREAS EXCEPT MALIGNANCY W/O CC/MCC 
694 URINARY STONES W/O ESW LITHOTRIPSY W/O MCC 
389 G.I. OBSTRUCTION W CC 
312 SYNCOPE & COLLAPSE 
552 MEDICAL BACK PROBLEMS W/O MCC 
64 INTRACRANIAL HEMORRHAGE OR CEREBRAL INFARCTION W MCC 
494 LOWER EXTREM & HUMER PROC EXCEPT HIP,FOOT,FEMUR W/O CC/MCC 
918 POISONING & TOXIC EFFECTS OF DRUGS W/O MCC 
917 POISONING & TOXIC EFFECTS OF DRUGS W MCC 
417 LAPAROSCOPIC CHOLECYSTECTOMY W/O C.D.E. W MCC 
493 LOWER EXTREM & HUMER PROC EXCEPT HIP,FOOT,FEMUR W CC 
669 TRANSURETHRAL PROCEDURES W CC 
281 ACUTE MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, DISCHARGED ALIVE W CC 







Appendix Table 2.2: Representative Results From Individual-Level Models 
 
 Extensive: Any Admission 
Intensive: Price-Adjusted Spending, 
Major Joint Replacement w/o MCC 
 Coefficient S.E. P-Value Coefficient S.E. P-Value 
Male -0.0025 0.0004 0.0000 11.71 32.82 0.72 
Age 18-34 (Ref: 55-64) 0.0649 0.0015 0.0000 -69.36 185.12 0.71 
Age 35-44 (Ref: 55-64) 0.0276 0.0016 0.0000 -77.80 79.81 0.33 
Age 45-54 (Ref: 55-64) 0.0003 0.0015 0.6486 -33.96 36.48 0.35 
Comprehensive (Ref: EPO) 0.0012 0.0006 0.0032 -327.09 35.08 0.00 
POS (Ref: EPO) 0.0004 0.0005 0.3214 -215.73 31.53 0.00 
PPO (Ref: EPO) 0.0016 0.0004 0.0000 -88.67 26.02 0.00 
CDHP  (Ref: EPO) 0.0001 0.0005 0.7087 31.10 31.17 0.32 
HDHP  (Ref: EPO) 0.0002 0.0006 0.7209 142.26 50.36 0.00 
Male, Age 18-34 -0.0673 0.0002 0.0000 158.15 98.11 0.11 
Male, Age 35-44 -0.0288 0.0003 0.0000 120.52 41.00 0.00 
Male, Age 45-54 -0.0024 0.0002 0.0000 17.94 17.94 0.32 
Male, Comprehensive  0.0059 0.0012 0.0000 -86.80 49.25 0.08 
Male, POS  0.0030 0.0011 0.0000 83.40 42.12 0.05 
Male, PPO  0.0019 0.0011 0.0000 -33.13 33.51 0.32 
Male, CDHP  0.0028 0.0011 0.0000 -29.17 40.84 0.48 
Male, HDHP  0.0036 0.0011 0.0000 -103.99 65.11 0.11 
Age 18-34, Comprehensive  -0.0086 0.0017 0.0000 -1,447.78 409.78 0.00 
Age 35-44, Comprehensive  -0.0080 0.0018 0.0000 -453.45 167.93 0.01 
Age 45-54, Comprehensive  0.0000 0.0016 0.9735 -333.30 65.25 0.00 
Age 18-34, POS  -0.0033 0.0016 0.0000 95.36 238.53 0.69 
Age 35-44, POS  -0.0030 0.0017 0.0000 -191.54 106.13 0.07 
Age 45-54, POS  -0.0005 0.0015 0.4301 -104.33 47.84 0.03 
Age 18-34, PPO  -0.0023 0.0015 0.0000 4.99 186.56 0.98 
Age 35-44, PPO  -0.0048 0.0017 0.0000 -81.53 81.01 0.31 
Age 45-54, PPO  -0.0012 0.0015 0.0365 -20.59 37.04 0.58 
Age 18-34, CDHP  -0.0023 0.0016 0.0002 219.82 240.09 0.36 
Age 35-44, CDHP  -0.0061 0.0017 0.0000 -8.18 101.34 0.94 
Age 45-54, CDHP  -0.0017 0.0015 0.0077 37.96 45.37 0.40 
Age 18-34, HDHP  -0.0037 0.0016 0.0000 749.08 398.56 0.06 
Age 35-44, HDHP  -0.0062 0.0017 0.0000 -207.65 167.83 0.22 
Age 45-54, HDHP  -0.0023 0.0015 0.0007 -95.42 72.46 0.19 
HCC 1 0.0122 0.0006 0.0000 99.98 101.32 0.32 
HCC 2 0.3958 0.0006 0.0000 -76.35 41.62 0.07 
HCC 6 0.0588 0.0011 0.0000 -63.26 106.76 0.55 
HCC 8 0.1526 0.0006 0.0000 592.91 57.33 0.00 
HCC 9 0.0837 0.0007 0.0000 54.68 62.27 0.38 
HCC 10 0.0590 0.0004 0.0000 149.25 39.54 0.00 
HCC 11 0.0811 0.0004 0.0000 74.73 40.59 0.07 
HCC 12 0.0405 0.0002 0.0000 31.02 19.10 0.10 





HCC 18 0.0163 0.0002 0.0000 73.99 17.94 0.00 
HCC 19 0.0116 0.0001 0.0000 19.90 11.03 0.07 
HCC 21 0.1207 0.0008 0.0000 74.25 52.32 0.16 
HCC 22 0.1290 0.0002 0.0000 25.55 10.26 0.01 
HCC 23 0.0234 0.0003 0.0000 55.15 23.88 0.02 
HCC 27 0.0896 0.0010 0.0000 -75.35 87.39 0.39 
HCC 28 0.0442 0.0009 0.0000 27.52 65.90 0.68 
HCC 29 0.0194 0.0006 0.0000 -3.95 52.29 0.94 
HCC 33 0.4129 0.0005 0.0000 126.51 38.78 0.00 
HCC 34 0.2191 0.0012 0.0000 49.69 112.70 0.66 
HCC 35 0.0482 0.0004 0.0000 53.63 36.67 0.14 
HCC 39 0.1711 0.0006 0.0000 50.65 16.17 0.00 
HCC 40 0.0143 0.0002 0.0000 25.40 13.64 0.06 
HCC 46 0.1072 0.0010 0.0000 169.58 76.58 0.03 
HCC 47 0.0503 0.0004 0.0000 96.07 36.70 0.01 
HCC 48 0.1024 0.0003 0.0000 101.53 17.42 0.00 
HCC 54 0.4409 0.0007 0.0000 -7.50 50.66 0.88 
HCC 55 0.1427 0.0003 0.0000 52.06 27.22 0.06 
HCC 57 0.2155 0.0009 0.0000 18.87 104.43 0.86 
HCC 58 0.0458 0.0002 0.0000 54.31 15.72 0.00 
HCC 70 0.0009 0.0019 0.6416 -133.32 228.93 0.56 
HCC 71 0.0960 0.0018 0.0000 284.19 183.80 0.12 
HCC 72 0.1300 0.0006 0.0000 -35.84 55.48 0.52 
HCC 73 0.0003 0.0028 0.9094 -0.23 261.26 1.00 
HCC 74 -0.0131 0.0013 0.0000 44.71 156.34 0.77 
HCC 75 0.0381 0.0007 0.0000 31.69 50.62 0.53 
HCC 76 -0.0002 0.0022 0.9188 -15.03 227.92 0.95 
HCC 77 0.0171 0.0005 0.0000 49.74 55.62 0.37 
HCC 78 0.0353 0.0011 0.0000 15.01 73.66 0.84 
HCC 79 0.0569 0.0003 0.0000 -51.02 34.27 0.14 
HCC 80 0.1462 0.0011 0.0000 261.92 131.35 0.05 
HCC 82 -0.0781 0.0019 0.0000 -133.76 221.83 0.55 
HCC 83 0.1988 0.0034 0.0000 713.20 543.01 0.19 
HCC 84 0.2659 0.0006 0.0000 0.33 42.66 0.99 
HCC 85 0.0752 0.0003 0.0000 32.25 21.13 0.13 
HCC 86 0.5791 0.0008 0.0000 -46.93 72.77 0.52 
HCC 87 0.2019 0.0006 0.0000 69.04 41.44 0.10 
HCC 88 0.0495 0.0005 0.0000 24.60 38.75 0.53 
HCC 96 0.0782 0.0003 0.0000 120.96 16.91 0.00 
HCC 99 0.2640 0.0011 0.0000 -134.51 113.93 0.24 
HCC 100 0.1753 0.0005 0.0000 55.00 42.88 0.20 
HCC 103 0.1397 0.0010 0.0000 67.89 86.71 0.43 
HCC 104 0.0862 0.0017 0.0000 318.89 128.16 0.01 
HCC 106 0.1038 0.0015 0.0000 367.35 125.47 0.00 
HCC 107 0.1505 0.0005 0.0000 129.83 30.01 0.00 





HCC 110 0.1186 0.0021 0.0000 283.16 322.42 0.38 
HCC 111 0.0640 0.0003 0.0000 24.76 16.61 0.14 
HCC 112 0.0432 0.0005 0.0000 38.48 36.95 0.30 
HCC 114 0.0917 0.0011 0.0000 4.46 83.92 0.96 
HCC 115 0.1433 0.0012 0.0000 -16.75 107.86 0.88 
HCC 122 -0.0037 0.0007 0.0000 119.06 79.76 0.14 
HCC 124 -0.0010 0.0015 0.5058 -168.54 119.36 0.16 
HCC 134 0.0807 0.0014 0.0000 12.66 206.90 0.95 
HCC 135 0.3122 0.0005 0.0000 205.24 27.99 0.00 
HCC 136 0.0072 0.0011 0.0000 -33.31 103.17 0.75 
HCC 137 -0.0125 0.0013 0.0000 -60.89 92.09 0.51 
HCC 157 -0.1800 0.0037 0.0000 -275.14 293.90 0.35 
HCC 158 -0.0917 0.0029 0.0000 -47.04 189.01 0.80 
HCC 161 0.0227 0.0005 0.0000 8.46 39.08 0.83 
HCC 162 0.2243 0.0038 0.0000 101.21 283.39 0.72 
HCC 166 0.0507 0.0041 0.0000 42.09 387.43 0.91 
HCC 167 0.1158 0.0008 0.0000 -72.06 83.74 0.39 
HCC 169 0.1151 0.0008 0.0000 136.47 60.70 0.02 
HCC 170 0.2482 0.0009 0.0000 350.31 25.34 0.00 
HCC 173 0.1114 0.0009 0.0000 181.70 56.24 0.00 
HCC 176 0.1930 0.0005 0.0000 95.87 15.55 0.00 
HCC 186 0.0274 0.0011 0.0000 -103.80 94.05 0.27 
HCC 188 0.0933 0.0008 0.0000 -23.26 76.79 0.76 
HCC 189 0.0229 0.0016 0.0000 15.68 88.00 0.86 
       
Number of Observations 46,518,630   121,612   
R-Square 0.21   0.01   
 
Notes: Data comes from the Truven Health MarketScan Database of Commercial Claim for 2013-2015, 
based on the sample in Table 2.1. The measure of price-adjusted spending reprices all services using the 
mean payment rate observed in the data and sums over all services provided in an admission. Major Joint 
Replacement w/o MCC corresponds to DRG 470.. For the extensive sample, the fraction in each plan is the 
average fraction of a year that enrollees spent in each plan. For the intensive sample, it is the fraction of the 
sample enrolled in that plan at the point of admission. 
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Appendix Table 2.3: Models of Extensive Utilization, Full Stratified Results 
         






HHI > 2500 
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
VARIABLES     
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
                  
Insurance Market  0.125* 0.0377 0.0605 0.0844 0.0937 -0.00222 0.0944 0.0449 
 Concentration (1,000s) (0.0639) (0.0655) (0.0695) (0.0592) (0.0865) (0.0963) (0.0877) (0.0767) 
Hospital Market  -0.0309 0.0977 -0.0602 0.0184 -0.104 0.0715 0.0265 0.120 
 Concentration (1,000s) (0.0396) (0.0812) (0.0483) (0.0424) (0.0656) (0.0738) (0.0450) (0.178) 
Physician Market  -0.0849 0.0150 -0.0275 -0.0232 -0.0469 0.0115 -0.142 0.00862 
 Concentration (1,000s) (0.0844) (0.0402) (0.0552) (0.0516) (0.138) (0.0543) (0.136) (0.0587) 
Percent Uninsured -0.0151 -0.0333** -0.0107 -0.0401** -0.00687 -0.0137 -0.0435* -0.0401** 
 (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0133) (0.0168) (0.0137) (0.0223) (0.0237) (0.0188) 
Median Real Income 0.0221* 0.0146 0.0145 0.0310*** 0.0167 0.00557 0.0471*** 0.0175 
 (0.0119) (0.0105) (0.0127) (0.0109) (0.0148) (0.0175) (0.0164) (0.0122) 
Percent Unemployed -0.000762 -0.00312 -0.0552 0.0449* -0.0491 -0.0443 0.0651** 0.0186 
 (0.0277) (0.0288) (0.0348) (0.0247) (0.0381) (0.0655) (0.0306) (0.0298) 
Percent in Poverty 0.0151 0.0172 0.0333* -0.000511 0.0362 0.0142 -0.00837 0.0108 
 (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0186) (0.0173) (0.0237) (0.0256) (0.0283) (0.0215) 
Percent Non-White 0.0308 -0.0136 0.0240 0.0826 0.0155 0.205 0.136 -0.0785 
 (0.0609) (0.0833) (0.0705) (0.0857) (0.0802) (0.138) (0.0922) (0.0945) 
Percent Bachelor's Degree -0.0202 0.00504 -0.00934 0.00390 -0.0399 0.0515 0.0159 -0.0266 





0.000101*** -3.54e-05 -9.77e-05*** 0.00101** -3.88e-05 -6.44e-05 
 (2.08e-05) (0.000166) (2.33e-05) (7.64e-05) (2.61e-05) (0.000449) (8.36e-05) (0.000150) 
MDs per 1,000 -0.816*** 0.0568 -0.457 -0.570* -0.730* 1.197 -1.163** -0.161 





Medicare Advantage  -0.00770 -0.00282 -0.00842 -0.00176 -0.00429 -0.0305* -0.000699 0.00348 
 Penetration (0.00804) (0.00837) (0.0120) (0.00755) (0.0137) (0.0155) (0.0117) (0.00834) 
Year = 2014 -0.379*** -0.450*** -0.437*** -0.438*** -0.395*** -0.497*** -0.453*** -0.401*** 
 (0.0617) (0.0671) (0.0737) (0.0717) (0.0900) (0.138) (0.103) (0.0673) 
Year = 2015 -0.675*** -0.744*** -0.722*** -0.838*** -0.648*** -0.813*** -0.924*** -0.681*** 
 (0.117) (0.123) (0.130) (0.138) (0.161) (0.230) (0.193) (0.132) 
Constant 0.868 -0.779 0.438 -2.676 2.128 -7.228* -4.256 1.853 
 (3.280) (2.998) (3.467) (3.490) (4.501) (4.258) (4.382) (3.790) 
         
Observations 538 584 475 647 288 187 250 397 
R-squared 9.36e-01 8.93e-01 9.44e-01 9.06e-01 9.50e-01 9.30e-01 9.27e-01 8.78e-01 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual by market and year from models predicting having any 
admission as a function of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between those variables, and hierarchical conditional categories estimated using the 










Appendix Table 2.4: Models of Intensive Utilization, Full Stratified Results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
VARIABLES     
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
                  
Insurance Market  142.1** -6.716 196.4* 22.92 211.7 163.3 52.40 -35.67 
HHI (1,000s) (60.49) (45.46) (108.2) (35.39) (133.9) (126.7) (56.94) (46.29) 
Hospital Market  -25.08 -50.93 -31.44 -22.96 -36.94 -47.67 -16.95 -67.46 
HHI (1,000s) (29.04) (45.65) (48.38) (32.05) (63.42) (61.63) (36.08) (72.92) 
Physician Market  -14.86 -12.73 7.928 -13.04 102.8 -25.92 -65.21 -2.322 
 HHI (1,000s) (74.55) (24.49) (50.72) (31.00) (124.6) (41.42) (81.21) (29.93) 
Percent Uninsured -22.24** -28.82** -18.84* -21.03* -14.42 -25.10 -16.15 -31.39* 
 (8.851) (12.12) (10.31) (11.34) (12.77) (15.57) (15.02) (16.85) 
Median Real Income 3.115 4.566 2.153 0.258 3.143 -2.632 2.099 9.762 
 (8.833) (9.004) (8.559) (9.774) (10.10) (11.08) (14.59) (12.97) 
Percent Unemployed 16.56 18.39 17.75 25.51 32.17 -13.44 21.12 28.86 
 (27.36) (24.95) (31.30) (24.77) (40.11) (43.69) (31.93) (29.72) 
Percent in Poverty -15.39 -0.297 -12.34 -5.569 -14.48 -9.611 -2.837 0.459 
 (17.54) (14.09) (21.18) (12.90) (27.27) (26.18) (20.21) (14.92) 
Percent Non-White 18.52 -16.05 14.85 -32.80 -5.714 7.645 -32.33 -40.18 
 (54.68) (69.62) (85.15) (67.00) (101.9) (81.04) (83.42) (87.24) 
Percent Bachelor's  -18.44 -20.10 -4.735 -45.62 -23.86 -38.66 -56.44 -21.78 
 Degree (60.18) (30.90) (53.40) (41.12) (66.59) (68.52) (81.65) (36.88) 
Total Beds -0.0320 -0.0679 -0.0395* 0.00853 -0.0397 0.294 0.00296 -0.0881 
 (0.0354) (0.156) (0.0232) (0.102) (0.0259) (0.212) (0.113) (0.166) 
MDs per 1,000 -282.5 -78.07 -305.2 -261.8 -519.9 625.4 -287.3 -180.0 
 (311.3) (277.8) (328.6) (260.8) (388.8) (479.9) (539.3) (288.8) 
Medicare Advantage  -0.881 -2.873 9.405 -7.138 13.38 -5.954 -7.951 -2.738 





Year = 2014 70.48 82.73 72.10 124.0*** 123.1 20.13 131.7* 119.5 
 (64.60) (61.82) (92.66) (45.91) (125.7) (57.74) (66.50) (81.41) 
Year = 2015 52.19 85.08 61.54 146.6* 146.8 10.40 161.4 124.2 
 (116.2) (105.9) (160.9) (79.29) (217.5) (101.6) (118.1) (139.1) 
Constant 668.7 1,402 -74.22 3,517 1,574 231.1 3,896 2,215 
 (2,804) (2,029) (3,517) (2,498) (4,757) (3,398) (4,236) (2,658) 
         
Observations 538 584 475 647 288 187 250 397 
R-squared 0.917 0.895 0.897 0.940 0.891 0.923 0.953 0.883 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual by market and year from models predicting price-
adjusted professional spending (intensive) as a function of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between those variables, and hierarchical conditional 

























Appendix Table 2.5: Effect of Insurance Market Concentration on Acute and 
Planned Extensive Utilization, Stratified by Physician and Insurer Concentration 
 
Panel A: Acute Extensive Utilization (Any Admission) 
Unadjusted Mean: 0.40 
 All Physician Markets Physician HHI <2,500 Physician HHI > 2,500 
All Insurance 
Markets 
Beta (SE)= 0.0134 
(0.0103) 
Beta (SE)= 0.0237* 
(0.0138) 
Beta (SE)= -0.00136 
(0.0152) 
 N= 1,166 N= 538 N= 584 
   Stratified P-value=0.2 
Insurance HHI 
<2,500 
Beta (SE)= 0.00991 
(0.0161) 
Beta (SE)= 0.0147 
(0.0187) 
Beta (SE)= 0.00912 
(0.0351) 
 N= 475 N= 288 N= 187 
   Stratified P-value= 0.81 
Insurance HHI 
>2,500 
Beta (SE)= 0.0111 
(0.0122) 
Beta (SE)= 0.0178 
(0.0156) 
Beta (SE)= -0.00624 
(0.0167) 
 N= 647 N= 250 N= 397 
 Stratified P-value= 0.95 Stratified P-value= 0.88 Stratified P-value= 0.47 
 
Panel B: Planned Extensive Utilization (Any Admission) 
Unadjusted Mean: 1.32 
 All Physician Markets Physician HHI <2,500 Physician HHI > 2,500 
All Insurance 
Markets 
Beta (SE)= 0.00983 
(0.0281) 
Beta (SE)= 0.0161 
(0.0414) 
Beta (SE)= -0.00232 
(0.0295) 
 N= 1,166 N= 538 N= 584 
   Stratified P-value=0.75 
Insurance HHI 
<2,500 
Beta (SE)= -0.0176 
(0.0602) 
Beta (SE)= -0.00114 
(0.0763) 
Beta (SE)= -0.0624 
(0.0856) 
 N= 475 N= 288 N= 187 
   Stratified P-value= 0.5 
Insurance HHI 
>2,500 
Beta (SE)= 0.0160 
(0.0270) 
Beta (SE)= 0.0144 
(0.0411) 
Beta (SE)= 0.0121 
(0.0325) 
 N= 647 N= 250 N= 397 
 Stratified P-value= 0.61 Stratified P-value= 0.83 Stratified P-value= 0.91 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual 
by market and year from models predicting having any admission (extensive) and price-adjusted 
professional spending (intensive) as a function of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between 
those variables, and hierarchical conditional categories estimated using the sample in Table 2.1. For 
intensive utilization, separate models are estimated for each DRG. Planned admissions are defined as the 
set of DRGs with at least 5,000 admissions for which the share of weekend admissions was below 15%. 
Stratified p-values report the results of a test of the equality of coefficients between market stratifications, 
with the effect in concentrated physician (insurance) markets tested against competitive physician 
(insurance) markets, and high/low, low/high, and high/high concentration physician/insurance markets 
tested against low/low concentration physician/insurance markets. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table 2.6: Models of Acute Intensive Utilization, Full Stratified Results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Markets 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
VARIABLES      
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
                    
Insurance Market  17.89 40.12 -38.98 -37.36 6.817 6.290 -201.0 -1.631 -8.214 
 Concentration (1,000s) (54.34) (75.08) (86.56) (134.8) (54.33) (170.4) (193.0) (65.83) (97.03) 
Hospital Market  -6.961 -9.212 47.55 39.47 -29.56 36.68 6.420 -26.79 -6.074 
 Concentration (1,000s) (32.77) (35.62) (81.94) (75.45) (31.47) (89.17) (85.17) (35.23) (162.6) 
Physician Market 12.07 -35.78 -14.38 -44.65 32.68 -21.34 -67.63 17.50 32.01 
 Concentration (1,000s) (46.57) (92.37) (47.44) (70.89) (56.50) (143.9) (65.04) (127.4) (57.77) 
Percent Uninsured -19.67 -20.00 -21.31 -19.21 -17.70 -17.03 -18.95 -16.73 -18.52 
 (12.25) (13.99) (18.79) (13.80) (14.74) (15.67) (30.87) (18.14) (23.56) 
Median Real Income -3.977 -0.944 -14.35 -2.813 -10.60 2.005 -21.37 -4.383 -8.770 
 (9.288) (12.03) (14.31) (11.50) (14.33) (13.86) (18.87) (20.18) (19.81) 
Percent Unemployed 8.730 -1.309 29.73 -35.01 29.91 -34.86 4.064 21.08 37.53 
 (21.63) (26.25) (33.55) (44.23) (22.17) (51.38) (73.16) (27.17) (37.63) 
Percent in Poverty -18.17 -12.82 -26.38 -21.11 -11.89 -10.75 -50.73 -2.312 -14.95 
 (13.86) (19.91) (19.86) (19.89) (19.01) (25.49) (33.78) (29.60) (25.96) 
Percent Non-White 39.54 38.35 138.2 -10.82 59.65 -31.59 326.7 45.63 80.78 
 (50.83) (56.09) (158.0) (87.34) (70.28) (102.7) (221.2) (76.75) (196.4) 
Percent Bachelor's  -18.80 -34.69 34.12 -30.71 -24.23 -35.42 -62.62 -78.60 47.84 
 Degree (42.52) (63.96) (53.87) (60.77) (54.35) (72.00) (122.0) (100.6) (63.47) 
Total Beds -0.0488* -0.0477 -0.180 -0.0493 -0.0286 -0.0456 0.689 -0.0188 -0.214 
 (0.0286) (0.0313) (0.200) (0.0300) (0.0963) (0.0334) (0.545) (0.110) (0.213) 
MDs per 1,000 104.6 180.7 -54.16 419.9 -28.59 213.3 1,544 337.1 -344.1 
 (299.9) (386.8) (466.0) (470.6) (334.1) (561.9) (944.5) (516.2) (420.6) 





 (8.705) (11.67) (10.43) (16.18) (7.568) (18.94) (20.01) (9.289) (12.19) 
Year = 2014 65.79 61.51 48.07 1.340 123.3** 17.03 6.166 160.6* 76.17 
 (49.75) (62.50) (89.64) (93.85) (61.29) (119.1) (150.3) (81.15) (114.9) 
Year = 2015 126.6 122.9 61.02 38.46 208.9* 73.09 -33.74 268.5* 134.8 
 (93.28) (119.8) (161.6) (167.6) (113.4) (211.7) (279.4) (156.9) (197.5) 
Constant -393.7 -225.6 -3,245 859.2 -46.34 1,789 -5,743 828.4 -2,151 
 (2,151) (2,822) (4,110) (3,625) (2,758) (4,686) (5,868) (4,148) (5,506) 
          
Observations 1,165 538 584 475 647 288 187 250 397 
R-squared 0.797 0.836 0.639 0.818 0.795 0.831 0.707 0.859 0.626 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual by market and year from models predicting having any 
admission (extensive) and price-adjusted professional spending (intensive) as a function of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between those variables, 
and hierarchical conditional categories estimated using the sample in Table 2.1. For intensive utilization, separate models are estimated for each DRG. Acute 
admissions are defined as the set of DRGs with at least 5,000 admissions for which the share of weekend admissions was above 25%. Robust standard errors in 






















Appendix Table 2.7: Models of Planned Intensive Utilization, Full Stratified Results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Markets 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
Physician 
HHI < 2500 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
VARIABLES      
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
                    
Insurance Market  200.5*** 299.8*** 54.44 407.2** 91.44 396.4* 525.4** 157.1 -23.81 
 Concentration (1,000s) (71.23) (110.3) (82.76) (184.9) (65.90) (223.3) (225.4) (113.4) (81.71) 
Hospital Market  -32.02 -22.16 -122.9 -62.60 -9.684 -65.46 -92.10 5.153 -174.4 
 Concentration (1,000s) (41.72) (45.50) (100.9) (79.07) (49.97) (96.02) (147.1) (56.01) (143.8) 
Physician Market -20.48 -12.80 -25.45 17.58 -27.63 174.0 -27.27 -71.36 -18.58 
 Concentration (1,000s) (52.26) (133.6) (49.51) (94.30) (59.77) (216.1) (83.44) (149.0) (57.10) 
Percent Uninsured -37.03*** -35.67** -42.68* -25.45 -42.37* -17.72 -28.70 -38.98 -54.13 
 (13.46) (16.41) (24.44) (18.53) (24.48) (22.51) (31.72) (33.34) (33.75) 
Median Real Income 6.875 2.821 13.11 4.003 -1.869 4.574 1.517 -3.020 23.56 
 (12.81) (17.02) (17.96) (15.99) (18.42) (18.38) (22.07) (27.05) (25.41) 
Percent Unemployed 34.85 29.94 21.74 58.69 31.15 96.46 -62.33 21.22 44.24 
 (43.48) (55.05) (48.96) (55.26) (50.46) (70.15) (88.63) (64.96) (57.38) 
Percent in Poverty -24.73 -39.76 -4.241 -37.86 -15.08 -45.51 -17.00 -10.47 -2.970 
 (21.08) (31.34) (27.21) (37.58) (24.48) (47.00) (50.54) (38.12) (28.32) 
Percent Non-White 9.478 29.47 -38.53 30.54 -81.72 -22.18 -71.06 -83.78 -73.99 
 (88.22) (101.4) (124.8) (148.6) (133.1) (174.3) (158.9) (169.1) (146.6) 
Percent Bachelor's  -69.60 -66.31 -79.62 -78.14 -94.49 -119.9 -172.7 -97.65 -66.82 
 Degree (70.79) (108.6) (62.12) (99.15) (79.17) (122.1) (146.6) (153.4) (69.56) 
Total Beds -0.0188 -0.0158 -0.272 -0.0386 0.0154 -0.0396 0.147 0.0140 -0.294 
 (0.0602) (0.0669) (0.283) (0.0405) (0.192) (0.0430) (0.381) (0.206) (0.304) 
MDs per 1,000 -395.8 -586.6 -124.1 -505.3 -697.7 -920.7 1,179 -889.9 -309.8 
 (454.9) (633.9) (516.3) (634.6) (568.7) (712.5) (936.9) (1,140) (549.0) 





 Penetration (12.69) (16.47) (14.49) (24.11) (11.80) (28.65) (31.98) (18.12) (17.34) 
Year = 2014 111.4 97.81 117.4 165.9 143.3 287.3 59.10 134.7 163.3 
 (89.72) (114.0) (113.6) (161.4) (92.45) (215.4) (107.0) (133.4) (147.2) 
Year = 2015 87.23 64.33 113.1 195.0 134.3 402.3 66.63 124.4 139.4 
 (159.6) (205.1) (199.2) (278.6) (160.8) (371.1) (183.4) (232.9) (259.6) 
Constant 2,878 2,875 3,744 1,938 8,228 6,069 4,422 9,337 4,842 
 (3,757) (5,047) (3,860) (6,397) (5,073) (8,289) (6,339) (8,460) (4,786) 
          
Observations 1,166 538 584 475 647 288 187 250 397 
R-squared 0.911 0.916 0.850 0.895 0.928 0.895 0.891 0.947 0.836 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual by market and year from models predicting having 
price-adjusted professional spending (intensive) as a function of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between those variables, and hierarchical 
conditional categories estimated using the sample in Table 2.1. For intensive utilization, separate models are estimated for each DRG. Planned admissions are 
defined as the set of DRGs with at least 5,000 admissions for which the share of weekend admissions was below 15%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 







Appendix Table 2.8: Models of Readmissions 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












              
Insurance Market  -0.551 -0.571 -0.213 -0.658 -0.620 -0.715 
 Concentration (1,000s) (0.583) (0.589) (0.742) (1.002) (1.112) (0.673) 
Hospital Market  0.947***  0.931** 1.075 0.317 1.271*** 
 Concentration (1,000s) (0.353)  (0.382) (1.520) (0.853) (0.374) 
Physician Market -0.851 -0.790 -1.736 -0.678 0.235 -1.437* 
 Concentration (1,000s) (0.629) (0.630) (1.130) (0.786) (0.998) (0.780) 
Percent Uninsured -0.0295 -0.0176 -0.0139 -0.0498 0.0788 -0.251 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.132) (0.278) (0.152) (0.217) 
Median Real Income -0.0696 -0.0771 -0.0932 0.0129 -0.0905 -0.0628 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.125) (0.243) (0.145) (0.169) 
Percent Unemployed -0.0212 -0.0456 -0.280 0.764 0.322 -0.0931 
 (0.242) (0.241) (0.275) (0.473) (0.493) (0.284) 
Percent in Poverty -0.140 -0.128 -0.115 -0.0462 -0.136 -0.0878 
 (0.185) (0.186) (0.222) (0.318) (0.294) (0.260) 
Percent Non-White 0.0640 0.113 -0.0615 1.305 -0.512 0.0529 
 (0.434) (0.440) (0.447) (1.629) (0.697) (0.656) 
Percent Bachelor's Degree 0.379 0.379 0.436 0.233 0.410 0.252 
 (0.426) (0.432) (0.533) (0.792) (0.752) (0.496) 
Total Beds -0.000415** -0.000342* -0.000244 -0.00434* -0.000353 -0.00163 
 (0.000204) (0.000198) (0.000196) (0.00246) (0.000268) (0.00100) 
MDs per 1,000 3.309 3.117 3.161 4.042 4.607 1.780 
 (2.925) (2.935) (3.673) (4.611) (4.396) (3.741) 
Medicare Advantage Penetration 0.00823 0.00823 0.0142 -0.0309 0.198 -0.0655 





Year = 2014 -0.396 -0.363 -0.596 0.284 0.326 -0.875 
 (0.484) (0.494) (0.571) (1.164) (0.836) (0.734) 
Year = 2015 -0.299 -0.189 -0.484 0.0121 1.154 -1.418 
 (0.882) (0.893) (1.049) (2.104) (1.480) (1.404) 
Constant -16.62 -14.69 -11.31 -52.40 -7.293 -2.405 
 (21.60) (22.25) (25.77) (52.08) (31.90) (31.44) 
       
Observations 1,163 1,165 537 583 475 645 
R-squared 0.498 0.493 0.566 0.407 0.489 0.523 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual by market and year from models predicting 
experiencing a readmission as a function of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between those variables, and hierarchical conditional categories 
estimated using the sample in Table 2.1, with separate models for 5 cohorts of patients (defined by CMS methodology). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Appendix Table 2.9: Summary Statistics, Continuously Enrolled Sample 
 
  Extensive Intensive Acute Intensive Planned Intensive Readmissions 














Percent with Any Admission 4.40 20.50         
 
Price-Adjusted Professional Spending   3,822.89 3,370.13 2,567.02 2,088.12 5,629.98 4,150.82   
 
Percent with a Readmission         7.66 26.60 
 
Fraction Male 0.48 0.50 0.24 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.35 0.48  
Fraction Female 0.52 0.50 0.76 0.43 0.51 0.50 0.79 0.41 0.65 0.48  
Fraction Aged 18-34 0.26 0.44 0.42 0.49 0.11 0.31 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44  
Fraction Aged 35-44 0.22 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.35 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.38  
Fraction Aged 45-54 0.28 0.45 0.16 0.37 0.31 0.46 0.19 0.40 0.23 0.42  
Fraction Aged 55-64 0.24 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.44 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.47  
Fraction in Comprehensive Plan 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.23  
Fraction in EPO Plan 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08  
Fraction in POS Plan 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29  
Fraction in PPO Plan 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.64 0.48  
Fraction in CDHP Plan 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.35  
Fraction in HDHP Plan 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23  
 
Notes: Data comes from the Truven Health MarketScan Database of Commercial Claim for 2013-2015. The sample was restricted to beneficiaries continuously 
enrolled from 2013 through 2015. The measure of price-adjusted spending reprices all services using the mean payment rate observed in the data and sums over 
all professional services provided in an admission. The intensive sample is restricted to the set of admissions for the set of diagnosis-related-groups (DRGs) with 
at least 5,000 admissions. For the extensive sample, the fraction in each plan is the average fraction of a year that enrollees spent in each plan. For the intensive 
sample, it is the fraction of the sample enrolled in that plan at the point of admission. Planned admissions are the subset of those admissions for which the share 





Appendix Table 2.10: Sensitivity Analysis, Continuously Enrolled Sample 
 
  Extensive (Any Admission) Intensive (Price-Adjusted Professional Spending)  Readmissions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 










>2500 Acute Planned  
            
Insurance Market  
 Conc. (1,000s) 
0.0628 0.00297 -0.0188 127.2** 195.2** 43.08 344.2*** 23.23 -5.634 194.9** -1.857** 
(0.0583) (0.00906) (0.0294) (52.73) (81.51) (58.15) (128.5) (51.31) (61.72) (87.17) (0.735) 
Hospital Market  
 Conc. (1,000s) 
-0.00367 -0.00483 0.00881 -58.82 -61.84 -50.13 -73.40 -39.22 -43.84 -73.02 0.481 
(0.0481) (0.00941) (0.0216) (38.78) (44.42) (48.41) (62.12) (51.66) (70.94) (59.38) (0.500) 
Physician Market  
 Conc. (1,000s) 
0.00329 0.00484 -0.0197 -1.835 -26.65 1.478 40.90 -21.92 48.80 -40.55 -1.234* 
(0.0474) (0.00707) (0.0216) (34.00) (95.17) (33.46) (65.81) (31.20) (68.40) (59.10) (0.738) 
Percent Uninsured 0.00919 -0.000275 0.00600 -11.29 -10.02 -9.855 -8.282 -13.74 -5.800 -15.82 -0.0384 
 (0.0101) (0.00167) (0.00424) (10.99) (13.50) (11.58) (15.35) (11.75) (20.11) (18.85) (0.149) 
Median Real Income 0.00899 0.00120 0.00265 0.889 -0.876 7.783 -3.938 5.013 -0.508 7.813 -0.145 
 (0.00871) (0.00134) (0.00422) (6.864) (9.891) (9.907) (10.27) (8.748) (15.42) (12.59) (0.153) 
Percent Unemployed 0.0104 0.00875** -0.00282 19.45 9.580 44.90* 42.72 18.33 30.66 17.07 0.307 
 (0.0271) (0.00397) (0.0134) (22.78) (29.64) (24.12) (40.58) (22.88) (30.43) (37.72) (0.375) 
Percent in Poverty 0.00498 0.00267 0.00483 -10.94 -13.18 -6.727 4.959 -20.14 -30.00 -22.64 0.0162 
 (0.0156) (0.00247) (0.00786) (14.01) (22.62) (15.90) (27.58) (14.59) (24.17) (23.16) (0.272) 
Percent Non-White -0.00698 -0.00482 -0.0249 -2.204 -1.953 -40.61 29.45 -50.84 28.51 -7.965 0.0692 
 (0.0567) (0.00912) (0.0227) (58.18) (69.05) (73.44) (122.3) (45.03) (85.10) (97.39) (0.654) 
Percent Bachelor's 
 Degree 
0.0320 0.00671 0.0131 -16.02 -10.17 -22.31 41.34 -60.15* -3.616 -39.52 0.895 
(0.0442) (0.00637) (0.0200) (37.99) (58.03) (33.65) (62.23) (32.70) (58.73) (59.17) (0.630) 
Total Beds 
-5.62e-
05** -2.49e-06 -1.92e-05 0.0132 0.0192 0.0136 -0.00604 0.0772 0.0363 0.0374 -0.000395 
 (2.26e-05) (5.17e-06) (1.25e-05) (0.0268) (0.0290) (0.187) (0.0240) (0.0950) (0.0417) (0.0438) (0.000327) 
MDs per 1,000 -0.640** -0.0263 -0.174 -111.2 -210.4 -49.42 -215.2 -204.6 252.5 -273.0 7.396 





Medicare Advantage  
 Penetration 
-0.00344 0.00145 -0.000189 -8.952 -9.068 -8.869 4.988 -17.02** -8.256 -18.02 0.135 
(0.00825) (0.00128) (0.00381) (7.815) (10.28) (6.864) (13.96) (7.448) (11.88) (11.41) (0.0947) 
Year = 2014 -0.317*** -0.0141* -0.0541** 106.9* 105.1 123.5** 90.82 150.9*** 43.52 137.5 -0.265 
 (0.0609) (0.00839) (0.0254) (61.41) (78.29) (60.84) (112.9) (53.53) (81.02) (100.1) (0.724) 
Year = 2015 -0.578*** -0.0304** -0.152*** 123.9 118.9 177.9* 105.0 174.3** 79.87 122.6 0.314 
 (0.112) (0.0152) (0.0463) (108.0) (137.5) (95.01) (195.4) (88.31) (146.3) (174.4) (1.333) 
Constant 0.492 -0.153 0.831 1,094 1,265 1,410 -2,724 4,586** -975.3 2,513 -42.36 
 (2.600) (0.369) (1.012) (2,407) (3,353) (2,177) (4,492) (2,010) (3,587) (3,899) (28.32) 
            
Observations 1,166 1,166 1,166 1,166 520 602 475 647 1,123 1,166 1,152 
R-squared 0.895 0.619 0.785 0.913 0.911 0.895 0.872 0.951 0.709 0.904 0.487 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual by market and year from models predicting having any 
admission (extensive), price-adjusted professional spending (intensive), and readmissions as a function of age, sex, plan type, the pairwise interactions between 
those variables, and hierarchical conditional categories estimated using the sample in Appendix Table 2.9. For intensive utilization, separate models are estimated 
for each DRG. This sample was restricted to beneficiaries continuously enrolled from 2013 through 2015. Acute admissions are defined as the set of DRGs with 
at least 5,000 admissions for which the share of weekend admissions was above 25%, while planned admissions have weekend admission shares of below 15%. 




Appendix Table 2.11: Readmissions for Continuously Enrolled Sample, 
Stratified Results    




HHI < 2500 
Readmissions 
Physician 
HHI > 2500 
Readmissions 
Insurance 
HHI < 2500 
Readmissions 
Insurance 
HHI > 2500 
          
Insurance Market HHI (1,000s) -1.367* -2.481* -2.164** -1.893* 
 (0.807) (1.428) (1.032) (0.985) 
Hospital Market HHI (1,000s) 0.399 2.399 -0.569 1.181** 
 (0.547) (1.860) (1.004) (0.566) 
Physician Market HHI (1,000s) -3.459*** -0.494 -1.140 -1.228 
 (1.205) (0.890) (1.068) (1.013) 
Percent Uninsured -0.0153 -0.0982 0.197 -0.551 
 (0.166) (0.423) (0.164) (0.334) 
Median Real Income -0.154 -0.179 -0.187 -0.216 
 (0.152) (0.356) (0.168) (0.281) 
Percent Unemployed -0.0567 1.073 0.578 0.430 
 (0.460) (0.661) (0.571) (0.486) 
Percent in Poverty -0.0501 0.110 0.0588 -0.0806 
 (0.321) (0.418) (0.322) (0.416) 
Percent Non-White -0.0335 1.971 -0.716 0.478 
 (0.712) (2.436) (0.830) (1.174) 
Percent Bachelor's Degree 1.092 0.990 1.310 0.506 
 (0.788) (1.002) (0.946) (0.783) 
Total Beds -0.000250 -0.00468 -0.000270 -0.00175 
 (0.000328) (0.00404) (0.000348) (0.00161) 
MDs per 1,000 10.43* 2.199 12.59*** 1.366 
 (5.344) (7.163) (4.614) (5.495) 
Medicare Advantage Penetration 0.0955 0.220 0.285 0.0986 
 (0.120) (0.159) (0.182) (0.109) 
Year = 2014 -0.628 -0.00671 1.106 -1.781* 
 (0.883) (1.630) (1.089) (1.077) 
Year = 2015 -0.263 0.00609 2.496 -2.165 
 (1.669) (2.820) (1.971) (2.056) 
Constant -48.95 -89.75 -46.46 -13.33 
 (35.12) (74.46) (35.38) (49.32) 
     
Observations 517 592 472 637 
R-squared 0.546 0.420 0.515 0.490 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a market-year. The outcome variable in each model is the mean residual 
by market and year from models predicting experiencing a readmission as a function of age, sex, plan type, 
the pairwise interactions between those variables, and hierarchical conditional categories estimated using 
the sample in Appendix 11, with separate models for 5 cohorts of patients (defined by CMS methodology). 













3. Paper 2: Do Physician Financial Incentives Matter in the 










A small literature documents that insurance market concentration is positively 
related to healthcare utilization. While this may be related to patients demanding more 
healthcare services as insurers negotiate lower rates, it is also possible that healthcare 
providers recommend more services in order to maintain higher revenues as the per-unit 
payment rate falls. Diagnostic imaging presents an opportunity to explore how financial 
incentives modify the relationship between insurer concentration and utilization, as non-
radiologists who own imaging equipment and can bill for the scan have a strong financial 
incentive to order imaging services for their patients, compared to non-radiologists who 
refer a patient to a radiologist for imaging. 
For a set of physician specialties disproportionately associated with ownership of 
MRI (orthopedics and neurology) or CT (urology), I construct specialty-specific 
measures of a patient having any MRI or CT utilization in the 30-days following a new 





effect of insurer concentration on the probability of receiving a scan varies significantly 
across the patients of owners and non-owners, using inverse-probability-weighted 
regression adjustment to mitigate confounding. Measures of insurance and physician 
market concentration are constructed from HealthLeaders-InterStudy data and publicly 
available Medicare files, respectively. I also estimate models predicting low-value 
imaging - the use of back MRI following an office visit with a diagnosis of back pain, the 
use of head MRI following an office visit with a diagnosis of headache, and the use of 
abdomen CT with and without contrast material. 
I find that for neurology and urology, imaging ownership does not significantly 
affect the relationship between insurer concentration and utilization. However, the effect 
of insurer concentration on overall imaging and low-value imaging is significantly more 
positive for orthopedists who own imaging equipment. A 1,000-point increase in insurer 
HHI leads to a 4% increase in the probability of imaging following a new patient visit 
with an orthopedist non-owner, compared to an 11.9% increase following a visit with an 
owner, a difference that is significant at below the 1% level. The difference in the effect 
on the probability of low back imaging is borderline significant, with a 1,000-point 
increase in insurer HHI having no effect on the imaging utilization of patients of non-
owners, compared to a 9.5% increase among the patients of owners. These findings 
suggest that healthcare providers’ financial interests may contribute to the higher 







A small and growing literature finds a positive relationship between insurer 
concentration and healthcare utilization. This literature has largely been framed around a 
model of insurers exercising countervailing bargaining power against hospitals and 
physicians to negotiate lower prices that lead, through movement down the demand 
curve, to higher utilization. However, this model does not incorporate the role that 
supply-side financial incentives might play in a provider’s treatment decisions as insurers 
negotiate lower payment rates. A range of empirical literature in health economics has 
found that provider behaviors respond to financial incentives, including work around 
diagnostic and procedural upcoding, physician self-referral, and inducement of demand 
following a cut in administered prices. 
In light of this evidence, it is possible that physicians increase the number of 
services provided to their patients as payment rates fall, contributing to the positive 
relationship between insurer concentration and utilization. To explore that possibility, this 
paper tests for demand inducement using a subset of private utilization for which 
different physicians likely face different incentives to provide more care. In particular, I 
test whether the effect of insurer concentration on imaging utilization varies for 
physicians who own their own imaging equipment and have a strong financial incentive 
to order more imaging, compared to physicians who instead refer their patients to other 
providers for imaging services. 
Though Stark laws prevent physician self-referral, there are exceptions for in-
office axillary services, including imaging. Non-radiologists ordering imaging services 





bill for the service, while those non-radiologists lack that incentive when they do not bill 
for the service because they instead refer a patient to a radiologist for imaging. Imaging 
therefore presents an important opportunity to identify differences in a physician’s 
financial incentive to provide more services, which are not typically observable in 
commercial claims or other utilization data. This difference in financial incentives can 
help disentangle the volume changes that could arise from patient-driven increases in 
demand from those that arise from a physician inducing demand. If there is a significant 
difference in the effect of health insurance market concentration on the imaging 
utilization of patients based on a physicians’ ability to bill for the imaging, that would 
suggest that supply-side financial incentives contribute to the volume response. 
Though diagnostic imaging is a narrow subset of healthcare utilization, it is also a 
costly service associated with overuse, with the United States having the highest per-
capita utilization of costly diagnostic imaging services (Emanuel and Fuchs, 2008; 
Squires and Anderson, 2015). It therefore serves as a meaningful case study for exploring 
the connection between insurer concentration and utilization related to supply-side 
incentives. 
I identify three physician specialties with disproportionate rates of ownership of 
imaging equipment – orthopedics and neurology associated with ownership of MRI, and 
urology associated with ownership of CT. I construct measures of imaging utilization in 
the 30 days following an office visit with one of these specialists using the Truven 
MarketScan Database of Commercial Claims for 2015. I use measures of insurer 
concentration in 2015 derived from HealthLeaders-Interstudy data, and construct 





Medicare files. I then test whether the effect of insurance market concentration on 
utilization differs significantly between the patients who visited owners and the patients 
who visited non-owners. I use inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment to 
balance the patients who visited owners of imaging equipment and patients who visited 
non-owners of imaging equipment on observable characteristics. For each physician 
specialty, I estimate two models. The first model predicts utilization in the 30-days 
following a new patient visit, and the second model predicts low-value imaging in the 30-
days following a visit associated with overuse. The low-value models cover the use of 
back MRI following an office visit with a diagnosis of back pain for orthopedics, the use 
of head MRI following an office visit with a diagnosis of headache for neurology, and the 
use of abdomen CT with and without contrast material for urology. 
I find that the effect of insurer concentration on utilization varies significantly 
between patients seen by imaging owners (with a strong financial incentive) and patients 
seen by non-owners (with a weak financial incentive), but only for the patients of 
orthopedists. For these patients, a 1,000-point increase in insurer HHI increases the 
probability of imaging after a new patient visit by an estimated 4% among the patients of 
non-owners, compared to an 11.9% increase among the patients of owners, a difference 
that is significant at below the 1% level. Likewise, a 1,000-point increase in insurer HHI 
does not significantly affect the probability of low back imaging within 30-days of an 
orthopedist office visit associated with back pain among the patients of non-owners, but 
increases the probability among the patients of owners by 9.5%; this difference falls just 






3.2 Conceptual Framework 
Pauly (1998) describes a model for the relationship between insurer concentration 
and healthcare utilization that is based on the exercise of countervailing bargaining 
leverage against healthcare providers to negotiate lower prices that lead, in turn, to higher 
quantities of care demanded by consumers. However, the presence of asymmetric 
information between patients and healthcare providers regarding appropriate treatment 
complicates this picture. The patient’s demand is, in part, shaped by the recommendation 
made by their physician. 
In light of this asymmetric information, the theory of demand inducement could 
apply to the relationship between insurer concentration and utilization. McGuire and 
Pauly (1991) presented a mathematical model of physician behavior under a fee change. 
In this model, physician utility is increasing in revenue and leisure time and decreasing in 
demand inducement. The total number of services they provide is a function of the level 
of inducement, and their remaining leisure time is a function of the number of services. 
Their choice variable is therefore inducement. Their response to a fee change depends on 
whether the physician has strong preferences around a certain income. Under a single 
payer, if income effects are large enough, the supply curve slopes downward and the 
physician will respond to a fee decrease by increasing inducement, and hence, quantity. 
Under multiple payers, as is the case of most physicians providing care in the U.S., each 
payer accounts for a smaller percentage of a physician’s income than in the single-payer 
case. The volume offsets in order to maintain income are therefore smaller, but the 
analysis is also complicated by substitution effects. In addition to adjusting the total 





provide across their mix of patients (i.e., Medicare vs. commercially insured patients). 
The profit margin for the service will vary with the patient group, and the physician will 
shift towards the group with the higher profit margin, weighing the relative profit against 
a growing disutility of inducement. If commercial rates are higher than Medicare rates, as 
is true on average in the United States, more demand will tend to be induced in the 
commercial population. 
This model suggests that if in more concentrated insurance markets, negotiated 
rates are lower, physicians with preferences around achieving or maintaining a certain 
income may provide more healthcare services. If payments are nevertheless higher for 
commercial patients, this inducement will be targeted towards the commercially insured, 
implying a positive relationship between insurer concentration and overall utilization. 
The effect on imaging utilization in particular depends on whether the physician can bill 
for their own imaging services or refers their patients to a radiologist for imaging. In the 
latter case, the financial incentive associated with demand inducement is weak or non-
existent. This suggests that, if demand inducement is present, the effect of insurer 
concentration on imaging utilization should be higher among the patients who were 
treated by imaging owners. 
 
3.3 Literature 
This paper builds on three key subsets of the health economics literature – 
research on healthcare market concentration, on demand inducement, and on financial 





First, a large literature explores the effect of concentration in healthcare markets 
on outcomes important to patients. Studies implementing a range of methodological 
approaches find that hospital prices increase as hospital concentration increases (Gaynor, 
Ho and Town 2015). A smaller literature indicates that the prices of physician services 
increase with physician concentration (Baker et al. 2014, Dunn and Shapiro 2014). By 
contrast, the balance of evidence suggests that insurer concentration decreases the 
negotiated prices between insurers and healthcare providers (Moriya et al. 2010, 
McKellar et al. 2014, Melnick et al. 2011, Halbersma et al. 2011, Trish and Herring 
2015), though there are some inconsistencies (Ho and Lee 2017, Schneider et al. 2008, 
Dunn and Shapiro 2014). Regarding volume, Bates and Santerre (2008), McKellar et al. 
(2014), and Hanson (2019) find that insurer concentration is positively related to 
utilization. On the provider side, Dunn and Shapiro (2017) find that more intensive 
treatment for myocardial infarction patients was provided by cardiologists in more 
concentrated cardiology markets, though Hanson (2019) finds no relationship between 
overall inpatient utilization and hospital or physician market concentration. 
Second, this paper builds on empirical work around demand inducement. Several 
studies have explored the demand inducement hypothesis proposed by McGuire and 
Pauly, using Medicare fee changes to identify an effect on Medicare and commercial 
utilization. For example, Yip (1998) uses a policy shift towards the Medicare Fee System, 
which reduced compensation for surgical procedures generally and incorporated an 
additional reduction for CABG surgery. Moreover, the reduction in payment varied 
geographically, depending on the local prevailing average compared to the national 





physicians did compensate for income loss by increasing volume for both Medicare and 
commercial patients. Nguyen and Derrick (1997) use a similar mandated fee reduction to 
estimate a fixed effects model of the effect of variation in a price index on a (Medicare) 
volume index. They find that physicians replace $0.40 of a $1.00 reduction in fees with 
increased volume. Jacobson et al. (2010) examines the effect of a reduction in Medicare 
payment rates for chemotherapy drugs on treatment for lung cancer patients following the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act. The study finds that 
the probability of receiving chemotherapy treatment increases and that the percentage 
treated by the lowest-margin drugs decreases while the percentage treated by the highest-
margin drugs increases. Each of these three studies finds evidence of compensating 
behavior by physicians facing a fee decrease, and one study finds that it affects both 
patient populations. All of these studies have focused on changes in Medicare fees, rather 
than changes in private prices. 
Finally, this paper builds on several studies that have examined the effect of 
having an ownership interest in imaging equipment on utilization and spending. Baker 
(2010) examined utilization and spending by orthopedists and neurologists who began 
billing for MRI scans between 1999 and 2005. He identifies a set of physicians who 
began billing for the technical component of an MRI procedure, which covers the use of a 
machine as opposed to the interpretation of results, and compares the number of MRIs 
received by their patients on their first visit, and within 30 and 90 days, before and after 
acquisition. He also compares these trends to a comparison group that never billed for the 
technical component. For both orthopedists and neurologists, he observes an increase in 





component. Hughes, Bhargavan and Sunshine (2010) examine self-referral in Medicare 
claims and find that a physician who both referred for and performed an imaging 
procedure had patient episodes with higher costs but, for the most part, no corresponding 
decrease in the length of illness. This suggests that the effect on utilization of financial 
incentives does not generally benefit the patient. Flug et al. (2016) compare the rate of 
“double scans”, or performing a CT scan with and without contrast material, between 
radiologists and non-radiologists before and after a CMS monitoring and reporting 
initiative. Rates of double scans were higher for non-radiologists than for radiologists and 
declined more slowly after the policy change. Bhargavan et al. (2011) addresses the 
criticisms of this literature that the results are not generalizable, that patient adjustment is 
not adequate, and that a financial interest has not been correctly identified. Their finding 
that utilization is higher amongst physicians with a financial interest in imaging is robust 
to many different medical conditions, different methods of identifying a financial interest, 
and different degrees of adjustment. 
 This paper extends these sets of literature in several ways. First, it adds to the 
literature on insurer concentration and utilization by focusing on a subset of utilization 
associated with overuse (imaging). Second, it uses insights from the literature on self-
referral in diagnostic imaging to isolate supply-side financial incentives that contribute to 
the relationship between insurer concentration and utilization. Finally, it adds to the 
literature on demand inducement, focusing on how commercial utilization responds to 
changes in insurer concentration that should affect commercial prices, distinct from the 
bulk of this literature, which has focused on changes in commercial and Medicare 





3.4 Data and Methods 
 I use commercial claims data to identify the patients treated by orthopedists, 
neurologists, and urologists, to construct measures of their imaging utilization in the 30-
days following an office visit with those physicians (“index visits”), and to determine 
whether the physician owned imaging equipment. I use measures of insurance market 
concentration from HealthLeaders-Interstudy and measures of physician concentration 
constructed from publicly available Medicare files. I use inverse-probability-weighted 
regression adjustment to balance the characteristics of patients treated by owners 
compared to non-owners on observable factors, and then compare the effect of insurance 
market concentration on imaging utilization between the two groups. I estimate these 
models separately for each type of physician specialist, and for each specialty, I estimate 
a model of utilization following a new patient visit, and the use of low-value imaging 




The primary sample consists of beneficiaries aged 18-64 who were continuously 
enrolled in a non-capitated plan over 2014 and 2015. I further limit the sample to adults 
aged 18 or above and aged 64 or below, and excluded enrollees in Puerto Rico, with a 
geographic location of Nation (region unknown), and in non-metro areas. From this pool 
of eligible beneficiaries, I identify the subset of patients with a new patient and/or 





matching on observable market characteristics, I narrow the sample to beneficiaries living 
in markets for which I observe patients of both owner and non-owner physicians. 
I focus on three physician specialties, each of which is associated with 
disproportionate ownership of either MRI (orthopedics and neurology) or CT (urology). 
(I also identified the patients of otolaryngologists, associated with ownership of CT. 
However, the IPWRA approach did not achieve balance on observable covariates). I look 
at two broad types of imaging utilization. First, I look at the probability of having an MRI 
or CT in the 30 days following a new patient office visit (index visit) with a specialist of 
one of the four specialties. Second, for each of the three types of specialties, I identify a 
type of low-value imaging, and look at utilization of that imaging in the 30 days 
following a new or established patient office visit. Due to the narrow parameters that 
define these low-value services, and correspondingly low sample size, I include both new 
and established office visits in the index visit. For simplicity, I refer to these two sets of 
models as “new patient” or “low-value” models, respectively. 
For orthopedics, the type of low-value imaging I focus on is utilization of MRI for 
imaging of the back following an office visit associated with low back pain. For 
neurology, I look at utilization of MRI of the head following an office visit associated 
with uncomplicated headache. For each of these types of low-value imaging, I construct 
measures following Schwartz et al. (2014), which provides detailed information on the 
procedural and diagnosis codes that meet the inclusion criteria, in addition to details on 
excluding patients with histories of certain clinical conditions, for which these types of 
imaging may be more appropriate. For urology, for the subset of patients who had an 





both with and without contrast material (“double-scans”). The measurement of abdominal 
double-scans is based on the methodology used for the public reporting of this measure 
(for outpatient hospital procedures) on Hospital Compare (YNHHSC/CORE 2016). 
I identify ownership of either MRI or CT primarily as the physician billing for the 
technical component of an imaging claim. The technical component of the claim covers 
the utilization of the machine, while the professional component covers the interpretation 
of the scan, for which a non-owner can bill. 
I measure market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is 
widely used in the literature and by the regulatory agencies. It is measured as the sum of 
squared market shares on a scale from 0 to 10,000, with 10,000 representing a monopoly 
and HHIs approaching 0 representing perfect competition. Measures of health insurance 
market concentration are constructed from HealthLeaders-Interstudy, based on Trish and 
Herring (2015), where markets are defined by enrollment in all self-insured and fully-
insured private plans within a Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA). The 11 largest 
CBSAs are further divided into smaller metropolitan divisions, and these smaller areas 
were used in this analysis. Measures of specialty-specific physician market concentration 
derive from archived CMS Physician Compare data from March 2014, April 2015, and 
April 2016 and the Medicare Physician and Other Supplier Data for 2013-2015, both 
publicly available data sources. A detailed description of how these files were used to 
construct physician concentration is provided in Appendix 3A. 
The analysis also incorporates several market-level control variables, describing 
economic and demographic characteristics that might be correlated with both utilization 





Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE), the percent uninsured from the 
Census Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE), the unemployment rate from 
Bureau of Labor Statistic Local Area Unemployment Statistics (BLS LAUS), and the 
percent nonwhite from the Area Health Resource File (AHRF). The market-level control 
variables also include healthcare supply variables that might confound the relationship 
between insurer and provider concentration and utilization, including the total number of 
beds, the number of doctors per 1,000 residents and Medicare Advantage penetration, 
each from the AHRF. Most variables were aggregated from the county to the market 
level using an average weighted by the county population from the AHRF.  
  
3.4.2. Econometric Methods 
I use inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) to mitigate 
confounding resulting from differences in the patient populations that select a non-owner 
specialist versus those that select an owner specialist. The first step of this approach is to 
specify a treatment model, using observable patient and market characteristics to predict 
the probability of visiting an owner versus a non-owner. The second step of this approach 
is to specify an outcome model, adjusting imaging utilization for observable patient and 
market characteristics, which is estimated separately for the treatment (owner) and 
comparison (non-owner) group. The inverse probability of treatment from the treatment 
model is used to weight the outcome models, and the “treatment effect” is the difference 
in the predicted outcome between the two groups. However, the treatment effect is not 
the focus of this research, but rather how treatment – or the physician’s differential 





utilization. I therefore test for significant differences in the coefficient on insurer 
concentration in the outcome model between patients who visited owners and patients 
who visited non-owners. Because physician concentration, associated with lower 
negotiated rates, may also affect utilization in the opposite way as insurer concentration, I 
also test for significant differences in the coefficient on physician concentration. 
The treatment model, for the construction of inverse-probability-weights, uses 
logistic regression to predict the probability P of visiting an owner ("# = 1)	during a 
patient visit i. 
 
() * +(,-./)/0+(,-./)1 = 23 + 2/5)6775# + 289ℎ;6775# + 2<9=>?@)># + 2AB=CD@>#	 + E#              [1] 
 
This probability is predicted as a function of insurance and physician concentration in the 
patient’s market, the other market confounders outlined above, and patient characteristics 
including age, sex, plan type, and clinical conditions in the year prior to the observation 
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The outcome models, weighted by the weights from [2] and estimated separately 
for the treatment and comparison group, include the same set of covariates, but replace 
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The primary question of interest is whether K/L and K/M  significantly differ. In the primary 
specification, the outcome model is specified as a linear probability model. To account 
for the correlation of errors with a geographic market, I use the clustered bootstrap to 
estimate standard errors.  
 
3.4.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
 To explore the robustness of the findings, I include four different sensitivity 
analyses for each model. First, I relax the enrollment restriction, requiring only that the 
beneficiary is not enrolled in a capitated plan as of the date of the office visit. In these 
models, I risk adjust on the basis of observation year (2015) claims in both the treatment 
and outcome models. Second, I loosen the assignment criterion to the treatment group, by 
defining imaging owners as physicians who either bill for the technical component, or 
who do not specify the component they are billing for (i.e., who do not include a 
procedural code modifier). These physicians may be billing for the global claim, 
inclusive of both the technical and professional component. (Because these claims may 
simply not include modifier codes, this approach likely overstates the number of 
physician owners and is not the preferred approach.) Third, rather than using clinical 
conditions recorded in the prior year for the treatment assignment model, but clinical 
conditions recorded in the observation year for the outcome model, I test sensitivity to 







re-estimate the main specification using logistic regression to estimate the outcome 
model, rather than a linear probability model. 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Treatment Model and Weighted Summary Statistics 
The samples for the first set of utilization models consist of 275,801 patients with 
a new patient office visit to an orthopedist, 38,377 with a new patient office visit to a 
neurologist, and 62,323 with a new patient office visit to a urologist in 2015. The low-
value samples consist of 48,089 patients with a new/established patient visit to an 
orthopedist with a diagnosis of back pain, 13,830 patients with a new/established patient 
visit to a neurologist with a diagnosis of headache, and 13,020 patients with a 
new/established patient to a urologist who received an abdomen CT within 30 days. The 
percentage of these visits with an imaging owner ranged from a low of 11.2% for the new 
patient neurology model to a high of 27% for the low-value urology model. The 
unweighted summary statistics describing these underlying samples are presented in 
Appendix Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
Table 3.1 illustrates the coefficients on the key covariates of interest, insurer and 
physician concentration, from fitting equation [1], the treatment assignment model that 
predicts whether the patient visited an imaging owner. Across the three specialties and 
the two corresponding imaging modalities, physician concentration is positively and 
significantly associated with a patient visiting an imaging owner. Conversely, the point 
estimate of the effect of insurer concentration is negative across all six models, though it 





covariate balance between the patients of owners and non-owners resulting from applying 
the inverse probability weights derived from these treatment models. It plots the 
standardized mean differences (SMD) between the groups for each covariate before and 
after weighting, separately for each category of office visit to a specialist. For each 
model, the SMDs are much more clustered around zero in the weighted specification. 
Across all models, the maximum SMD decreases from 0.46 to 0.10, and the minimum 
SMD increases from -0.39 to -0.05. The magnitude of the average SMD decreases 
substantially, moving from -0.012 to 8.36E-05. 
Table 3.2 reports the weighted summary statistics describing the patients treated 
by owners compared to non-owners for each of the new patient models. Across the three 
specialties, the percentage of patients who received a scan within 30 days of their visit is 
between 2 and 4 percentage points higher among patients who saw an owner compared to 
a non-owner, consistent with the empirical evidence around higher imaging utilization 
amongst imaging owners. After weighting, the remaining characteristics of patients of 
owners and non-owners are similar, consistent with Figure 3.1. Table 3.3 provides the 
corresponding weighted summary statistics for the subset of imaging associated with 
overuse. The findings follow a similar pattern, with the exception of receiving a double 
abdominal CT among patients who visited a urologist, where the percentage of patients 









3.5.1 Outcome Model Predicting Imaging Utilization 
 Table 3.4 presents parameters of primary interest from the inverse-probability-
weighted regression equations in [3] and [4], with Panel A presenting results for models 
predicting imaging within 30-days of a new patient visit, and Panel B presenting results 
for the low-value utilization models. The first column presents the estimated average 
treatment effect, or the difference in the probability of receiving imaging for the patients 
of owners compared to non-owners, weighted by the inverse probability of treatment and 
adjusted for observable characteristics. The estimated treatment effects are largely 
consistent with the existing empirical literature, finding that patients of the financially 
incentivized owners are more likely to receive imaging. However, the estimated 
treatment effect associated with visiting a neurologist for headache or a urologist and 
receiving an abdominal scan are both statistically insignificant. 
 The next two columns of Table 3.4 present the coefficient on insurer 
concentration in the model predicting imaging utilization, first among the patients of non-
owners and then among the patient of owners. Across both owners and non-owners, 
among those models where insurer concentration significantly affects imaging utilization, 
the effect is positive, consistent with the other studies of insurer concentration and 
utilization. The following column presents the p-value testing the equality of these 
coefficients across the two outcome models. The relative magnitudes of the point 
estimates comparing the effect among the patients of owners and non-owners do not 
follow a clear pattern, with the insurer coefficient among the treated group larger in 






However, in the only two models where these differences were statistically 
significant (or nearly significant), the effect of insurer concentration was greater amongst 
patients of owners. A 1,000-point increase in insurer HHI increases the probability of 
imaging within 30-days of a new patient visit with an orthopedist by 0.025 points (95% 
CI: 0.013, 0.036) among the patients of owners, compared to 0.007 points (95% CI: 
0.002, 0.12) among the patients of non-owners, a difference that is significant at below 
the 1% level. These magnitudes translate to 4% of the unadjusted fraction with a scan 
among the patients of non-owners, compared to 11.9% of the unadjusted fraction with a 
scan among the patients of owners. Likewise, a 1,000-point increase in insurer HHI 
increases the probability of low back imaging within 30-days of an orthopedist office 
visit associated with back pain by 0.019 points (95% CI: -0.0001, 0.038) among the 
patients of owners, compared to no significant effect among the patients of non-owners, a 
difference that falls just short of significance at the 10% level. The magnitudes of these 
point estimates translate to a (statistically insignificant) 0.18% decrease in the unadjusted 
fraction with a scan among the patients of non-owners, compared to a 9.5% increase 
among the patients of owners. It is worth noting that the effect of insurer concentration is 
positive and significant among new patients of non-owner urologists (95% CI: 0.001, 
0.015), compared to an insignificant effect among the patients of owners, a finding that is 
inconsistent with the orthopedics results and with demand inducement. However, the 
difference is not significant (p=0.18), and the opposite pattern emerges in the low-value 
urology model. 
The final three columns of Table 3.4 present the same information for the 





are more mixed, with the relationship between physician concentration and utilization 
being significant and negative in two models, but significant and positive in one. As with 
insurer concentration, the relationship between the point estimates does not hold 
systematically across the six models. However, also as with insurer concentration, in the 
two models where both the effect of physician concentration is significant, and the 
differences across the owner and non-owner models are significant – the new patient and 
low-value orthopedist models – the point estimates on physician concentration are more 
negative among the patients of owners. In the low-value neurology model, the difference 
is borderline significant (p=0.10) and the coefficient on physician concentration is more 
negative among the patients of owners, though in that case neither of the point estimates 
are statistically different from zero. 
Tables 3.5-3.6 report the results of the sensitivity analysis, illustrating coefficients 
on the primary exposures of interest and the p-value testing their equality across the 
owner and non-owner groups. The results are largely robust to changes to the sample 
definition, changes to the approach to identifying owner physicians, and to using logistic 
regression rather than a linear probability model. The estimated effect of insurance 
concentration is larger among the patients of orthopedist owners in both the new patient 
and low-value models, and the difference is at least borderline significant in most models. 
Likewise, the estimated effect of physician concentration is more negative amongst the 
patients of orthopedist owners, with those differences significant in most models. There 
are not significant differences in either the new patient or low-value models associated 






3.6 Discussion and Limitations 
 This paper adds to the evidence around insurer concentration and utilization being 
positively related, while the relationship between physician concentration and utilization 
does not follow a consistent pattern. In terms of how this relationship is modified by the 
physician’s financial incentive, I find that the effect of insurer concentration on imaging 
utilization is significantly larger for patients treated by orthopedists who own their own 
imaging equipment, compared to patients of orthopedists who do not own their own 
imaging equipment. Likewise, the effect of physician concentration is more negative for 
patients treated by orthopedist owners, compared to non-owners. These findings are 
consistent with financially incentivized physicians ordering higher levels of imaging in 
markets where more concentrated insurer markets and less concentrated physician 
markets result in lower negotiated payment rates. I do not detect significant differences in 
the relationship between insurance market concentration and the utilization patterns of 
patients treated by neurologists or urologists. 
An important caveat to this latter finding is that in the new patient urology model, 
the effect of insurer concentration was larger in magnitude for the patients of non-owners, 
and while the difference was not statistically significant, the sample size was also 
smaller. Further research, perhaps pooling the sample over multiple years, can explore 
whether this difference is significant in a better powered study. (Pooling across years is 
not possible with available data sources, as an encrypted physician NPI, used for 
identifying a physician’s billing patterns across data contributors, was not added to the 





 While not the focus of this research, it is also interesting that while insurer 
concentration is positively predictive of utilization, it is negatively predictive of visiting 
an owner. Meanwhile, physician concentration is positively predictive of visiting an 
owner. This may be because physicians organized in larger practices (and therefore 
capturing larger market share) are able to spread the high cost of acquiring the technology 
over more physicians. 
This study has several limitations worth noting. The IPWRA approach is doubly 
robust, meaning that if either the outcome model (the regression adjustment) or the 
treatment model (for constructing weights) is correctly specified, the estimate of 
treatment effect is unbiased. However, it only achieves balance on observable 
characteristics, and there may be unobservable characteristics contribution to a patient’s 
selection of physician. For example, patients may have a priori knowledge about their 
own high likelihood of getting a scan, and select a physician with in-office imaging for 
convenience. This is a particularly important consideration when interpreting the 
estimated average treatment effect of visiting an owner versus a non-owner. This is, 
however, somewhat less of a concern for the principal question explored in this research 
– how the effect of insurance market concentration differs between patients of the two 
types of physicians – as those unobservable characteristics would need to also be 
correlated with insurer concentration to confound the relationship of interest. 
 While the Truven Health MarketScan data is a rich data source, it has several 
limitations. There may be some inconsistencies in the use of procedural modifier codes 
by data contributors. Only using the technical component of a claim to identify owners 





global claim (i.e., no modifier code) like overstates the number of owners. Relatedly, 
there are financial incentives that are not observable in the data. For example, imaging 
ownership is determined at the level of the individual provider (by NPI), rather than at the 
practice level. Physicians in a multi-specialty practice might have a financial interest in 
the income of the practice as a whole, which would not be evident in the data if their 
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Table 3.1: Effect of Insurer and Physician Market Concentration on Likelihood of 
Visiting an Imaging Owner 
 
 
Effect of Insurer HHI 
(1,000s), Log Odds (SE) 
Effect of Physician HHI 
(1,000s), Log Odds (SE) 
Panel A: Assignment to an Owner for a New 
Patient Visit    
Orthopedics (MRI), N=275,801 -0.395** (0.159) 0.237*** (0.0666) 
Neurology (MRI), N=38,377 -0.808*** (0.302) 0.231*** (0.0856) 
Urology (CT), N=62,323 -0.332 (0.220) 0.126** (0.0553) 
Panel B: Assignment to an Owner for a Low-
Value Visit    
Orthopedics for Back Pain (MRI), N=48,089 -0.203 (0.218) 0.332*** (0.0605) 
Neurology for Headache (MRI), N=13,830 -0.806*** (0.237) 0.346*** (0.0668) 
Urology for Abdomen Double Scan (CT), 
N=13,020 -0.0639 (0.267) 0.157*** (0.0602) 
 
Notes: In addition to insurer and physician HHI, models include the county’s percent uninsured, percent 
unemployed, percent non-white, the total number of beds, the number of doctors per-capita, Medicare 
advantage penetration, and age, sex, plan type, and hierarchical condition categories based on the patient’s 
2014 diagnosis codes. Data comes from the Truven Health MarketScan database of commercial claims, 
HealthLeaders-Interstudy, and other publicly available sources for 2015. Models are estimated using 
teffects in Stata, and clustered standard errors are estimated using the clustered bootstrap. Statistical 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.2: Weighted Summary Statistics Describing New Patient Sample by Specialty 




















Fraction with Scan in 30 days 0.17 (0.38) 0.21 (0.41) 0.26 (0.44) 0.3 (0.46) 0.12 (0.32) 0.14 (0.34) 
Insurance Market HHI (1000s) 2.56 (0.79) 2.57 (0.83) 2.44 (0.78) 2.49 (0.92) 2.56 (0.82) 2.54 (0.8) 
Physician Market HHI (1000s) 1.84 (2.01) 1.89 (1.63) 1.4 (1.54) 1.55 (1.44) 2.94 (2.42) 3.05 (2.11) 
Percent Uninsured 10.78 (4.13) 10.84 (4.07) 10.36 (4.04) 10.62 (4.24) 10.78 (4.15) 10.87 (4.03) 
Percent Unemployed 5.13 (0.93) 5.12 (0.86) 5.12 (0.9) 5.1 (0.99) 5.14 (0.93) 5.11 (0.92) 
Percent Nonwhite 38.44 (15.9) 38.65 (14.79) 39.09 (15.74) 38.81 (15.29) 38.19 (16.03) 38.15 (15.08) 
Total Beds 628.47 (871.72) 620.27 (855.08) 639.03 (872.59) 668.98 (850.47) 633.7 (861.21) 623.64 (922.99) 
MDs per 1,000 2.84 (1.02) 2.84 (0.82) 2.96 (1) 2.97 (0.91) 2.86 (1.05) 2.81 (0.9) 
Medicare Advantage Penetration 33.37 (12.21) 32.91 (10.85) 34.83 (11.69) 34.89 (12.51) 34.14 (12.22) 34.04 (10.42) 
Fraction Female 0.56 (0.5) 0.56 (0.5) 0.63 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48) 0.3 (0.46) 0.3 (0.46) 
Age Group (Ref: 55-64)       
Fraction 18-34 0.18 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39) 0.2 (0.4) 0.2 (0.4) 0.22 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 
Fraction 35-44  0.29 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45) 0.27 (0.44) 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 
Fraction 45-54 0.34 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 0.32 (0.46) 0.34 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 
Plan Type (Ref: Comprehensive)       
Fraction in EPO 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 
Fraction in POS 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28) 0.1 (0.3) 0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 
Fraction in PPO 0.72 (0.45) 0.73 (0.44) 0.72 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45) 0.71 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45) 
Fraction in CDHP 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.25) 0.05 (0.23) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.26) 
Fraction in HDHP 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.25) 0.06 (0.23) 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 
 
Notes: Summary statistics are weighted by the inverse-probability-weights derived from the treatment assignment model, whose results are partially presented in 






Table 3.3: Weighted Summary Statistics Describing Low-Value Sample by Specialty 
 
 
Orthopedics for Low Back Pain 
(Back MRI) 
Neurology for Headache  
(Head MRI) 
Urology 




















Fraction with Scan in 30 days 0.17 (0.38) 0.2 (0.4) 0.13 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35) 0.26 (0.44) 0.23 (0.42) 
Insurance Market HHI (1000s) 2.63 (0.8) 2.62 (0.79) 2.48 (0.74) 2.49 (0.78) 2.54 (0.76) 2.52 (0.8) 
Physician Market HHI (1000s) 1.89 (2.2) 1.86 (1.65) 1.3 (1.5) 1.36 (1.32) 2.99 (2.4) 3.07 (2.13) 
Percent Uninsured 11.15 (3.95) 11.17 (3.98) 10.91 (4.17) 10.94 (4.47) 10.94 (4.25) 11.04 (3.96) 
Percent Unemployed 5.22 (0.88) 5.21 (0.86) 5.11 (0.85) 5.1 (0.99) 5.14 (0.86) 5.11 (0.85) 
Percent Nonwhite 40.57 (14.95) 40.66 (14.14) 40.9 (14.88) 41.05 (14.46) 38.65 (15.62) 38.18 (15.12) 
Total Beds 654.91 (829.19) 660.27 (822.77) 768.16 (885.95) 806.1 (849.82) 693.33 (894.71) 682.27 (991.97) 
MDs per 1,000 2.87 (1.01) 2.86 (0.88) 2.98 (0.95) 3.02 (0.86) 2.85 (0.88) 2.81 (0.83) 
Medicare Advantage Penetration 33.26 (12.05) 32.91 (10.46) 34.76 (11.18) 34.35 (12.22) 34.65 (12) 34.19 (10.03) 
Fraction Female 0.55 (0.5) 0.55 (0.5) 0.75 (0.43) 0.74 (0.44) 0.4 (0.49) 0.4 (0.49) 
Age Group (Ref: 55-64)       
Fraction 18-34 0.17 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38) 0.25 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36) 
Fraction 35-44  0.3 (0.46) 0.3 (0.46) 0.29 (0.45) 0.27 (0.44) 0.29 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45) 
Fraction 45-54 0.4 (0.49) 0.4 (0.49) 0.22 (0.42) 0.24 (0.42) 0.45 (0.5) 0.45 (0.5) 
Plan Type (Ref: Comprehensive)       
Fraction in EPO 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.1) 0.01 (0.09) 
Fraction in POS 0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.3) 0.11 (0.32) 0.13 (0.34) 0.1 (0.3) 0.09 (0.29) 
Fraction in PPO 0.74 (0.44) 0.74 (0.44) 0.73 (0.44) 0.71 (0.45) 0.73 (0.45) 0.74 (0.44) 
Fraction in CDHP 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25) 
Fraction in HDHP 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 
 
Notes: Summary statistics are weighted by the inverse-probability-weights derived from the treatment assignment model, whose results are partially presented in 





Table 3.4: Inverse Probability Weighted Regression Adjustment Predicting Imaging Within 30 Days of an Office Visit, 
Selected Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors 

























Panel A: Imaging After a New Patient Visit  
Orthopedics (MRI), 
N=275,801 0.0386*** 0.00746*** 0.0249*** 0.0007 -0.00180 -0.0141** 0.023 
 (0.0116) (0.00263) (0.00585)   (0.00197) (0.00604)  
Neurology (MRI), 
N=38,377 0.0382** 0.0177** 0.0140 0.8306 -0.00537 0.00601 0.1992 
 (0.0183) (0.00873) (0.0128)   (0.00469) (0.00777)  
Urology (CT), N=62,323 0.0217*** 0.00825** -0.00263 0.1764 0.00275* 0.00182 0.7073 
 (0.00513) (0.00359) (0.00968)   (0.00146) (0.00234)  
Panel B: Low-Value Imaging After a New or Established Patient Visit  
Orthopedics for Back 
Pain (MRI), N=48,089 0.0257*** -0.000306 0.0191* 0.1009 0.00184 -0.00660* 0.01 
 (0.00752) (0.00659) (0.00980)   (0.00242) (0.00377)  
Neurology for Headache 
(MRI), N=13,830 0.0151 -0.00880 -0.0172 0.7676 -0.00355 0.0104 0.1007 
 (0.0157) (0.0117) (0.0240)   (0.00478) (0.00836)  
Urology for Abdomen 
Double Scan (CT), 
N=13,020 -0.0275 0.00935 0.0359 0.1898 0.00609 -0.00305 0.2082 
 (0.0195) (0.0185) (0.0267)   (0.00484) (0.00648)  
 
Notes: In addition to insurer and physician HHI, the outcome models include the county’s percent uninsured, percent unemployed, percent non-white, the total 
number of beds, the number of doctors per-capita, Medicare advantage penetration, and age, sex, plan type, and hierarchical condition categories based on the 
patient’s 2015 diagnosis codes. Models are weighted by the inverse-probability-weights derived from the treatment assignment model, whose results are partially 
presented in Table 3.1. Data comes from the Truven Health MarketScan database of commercial claims, HealthLeaders-Interstudy, and other publicly available 
sources for 2015. Models are estimated using teffects in Stata, and clustered standard errors are estimated using the clustered bootstrap. Statistical significance: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.5: Results of Sensitivity Analysis for New Patient Sample, Selected Regression Coefficients Predicting Imaging Within 
























Difference    
Orthopedics (MRI)             
Inclusive Sample, 2015 Adjustment, N=414,611 0.00665** 0.0237** 0.1009 -0.00132 -0.0131** 0.0063 
Less Restrictive Treatment Assignment, N=277,990 0.00986** 0.0152*** 0.2842 -0.00305* -0.00836*** 0.1061 
2014 Adjustment, N=275,801 0.00737*** 0.0248*** 0.0007 -0.00184 -0.0142** 0.0237 
Logistic Regression (Log Odds), N=275,801 0.0533*** 0.151*** 0.0019 -0.0130 -0.0887** 0.0273 
Neurology (MRI)       
Inclusive Sample, 2015 Adjustment, N=61,194 0.0108 0.0109 0.9964 -0.00373 0.00485 0.181 
Less Restrictive Treatment Assignment, N=41,837 0.0121 0.0251* 0.4403 -0.00395 -0.0113 0.3111 
2014 Adjustment, N=38,377 0.0181** 0.0138 0.7836 -0.00589 0.00613 0.1842 
Logistic Regression (Log Odds), N=38,377 0.0957** 0.0668 0.7332 -0.0306 0.0278 0.1958 
Urology (CT)       
Inclusive Sample, 2015 Adjustment, N=95,435 0.00653** -0.000889 0.527 0.00279*** 0.00171 0.7692 
Less Restrictive Treatment Assignment, N=64,518 0.00881*** 0.00229 0.2257 0.00132 0.00309 0.4983 
2014 Adjustment, N=62,323 0.00824** -0.00284 0.1656 0.00277* 0.00173 0.6716 
Logistic Regression (Log Odds), N=62,323 0.0816** -0.0180 0.2091 0.0268* 0.0140 0.559 
 
Notes: In addition to insurer and physician HHI, the outcome models include the county’s percent uninsured, percent unemployed, percent non-white, the total 
number of beds, the number of doctors per-capita, Medicare advantage penetration, and age, sex, plan type, and hierarchical condition categories based on the 
patient’s 2015 diagnosis codes. Models are weighted by the inverse-probability-weights derived from the treatment assignment model corresponding to each 
sensitivity analysis. The inclusive sample does not impose an enrollment restriction beyond being currently enrolled in a non-capitated plan and risk adjusts on 
the basis of 2015 diagnoses in both the treatment and outcome models. The less restrictive treatment assignment includes physicians who did not use a procedure 
modifier code, and who may have been billing for both the technical and professional component of the scan. The 2014 adjustment model risk adjusts on the 
basis of 2014 diagnoses in both the treatment and outcome model. The logistic regression model is the same as the main model, but estimates the outcome model 
using logistic regression. Data comes from the Truven Health MarketScan database of commercial claims, HealthLeaders-Interstudy, and other publicly available 
sources for 2015. Models are estimated using teffects in Stata, and clustered standard errors are estimated using the clustered bootstrap. Statistical significance: 







Table 3.6: Results of Sensitivity Analysis for Low-Value Sample, Selected Regression Coefficients Predicting 






















Orthopedics (Back Pain MRI)       
Inclusive Sample, 2015 Adjustment, N=73,857 -0.000238 0.0152** 0.0502 0.00171 -0.00595** 0.0261 
Stricter Treatment Assignment, N=50,881 -0.00460 0.0128** 0.0822 0.000706 -0.00244 0.3232 
2014 Adjustment, N=48,089 -0.000177 0.0181* 0.1147 0.00171 -0.00648* 0.0063 
Logistic Regression (Log Odds), N=48,089 -0.00203 0.120** 0.1139 0.0121 -0.0417* 0.0123 
Neurology (Headache MRI)       
Inclusive Sample, 2015 Adjustment, N=23,416 -0.00727 -0.0105 0.8346 -0.00281 0.00783 0.1969 
Stricter Treatment Assignment, N=16,427 -0.00634 0.0101 0.4939 -0.00175 -0.00105 0.9288 
2014 Adjustment, N=13,830 -0.00923 -0.0192 0.7012 -0.00385 0.0113 0.111 
Logistic Regression (Log Odds), N=13,830 -0.0799 -0.138 0.8327 -0.0407 0.0710 0.1979 
Urology (Double CT Scan of Abdomen)       
Inclusive Sample, 2015 Adjustment, N=19,027 0.00598 0.0320 0.1782 0.00641 1.70e-05 0.3061 
Stricter Treatment Assignment, N=13,466 0.00518 0.0276 0.3636 0.00717 -0.000649 0.2135 
2014 Adjustment, N=13,020 0.0108 0.0379 0.1613 0.00512 -0.00358 0.2412 
Logistic Regression (Log Odds), N=13,020 0.0532 0.203 0.1924 0.0331 -0.0221 0.2197 
 
Notes: In addition to insurer and physician HHI, the outcome models include the county’s percent uninsured, percent unemployed, percent non-white, the total 
number of beds, the number of doctors per-capita, Medicare advantage penetration, and age, sex, plan type, and hierarchical condition categories based on the 
patient’s 2015 diagnosis codes. Models are weighted by the inverse-probability-weights derived from the treatment assignment model corresponding to each 
sensitivity analysis. The inclusive sample does not impose an enrollment restriction beyond being currently enrolled in a non-capitated plan and risk adjusts on 
the basis of 2015 diagnoses in both the treatment and outcome models. The less restrictive treatment assignment includes physicians who did not use a procedure 
modifier code, and who may have been billing for both the technical and professional component of the scan. The 2014 adjustment model risk adjusts on the 
basis of 2014 diagnoses in both the treatment and outcome model. The logistic regression model is the same as the main model, but estimates the outcome model 
using logistic regression. Data comes from the Truven Health MarketScan database of commercial claims, HealthLeaders-Interstudy, and other publicly available 
sources for 2015. Models are estimated using teffects in Stata, and clustered standard errors are estimated using the clustered bootstrap. Statistical significance: 




Figure 3.1: Kernel Density of Standardized Mean Difference in Covariates Between 
Patients of Owners and Non-Owners, Weighted and Raw 
 
 
Notes: Inverse-probability-weights are derived from the treatment assignment model, 
whose results are partially presented in Table 3.1. Data comes from the Truven Health 
MarketScan database of commercial claims, HealthLeaders-Interstudy, and other publicly 
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Appendix 3A: Constructing Physician Concentration 
 
Yearly specialty-specific physician concentration measures were created using 
archived Physician Compare data from March 2014, April 2015, and April 2016 and the 
Medicare Physician and Other Supplier Data for 2013-2015. These files were linked by 
National Provider Identifier and year, with the quality of the match between the Physician 
Compare and Part B files suggesting that the March 2014 Physician Compare data is 
most reflective of the 2013 Calendar Year (compared to the 2014 Calendar Year), and so 
on. 
Because both Physician Compare and the Supplier Data include information on 
non-physician healthcare providers, the first step was to narrow the data to physicians. 
Providers were identified as non-physicians, either by having a non-doctoral degree listed 
in Physician Compare or by being listed under a non-physician provider type (i.e., CRNA 
or Licensed Clinical Social Worker) in either Physician Compare or the Supplier Data.  
The physician’s total allowed amounts were evenly divided between the practice 
locations listed in Physician Compare. (Allowed charges are the unit of service that the 
FTC and DOJ uses in monitoring ACOs and which have been implemented in several 
past studies.)14 Practice Locations were assigned to a County and a CBSA first on the 
basis of zip code from Physician Compare, then on zip code from the Supplier PUF, and 
lastly from the city listed in either file.15 As some zip codes and cities map to multiple 
counties, weights were assigned to each match based on the portion of the addresses in 
each zip code or city that belong to each county (i.e., a practice in a zip code that crosses 
a county line, where 95% of the address in the zip code belong to County 1 and 5% 
belong to county 2, is assigned to both counties with weights of .95 and .05, 
respectively). If a physician had multiple practice locations, and each practice location 
mapped to multiple counties, then that physician’s allowed amounts were evenly divided 
between practices, and then each county was assigned a share of that practice’s allowed 
amounts based on the weight. 
Some physicians were in one but not both databases. All physicians appearing in 
either database were included in the concentration calculations. Physicians that were not 
identified in Physician Compare were assumed to operate in a solo practice at the location 
listed in the Supplier PUF. Physicians that were not identified in the Supplier data were 
assigned the average allowed amount by for that specialty in that geographic area 
(County or CBSA). 
Physician concentration measures were constructed first defining the geographic 
market as a County and then as a CBSA. For physicians in group practices, the allowed 
                                                        
14 “FTC-DOJ Enforcement Policy Statement Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating In 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program | Federal Trade Commission,” accessed April 5, 2017, 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/federal-register-notices/ftc-doj-enforcement-policy-statement-regarding-
accountable-care; Baker et al., “Physician Practice Competition and Prices Paid by Private Insurers for 
Office Visits.” 
15 The crosswalk between zip code and county was accessed here: 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/usps_crosswalk.html#codebook. The crosswalk between city and 






amounts were aggregated onto the Organizational PAC ID. If no Organizational PAC ID 
was listed, the physician was assumed to work as a solo practitioner. Allowed amounts 
were summed by specialty, year, and geographic market, and market shares were 
calculated for each organizational ID or NPI. These market shares were used to construct 
specialty-specific physician HHIs. 
The specialty-specific physician HHIs were then aggregated into a single 
summary physician concentration measure. The first step in this aggregation was to 
assign a weight to each specialty. These weights were constructed from the set of 
inpatient admissions in the Truven Health MarketScan data over 2013-2015 that 
contributed to the intensive volume measure (and hence, that had at least 5,000 
admissions). The weights were the share of procedures performed by physicians in the 10 
largest physician specialties over those admissions. As a sensitivity analysis, these 
specialty weights were assigned separately for each market. 
This method of constructing physician concentration, which relies solely on 
publicly available data, has not, to my knowledge, been used before. In order to validate 
the measure, it was compared against others methods of constructing physician 
concentration using a 20% sample of Medicare claims data for 2015. First, the method 
was replicated as closely as possible using claims data, defining the geographic market as 
a County and as a CBSA, assigning physicians to practices using a tax identification 
number, and using allowed amounts to define market shares. The correlation between the 
specialty-specific measures using these two approaches was .93. This confirms that using 
publicly available data captures a comparable number of physicians and assigns them to 
group practices in a similar way. 
A more rigorous method uses patient flows and allows the geographic market 
served by each practice to vary based on the zip codes of its patients, assigns each 
practice an HHI based on the other practices serving those zip codes, and aggregates up 
to some larger geographic level (see, principally, Baker et al. (2014)). 16 The correlation 
between a specialty-specific patient-flow based measure and the specialty-specific 
measure feasible with publicly available data is .73. 
There are weaknesses to this approach to measuring physician concentration, 
primarily that it does not use patient flow data in order to construct a geographic market. 
Only the location of the physician is known, not the location of the beneficiaries treated 
by that physician. However, because this measure can be constructed with publicly 
available data, because it is available for three years instead of one, and because it has a 
high degree of correlation with more rigorous measures, it is the appropriate approach for 
this study.
                                                        
16 Laurence C. Baker et al., “Physician Practice Competition and Prices Paid by Private Insurers for Office 
Visits,” JAMA 312, no. 16 (October 22, 2014): 1653–62, https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2014.10921. A 
summary of the patient flow method is as follows: Practices are identified as a group of physicians with the 
same specialty billing under the same tax identification number. The product market is defined as all 
services provided by the physicians within a relevant specialty, measured using allowed charges. Each 
practice’s service area is defined as the set of zip codes from which the practice draws 75% of its total 
allowed charges. For each zip code, an HHI is calculated based on the market shares of the practices for 
whom that zip code is in their 75% service area.  The HHI faced by each practice is then the mean of the 
zip code level HHIs from their service area. These HHIs are then averaged over a county, to create a 
county-level, specialty-specific measure of HHI. 
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Appendix Table 3.1: Unweighted Summary Statistics Describing Sample with a New Patient Visit by Specialty 




















Insurance Market HHI (1000s) 2.6 (0.81) 2.43 (0.76) 2.47 (0.79) 2.18 (0.7) 2.6 (0.84) 2.43 (0.71) 
Physician Market HHI (1000s) 1.65 (1.73) 2.29 (1.9) 1.35 (1.43) 1.74 (1.86) 2.8 (2.3) 3.36 (2.29) 
Percent Uninsured 10.8 (4.15) 10.73 (4.11) 10.33 (4.02) 10.59 (4.35) 10.72 (4.13) 10.94 (4.07) 
Percent Unemployed 5.12 (0.93) 5.14 (0.85) 5.13 (0.89) 5.04 (1) 5.19 (0.93) 4.99 (0.87) 
Percent Nonwhite 38.59 (15.76) 38.13 (15.12) 39.07 (15.66) 39.65 (15.48) 38.83 (15.91) 36.16 (15.06) 
Total Beds 638.58 (872.19) 609.4 (865.09) 649.67 (879.04) 553.83 (785.99) 661.3 (871.47) 544.57 (865.61) 
MDs per 1,000 2.86 (1.01) 2.8 (0.83) 2.96 (0.98) 2.93 (0.94) 2.9 (1.06) 2.74 (0.85) 
Medicare Advantage Penetration 33.48 (12.16) 33.22 (10.54) 34.98 (11.62) 33.74 (11.48) 34.02 (12.21) 34.64 (10.38) 
Fraction Female 0.56 (0.5) 0.55 (0.5) 0.63 (0.48) 0.62 (0.49) 0.29 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47) 
Age Group (Ref: 55-64)       
Fraction 18-34 0.18 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39) 0.2 (0.4) 0.19 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42) 
Fraction 35-44  0.29 (0.45) 0.3 (0.46) 0.27 (0.44) 0.28 (0.45) 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 
Fraction 45-54 0.35 (0.48) 0.34 (0.47) 0.32 (0.46) 0.3 (0.46) 0.34 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 
Plan Type (Ref: Comprehensive)       
Fraction in EPO 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11) 0.02 (0.15) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.1) 
Fraction in POS 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28) 0.1 (0.3) 0.07 (0.26) 0.1 (0.29) 0.09 (0.28) 
Fraction in PPO 0.72 (0.45) 0.74 (0.44) 0.72 (0.45) 0.74 (0.44) 0.71 (0.46) 0.75 (0.44) 
Fraction in CDHP 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) 0.06 (0.24) 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.26) 
Fraction in HDHP 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.25) 0.05 (0.23) 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25) 
 







Appendix Table 3.2: Unweighted Summary Statistics Describing Low-Value Sample by Specialty 
 
 
Orthopedics for Low Back Pain 
(Back MRI) 
Neurology for Headache  
(Head MRI) 
Urology 




















Insurance Market HHI (1000s) 2.63 (0.8) 2.62 (0.8) 2.51 (0.75) 2.28 (0.67) 2.54 (0.76) 2.55 (0.79) 
Physician Market HHI (1000s) 1.52 (1.66) 2.36 (1.97) 1.19 (1.21) 1.75 (1.98) 2.66 (2.14) 3.61 (2.28) 
Percent Uninsured 11.31 (3.99) 10.79 (3.87) 10.89 (4.16) 10.93 (4.6) 10.75 (4.18) 11.39 (4.02) 
Percent Unemployed 5.23 (0.87) 5.21 (0.83) 5.12 (0.81) 5.04 (1.14) 5.2 (0.83) 5.02 (0.86) 
Percent Nonwhite 41.5 (14.72) 39.15 (14.05) 41.13 (14.72) 39.96 (15.08) 39.53 (15.53) 37.02 (14.58) 
Total Beds 676.39 (829.8) 642.49 (813.71) 785.14 (887.99) 683.39 (812.69) 774.54 (929.35) 508.02 (825.65) 
MDs per 1,000 2.88 (0.9) 2.88 (0.92) 2.99 (0.92) 2.95 (0.95) 2.95 (0.87) 2.66 (0.76) 
Medicare Advantage Penetration 33.65 (12.01) 32.88 (10.49) 35.17 (11.09) 32.78 (11.49) 35.1 (11.89) 34.07 (10.31) 
Fraction Female 0.55 (0.5) 0.55 (0.5) 0.75 (0.43) 0.75 (0.43) 0.39 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 
Age Group (Ref: 55-64)       
Fraction 18-34 0.17 (0.38) 0.17 (0.37) 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.15 (0.36) 0.16 (0.37) 
Fraction 35-44  0.3 (0.46) 0.3 (0.46) 0.29 (0.46) 0.28 (0.45) 0.28 (0.45) 0.29 (0.46) 
Fraction 45-54 0.4 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 0.22 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41) 0.46 (0.5) 0.44 (0.5) 
Plan Type (Ref: Comprehensive)       
Fraction in EPO 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.1) 0.01 (0.09) 
Fraction in POS 0.1 (0.3) 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.33) 0.08 (0.26) 0.11 (0.31) 0.1 (0.3) 
Fraction in PPO 0.73 (0.44) 0.75 (0.43) 0.72 (0.45) 0.78 (0.42) 0.72 (0.45) 0.75 (0.44) 
Fraction in CDHP 0.06 (0.25) 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24) 0.08 (0.28) 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25) 
Fraction in HDHP 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22) 
 













4. Paper 3: Do Health Insurance and Hospital Market 











Objective: To examine the effects of insurance and hospital market concentration on 
hospital patients’ experience of care, as hospitals may compete on quality for favorable 
insurance contracts. 
 
Data Sources/Study Setting: Secondary data for 2008-2015 on patient experience from 
Hospital Compare’s patient survey data, hospital characteristics from the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey, and insurance market characteristics from 
HealthLeaders-InterStudy. 
 
Study Design: Hospital/year-level regressions predict each hospital’s patient experience 






effects. The model is identified by longitudinal variation in insurance and hospital 
concentration.  
 
Data Collection/Extraction Methods: Hospital/year-level data from Hospital Compare 
and the AHA merged by market/year to insurance and hospital concentration measures.  
 
Principal Findings: Changes in patient satisfaction are positively associated with 
increases in insurance concentration and negatively associated with increases in hospital 
concentration. Moving from a market with 20th percentile insurance concentration and 
80th percentile hospital concentration to a market with 80th percentile insurance 
concentration and 20th percentile hospital concentration increases the share of patients 
that rated the hospital highly from 66.9% (95% CI: 66.5-67.2%) to 67.9% (95% CI: 67.5-
68.3%) and the share of patients that definitely recommend the hospital from 69.7% 
(95% CI: 69.4-70.0%) to 70.8% (95% CI: 70.5-71.2%). The relationship for insurance 
concentration is stronger in more concentrated hospital markets while the relationship for 
hospital concentration is stronger in less concentrated hospital markets. 
 
Conclusions: These findings add to the evidence on the harms of hospital consolidation 
but suggest that insurer consolidation may improve patient experience. 
 
Key Words: Anti-Trust/Health Care Markets/Competition, Patient 









The relationship between hospital market concentration and hospital quality has 
achieved substantial attention in the literature. In an administered-price setting where 
hospitals cannot compete on price, theory suggests that hospitals compete on quality to 
attract patients, so that increases in hospital market concentration worsen hospital 
performance.1 The empirical literature largely supports this, with studies of the US 
Medicare program and England’s National Health Service finding that hospital 
competition decreases mortality and readmission rates.2,3 In settings with market-
determined prices, where hospitals compete on quality and price (and perhaps make 
tradeoffs between the two), the theoretical predictions are ambiguous, and the empirical 
findings more mixed. Some studies have found that hospital market concentration 
decreases quality,4,5 though other studies have found no effect,6,7 and some have found a 
positive effect.8,9 In addition to the literature examining hospital quality, a robust 
literature documents that increases in hospital market concentration increase hospital 
prices.10 
However, little is known about the effect of insurance market concentration on 
hospital quality. Similar to hospitals competing with each other on quality dimensions to 
attract patients, hospitals may compete on quality to attain favorable contracts with 
insurers. As insurers consolidate, hospitals may increasingly view quality as a means to 
maintain bargaining leverage in their negotiations. For example, as insurance market 
concentration increases, hospitals may increase quality in order to increase patient 
pressure on the insurer to keep the hospital in-network, or to strengthen their ability to 






more recent than the literature on hospital concentration and price, but several studies 
have shown that concentrated insurers do negotiate lower hospital prices,11,12,13,14,15,16 but 
do not pass savings on to consumers in the form of lower premiums.17,18,19  
We address this important gap in the literature by empirically analyzing the 
relationship between insurance market concentration, hospital market concentration, and 
hospital quality, measured here as patient experience of care. 
We estimate hospital/year-level regression models predicting changes in patient 
experience over time as a function of changes in insurance and hospital market 
concentration, with hospital fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobservable 
hospital and market characteristics. Hospital-level data for 2008-2015 come from 
merging patient experience data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ 
(CMS) Hospital Compare with other hospital characteristics from the general medical 
and surgical community hospitals in the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual 
Survey. The CMS Hospital Compare data we use are Hospital Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) measures. Market-level Herfindahl-
Hirschman Indices (HHI) for insurance market concentration are constructed from 
HealthLeaders-InterStudy data for commercial enrollment market shares, while HHIs for 
hospital concentration are constructed from AHA data for all inpatient days aggregated to 
the system level.  
We hypothesize that insurance market concentration is positively related to 
hospital quality, measured as patients’ experience of care. We also expect that, consistent 
with much of the prior research, hospital concentration is negatively related to patient 






stronger in more concentrated hospital markets, where hospital market competition plays 




This section first describes our hospital-level dataset and both our dependent 
variable and hospital controls included in the data. It then describes our market-level 
measures for insurance and hospital market concentration, as well as our county-level 
controls. Our empirical methodology is described in the subsequent section. 
 
4.2.1 Hospital-Level Dataset 
We use measures of patient experience based on the HCAHPS survey, which is 
randomly sampled from adult patients across payer categories with at least one inpatient 
stay for a non-psychiatric diagnosis.20,21 CMS publicly reports summary HCAHPS results 
by hospital, adjusted for patient-mix (self-reported health status, education, service line, 
age, admission source, and primary language), survey mode, and non-response bias, on 
the Hospital Compare website.22 We use data collected over January-to-December for 
each year during 2008-2015. (There are no quality-oriented measures other than the 
HCAHPS measures that are available through Hospital Compare spanning such a long 
period of time with annual measures. For example, Hospital Compare’s mortality and 







Our analysis is based on the two HCAHPS global items. The first asks patients for 
their overall rating of the hospital, and the second asks whether the patient would 
recommend the hospital. Scores are aggregated by hospital and publicly reported as the 
percentage of a hospital’s patients in a given time period responding above a certain 
threshold. Our first outcome measure is the hospital’s percentage of patients rating it a 9 
or 10 (out of 10); this measure has been used in previous studies,23 and is the global 
measure used for the hospital’s Experience of Care score in the CMS Hospital Value-
Based Purchasing Program.24 Our second outcome measure, which is highly correlated, is 
the hospital’s percentage of patients reporting that they would definitely recommend the 
hospital. We test the sensitivity of our results for these two primary measures by using 
the remaining data on global patient experience to construct a measure of the percent of 
patients rating the hospital a 7 or higher and the percent of patients reporting that they 
would definitely or probably recommend the hospital.  
These two global scores presumably reflect several dimensions of the patient’s 
experience, including communication with doctors and nurses, satisfaction with the 
hospital facilities, and perception of clinical quality. A systematic review of the 
relationship between patient experience and other quality measures finds that patient 
experience is positively associated with self-reported health status and objective measures 
of clinical quality, though some studies have reported a weak or no relationship.25 For 
example, studies have found that patients treated at hospitals in the top quartile of patient 
satisfaction scores had lower mortality, but findings on other measures including 






experience scores should be thought of as one dimension of hospital quality, not a proxy 
for clinical quality.  
We obtain information on hospital characteristics from the AHA Annual Survey 
of Hospitals to include as time-varying covariates in the analyses in addition to hospital 
fixed effects. Relevant hospital characteristics include ownership type (public, nonprofit 
independent, nonprofit part of a system, and for-profit), number of beds, payer mix, 
whether it has an accredited Graduate Medical Education program, and average length of 
stay. We merged the HCAHPS data to the AHA data on the basis of the CMS 
Certification Number, which is not a perfect one-to-one match. There is only a small 
number of hospitals with HCAHPS data for which there is no match in the AHA data 
(e.g., 92 out of 4,240 for 2015), and a larger number of hospitals in the AHA data with no 
HCAHPS data (e.g., 568 out of 4,612 for 2015). We restrict to hospitals with patient 
experience data for 2008-2015, which excludes hospitals that opened or closed over the 
study period, but includes hospitals whose ownership changed, as long as there is a valid 
CMS Certification Number for merging. The excluded hospitals are disproportionately 
small and rural, and so the data we use covers over 89% of all inpatient days over our 
study period. Compared to the hospitals covering the remaining 11% of inpatient days, 
our sample of hospitals significantly differs on most covariates, which is expected as 
having missing Hospital Compare data is unlikely to be random. These descriptive 









4.2.2. Market-Level Concentration Measures 
We construct measures of insurance and hospital market concentration and merge 
these market concentration measures to the hospital/year-level data. We measure market 
concentration using the HHI, which is widely used in the literature and by the regulatory 
agencies. It is measured as the sum of squared market shares on a scale from 0 to 10,000, 
with 10,000 representing a monopoly and HHIs approaching 0 representing perfect 
competition. Our empirical model (described below) uses hospital fixed effects to focus 
on changes in insurance and hospital market concentration over time.  
For our measure of insurance market HHI, we calculate shares of commercial 
enrollment using the HealthLeaders-InterStudy census of private insurers. We include 
both fully-insured and self-insured business, as insurers would use the combined market 
share of both types of enrollees when negotiating provider contracts.28 Moreover, we 
measure market share based on combined enrollment in both the individual (nongroup) 
and employer markets. (We exclude exchange enrollment, though our results are robust 
to insurance HHI measures that do include exchange enrollment for 2014 and 2015.) We 
use the State Rating Areas defined by CMS’ Center for Consumer Information and 
Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) to define the geographic markets for insurers.29 Most states 
use metropolitan core-based statistical areas (CBSAs) as the basis for grouping their 
urban and suburban counties into Rating Areas; micropolitan and rural counties are then 
typically combined either with these existing Rating Areas and/or with each other. The 
median number of Rating Areas in a state is 7. 
For our primary measure of hospital market HHI, we calculate shares of all 






Dartmouth Atlas’ Hospital Referral Regions (HRR) to define the geographic markets for 
hospitals.30 We test the sensitivity of the results to different hospital HHI measures based 
on alternative ways of measuring market shares (using Medicare days, privately insured 
days, and all inpatient stays) and geographic markets (using counties).  
We also collect a number of time-varying county-level control variables from 
various sources and merge them to the hospital-level data. These covariates control for 
changes in local-level characteristics which could be correlated with changes in either 
market concentration measure and changes in hospital patient experience over time. For 
example, a county’s socioeconomic characteristics may affect the attractiveness of a 
market for a potential insurer entrant and may also be associated with patient experience. 
Hence, one set of county-level controls characterize the demographics of the county, 
including the percentage of the county’s population aged 65 and over and the percentage 
nonwhite from the Area Health Resource File. Additionally, we include the county’s real 
median income from the Census’ Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates database, 
and the unemployment rate from Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics. Another set of county-level controls characterize the healthcare market. We 
include the uninsured rate from the Census’ Small Area Health Insurance Estimates; the 
HMO/POS commercial penetration rate from the HealthLeaders-InterStudy data; and 
Medicare Advantage penetration, number of doctors per 1,000 residents, number of 
hospital inpatient days per capita, and number of Federally Qualified Health Centers from 









We estimate hospital/year-level models of hospital patient experience as a 
function of the observable market, hospital, and county characteristics discussed above, 
in addition to hospital fixed effects to account for unobserved, time-invariant factors that 
might affect both market concentration and patient satisfaction. Our models are identified 
by variation in the level of hospital and insurance market concentration within a market 
over time. To illustrate the variation, Appendix Figure 4.1 plots the change in hospital 
market concentration over the study period against the change in insurance market 
concentration over time for each hospital. (Note that we keep consistent geographic 
market definitions over time, so this variation results from changes in insurer and hospital 
market shares.) The model takes the following form, which we estimate using OLS 
regression, as the dependent variables (i.e., the hospital’s percentage of patients rating it a 
9 or 10 out of 10, or the hospital’s percentage of patients reporting they would definitely 
recommend the hospital) both have an approximate normal distribution: 
 
!"# = %& + %()*+,,)-# + %.,+/,,)0# + %1,2+/3456"# + %7829*4:;# + %<!=5># + ?" + @"#   [1] 
 
In the above specification, we estimate the patient experience score Yit  of hospital i, in 
county j, in insurance market k (defined as CCIIO Rating Areas), and in hospital market l 
(defined as Dartmouth Atlas HRRs), and in year t. InsHHIkt and HspHHIlt are the 
insurance and hospital market concentration measures, respectively; and so our 
coefficients of interest are %( and %.. We are interested in estimating %( and %. 






further below) for various stratified subsamples of hospitals based on the type of hospital 
and initial levels of market concentration (rather than additional interaction terms in the 
full sample’s model). Hospitalit is a vector of time-varying hospital characteristics, and 
Countyjt is a vector of time-varying county characteristics, both described in the Data 
section above. Yeart is a vector of binary year indicators, which account for time trends in 
patient satisfaction that were common across markets. The hospital fixed effects are 
denoted by ?". Each hospital/year observation is weighted by the number of hospital 
beds. To account for correlation in the error terms within markets, we cluster the standard 
errors at the insurance market level. 
 
4.3.1 Sensitivity Analyses  
We conduct three sets of sensitivity analyses to determine whether the %( and %. 
parameters from our main model are robust to alternative specifications. The first set of 
sensitivity analyses use alternative satisfaction measures for the dependent variable: 
defining the rating outcome measure as the percentage of respondents rating the hospital 
a 7 or higher (rather than 9 or higher) and defining the satisfaction outcome measure as 
the percentage of respondents definitely or probably recommending the hospital (rather 
than definitely recommending).  
The second set of sensitivity analyses uses an alternative sample. We estimate the 
model excluding the observations of vertically integrated hospital systems, including 
Kaiser Permanente, Geisinger Health System, and Intermountain Healthcare. These 
systems still exert competitive pressure on the other actors in the market, and are 






they do not undergo the typical bargaining process between an insurer and hospital, their 
patient experience scores may be unresponsive to insurance market concentration.  
The third set of sensitivity analyses use alternative hospital HHI measures. The 
first subset uses alternative hospital utilization measures to determine market shares. We 
re-estimate the model with hospital HHI measures using, alternately, only Medicare 
inpatient days, only commercially-insured inpatient days, and all hospital admissions 
(rather than all-payer inpatient days). The rationale for the latter is that less-efficient 
hospitals with longer average lengths of stay may have larger market shares based on 
days. The second subset uses counties to define geographic hospital markets instead of 
the Dartmouth Atlas HRRs.  
 
4.3.2 Stratified Analyses 
The extent to which hospitals respond to the competitive pressures exerted by 
other hospitals and by insurers may depend on certain hospital characteristics. For 
example, nonprofit hospitals, particularly those in systems which are often affiliated with 
academic medical centers, might be intrinsically motivated to provide high-quality care, 
so they may be relatively less sensitive to market concentration. We therefore estimate 
separate models for subsamples by hospital ownership type: public hospitals, nonprofit 
independent hospitals, nonprofit hospitals in systems, and for-profit hospitals. 
Additionally, the extent to which insurers can exert pressure on hospital quality 
may depend on the level of hospital concentration that those insurers face, as hospitals in 
more competitive hospital markets may have already increased quality considerably and 






competition with each other influences quality may depend on the level of insurance 
market concentration. We therefore consider how hospital and insurance market 
concentration interact with each other to affect patient experience by estimating models 
stratified by market concentration at the 2008 baseline. The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) use an HHI cutoff of 2,500 to distinguish 
between “moderately concentrated” and “highly concentrated” markets, and we follow 
this benchmark.31,32 We estimate separate models for low/moderate vs. high 
concentration levels for hospital markets, for low/moderate vs. high concentration levels 
for insurance markets, and for each pair of low/moderate vs. high concentration levels for 
both. 
We test the significance of differences between coefficients on insurance and 
hospital market concentration across stratified analyses (both by hospital type and by 
market concentration) using seemingly unrelated estimation in Stata. 
 
4.4 Results 
The sample of hospitals, after imposing the restrictions described above, result in 
a total of 25,180 observations at 3,154 hospitals over eight years and 465 insurance 
markets and 306 hospital markets. (Because of sporadically missing confounder data, the 
number of observations is not an exact multiple of the number of hospitals.)  
The first panel of Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the analytical sample 
over the 2008-2015 period, weighted by number of beds. Across hospitals, the mean 
percentage of patients rating their hospital a 9 or 10 over the study period was 67.4% and 






was 70.3%, with standard deviations across hospitals of 7.94% and 8.74%, respectively. 
Appendix Figure 4.2 illustrates the change in these average scores over the study period. 
The average insurance market HHI faced by hospitals during this time was 2,726, while 
the average hospital market HHI was 2,459; both are right around the FTC/DOJ “highly 
concentrated” benchmark of 2,500. (Note that the unit of observation here is the hospital, 
so these measures of mean market concentration differ from means reported elsewhere 
that reflect averages across markets or the population.) Appendix Table 4.2 provides 
more detail on the distribution of the patient experience scores and insurance and hospital 
concentration measures over hospital/years. The typical hospital bed in our sample is in a 
hospital that is a member of a nonprofit hospital system with between 200 and 299 beds 
and located in a metropolitan market. 
 The second and third panels of Table 4.1 present the results for the main model. A 
1,000-point increase in insurance concentration increases the percentage who rate the 
hospital a 9 or 10 by 0.273 percentage points (p=0.032) and the percentage who would 
definitely recommend the hospital by 0.268 percentage points (p=0.030), while a 1,000-
point increase in hospital concentration decreases these scores by 0.291 percentage points 
(p=0.069) and 0.350 percentage points (p=0.017). With the inclusion of hospital fixed 
effects, the control variables should be interpreted as changes in these characteristics over 
time. There is also a notable time trend (consistent with Appendix Figure 4.2), with 
patient experience scores moving steadily upward over the study period. 
To illustrate the magnitude of these results for changes in insurance and hospital 
market concentration, we consider the change in patient experience associated with 






and the 80th percentile of insurance concentration (HHI=3,332) from the 80th percentile of 
hospital concentration (HHI=3,439) and the 20th percentile of insurance concentration 
(HHI=2,004). About 4.4% of the hospital/year observations jointly have these lowest 
levels of hospital concentration and highest levels of insurance concentration, while about 
4.0% of the hospital/year observations jointly have these highest levels of hospital 
concentration and lowest levels of insurance concentration. (Appendix Figure 4.3 
illustrates the joint distribution of insurance and hospital market concentration across the 
hospitals in our sample for 2015.) This change in the joint distribution of market 
concentration would increase the percentage who rate the hospital a 9 or 10 from about 
66.9% (95% CI: 66.5-67.2%) to about 67.9% (95% CI: 67.5-68.3%) and would increase 
the percentage who would definitely recommend the hospital from about 69.7% (95% CI: 
69.4-70.0%) to about 70.8% (95% CI: 70.5-71.2%); both of which are differences of 
about 0.13 standard deviations in the measures across hospitals. These changes 
correspond to a hospital’s patient rating increasing from roughly the 41st to 45th percentile 
of its distribution and a hospital’s patient satisfaction moving from the 48th to 52nd 
percentile. Figures 4.1A-4.1B show these two predicted patient experience measures for 
all possible combinations of insurance and hospital market concentration.  
Table 4.2 presents the results of the sensitivity analyses, with only the coefficients 
on insurance and hospital market concentration reported and the first and second columns 
corresponding to the rating and recommended measures, respectively. In the first set of 
sensitivity results, the effect of hospital market concentration is robust to redefining the 
outcome measure as a rating of 7 or higher and to redefining the outcome measure as 






is comparable but not statistically significant. In the second set of sensitivity results, the 
findings are robust to excluding vertically integrated systems. In the third set of 
sensitivity analyses, the effect of insurance market concentration is robust to calculating 
hospital HHIs with Medicare days, with private days, and with hospital admissions 
instead of inpatient days. However, hospital HHIs calculated using private hospital days 
do not significantly affect patient satisfaction, suggesting that the findings in the main 
model may be primarily driven by competition for Medicare patients. While this is 
somewhat surprising because hospital HHI measures are highly correlated whether 
defined by all patients, Medicare patients, or private patients, this pattern is plausible 
given that hospital competition should have stronger quality implications in Medicare 
where prices are administered. The results on insurance market concentration are robust 
to using counties to define the geographic hospital market; the effect of hospital market 
concentration is not robust to using counties to define hospital markets. 
Table 4.3 presents the results for the analysis stratified by hospital type. While we 
do not generally observe statistically significant differences between the coefficients for 
the hospital type stratifications, the magnitude of the coefficient for insurance market 
concentration is slightly larger among independent nonprofit systems and for-profit 
hospitals, relative to hospitals in a nonprofit system; for the definitely recommend 
outcome measure, the effect of insurance concentration among for-profit hospitals is 
significantly different from nonprofit systems (p=0.046). The magnitudes of the effect of 
hospital market concentration are slightly larger among hospitals that are not members of 
a nonprofit system, though in general, neither the point estimates nor the tests of 






hospital’s teaching status, but we do not report those results as those magnitudes were 
similar to each other.  
Table 4.4 presents the results for the analyses stratified by low/moderate versus 
high insurance and hospital market concentration, again reporting only the coefficients on 
hospital and insurance market concentration for the two outcome measures. The 
insurance market concentration’s coefficient is larger in magnitude in more concentrated 
(HHI > 2,500) hospital markets, with a 1,000-point increase in insurance HHI increasing 
patient experience by 0.590 percentage points (p=0.002) for the rating measure and 0.469 
percentage points (p=0.009) for the recommendation measure. For the rating outcome 
measure, this difference is statistically significant (p=0.03). Conversely, the hospital 
market concentration’s coefficient is larger in magnitude, though not significantly 
different, in less concentrated hospital markets, with a 1,000-point increase in hospital 
HHI in a hospital market with low/moderate concentration at baseline decreasing the 
patient rating score by 0.591 points (p=0.047) and the recommend score by 0.560 points 
(p=.033), compared to no effect in a hospital market that was highly concentrated at 
baseline. The hospital market concentration’s coefficient is larger in magnitude, though 
not statistically different, in more concentrated insurance markets, with a 1,000-point 
increase in hospital HHI decreasing patient satisfaction by 0.352 percentage points 
(p=0.077) or 0.393 percentage points (p=0.026). Moreover, the insurance market 
concentration’s coefficient is largest when insurance markets are not concentrated and 
hospital markets are concentrated, improving patient experience by 1.181 percentage 







4.5 Discussion and Limitations 
We find that insurance market concentration positively impacts the patient’s 
experience of care, an important dimension of hospital quality, and that, consistent with 
much of the prior research, hospital concentration negatively impacts this measure of 
hospital quality. Moving from a market at the 20th percentile of insurance concentration 
and the 80th percentile of hospital concentration (consistent with 4.0% of the joint 
distribution) to a market at the 80th percentile of insurance and the 20th percentile of 
hospital concentration (consistent with 4.4% of the joint distribution) increases the patient 
rating score from 66.9% to 67.9% and the patient recommendation score from 69.7% to 
70.8%. These changes in patient satisfaction would be consistent with moving from the 
41st percentile to the 45th percentile in the distribution of patient rating scores across 
hospitals and with moving from the 48th percentile to the 52nd percentile in the 
distribution of patient recommendation scores. We interpret these as relatively modest yet 
nontrivial direct impacts on patient experience.  
Moreover, insurance market consolidation is relatively more beneficial to patient 
experience when the hospital market is more concentrated, and hospital market 
consolidation is relatively more detrimental to patient experience when the hospital 
market is less concentrated. This suggests that when a hospital market is not 
concentrated, other hospitals exert enough competitive pressure that insurance 
concentration has no additional impact on quality, but when a hospital market is 







We also find that the positive association of insurance market concentration with 
patient experience is particularly pronounced among for-profit hospitals and independent 
nonprofit hospitals. This may suggest that these types of hospitals are more responsive to 
competitive market pressures compared to nonprofit hospital systems and public 
hospitals. The former, which are commonly affiliated with academic medical centers and 
generally tend to have higher patient satisfaction scores, may be more intrinsically likely 
to prioritize quality absent competitive pressure. Public hospitals tend to serve a different 
patient population and, as a result, not be as affected by commercial insurance market 
conditions.  
Our analyses have several limitations. First, HCAHPS patient experience 
measures may not correlate very strongly with more clinically-oriented quality measures, 
and we have a limited ability to explore the effect on patients who rate the hospital very 
poorly. Second, consistently defining insurance and hospital markets across the country is 
a challenge. There is variation across states in how those regulators elected to define 
insurance rating areas for CCIIO. The Dartmouth HRRs reflect geographic markets for 
tertiary care hospitals, which are likely larger than the relevant geographic market for 
community hospitals. Furthermore, the proper utilization measure to define hospital 
market shares is unclear, though we used several approaches. Finally, hospital and insurer 
decisions to merge or enter/exit a market are not random, and drawing a causal 
conclusion from our study relies on the assumption that the (unmeasured) confounding 
factors were constant over time. 
Regarding the policy implications of these findings, most analyses of market 






insurance market concentration also impacts this dimension of quality. As noted above, 
we view the magnitude of the effects we observe as modest but not trivial. An overall 
assessment of the effects of consolidation in insurance and provider markets weighs the 
benefits against the harms (with those harms largely being tied to higher insurer 
administrative overhead and higher provider prices). Our research furthers the prior 
evidence on the harms of hospital market consolidation (observed, as noted above, in a 
portion of that literature) but suggests that, at least on this dimension, insurance market 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics and Main Model’s Full Regression Results 
 
  Regression:  Rating 9/10 
Regression:  
Recommend 
 Mean SD Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Percent Giving 9/10 Quality 
Rating  
67.4 7.94     
Percent Giving a 7+ Quality 
Rating 
90.8 3.96     
Percent Definitely 
Recmndecommending 
70.3 8.74     
Pct. Def./Probably 
RecmndRecommending 
94.5 3.06     
Market Concentration:        
     Insurance HHI (1,000s) 2.73 0.98 0.273** [0.127] 0.268** [0.124] 
     Hospital HHI (1,000s) 2.46 1.50 -0.291* [0.160] -0.350** [0.146] 
Hospital Characteristics       
     Type: Nonprofit Ind. 
(reference) 
0.20 0.40     
     Type: Nonprofit System 0.51 0.50 -0.572** [0.272] -0.725** [0.293] 
     Type: For-Profit 0.14 0.35 -1.795*** [0.472] -2.016*** [0.460] 
     Type: Public Nonfederal 0.14 0.35 -0.213 [0.553] -0.473 [0.543] 
     Size: 6-24 Beds 
(reference) 
0.003 0.06     
     Size: 25-49 Beds 0.02 0.15 -0.073 [0.630] -0.088 [0.654] 
     Size: 50-99 Beds 0.06 0.23 -0.037 [0.702] -0.413 [0.754] 
     Size: 100-199 Beds 0.18 0.38 0.079 [0.768] -0.267 [0.811] 
     Size: 200-299 Beds 0.18 0.39 0.438 [0.809] 0.046 [0.847] 
     Size: 300-399 Beds 0.16 0.36 0.408 [0.843] -0.026 [0.886] 
     Size: 400-499 Beds 0.11 0.32 0.971 [0.907] 0.339 [0.951] 
     Size: 500+ Beds 0.28 0.45 1.423 [0.945] 0.829 [0.967] 
     Medicare Share (Days) 0.49 0.13 -1.499*** [0.567] -1.398*** [0.538] 
     Medicaid Share (Days)  0.21 0.12 0.263 [0.624] -0.060 [0.689] 
     Graduate Medical 
Education 
0.51 0.50 0.010 [0.194] -0.042 [0.193] 
     Average Length of Stay 4.99 2.06 -0.072** [0.033] -0.079*** [0.029] 
County Characteristics       
     Non-CBSA (vs. CBSA) 
County 
0.04 0.19     
     Fraction Age 65+ 0.14 0.03 -14.05 [9.194] -14.98 [9.288] 
     Fraction Nonwhite 0.37 0.21 2.341 [6.461] 1.860 [6.615] 
     Median Income ($1,000s) 55.9 14.2 -0.012 [0.025] -0.022 [0.024] 
     Unemployment Rate 0.08 0.03 5.050 [5.593] 1.562 [5.277] 
     Fraction Uninsured 0.16 0.06 -7.288* [4.079] -5.662 [3.564] 
     HMO/POS Penetration 0.35 0.16 1.853** [0.805] 1.726** [0.760] 
     Medicare Adv. 
Penetration 
0.27 0.14 -1.885 [2.120] -0.300 [2.009] 
     MDs per 1,000 2.94 2.04 0.019 [0.172] 0.106 [0.179] 
     Inpatient Days Per Capita 0.71 0.51 0.058 [0.138] 0.0126 [0.141] 
     FQHC in County 0.86 0.35 0.056 [0.322] -0.097 [0.303] 
Year Indicators (2008) 
Reference) 
      
     2009   2.335*** [0.224] 1.593*** [0.211] 
     2010   3.915*** [0.261] 2.505*** [0.253] 
     2011   4.946*** [0.281] 3.073*** [0.280] 
     2012   6.175*** [0.293] 3.773*** [0.304] 
     2013   7.039*** [0.326] 4.032*** [0.343] 
     2014   7.166*** [0.416] 3.979*** [0.408] 
     2015   7.648*** [0.518] 3.972*** [0.499] 
Constant   65.60*** [3.594] 71.77*** [3.724] 
R-Squared   0.842   0.874  
Notes: Sample consists of 25,180 observations over 3,154 unique hospitals. Summary statistics and 
regressions are weighted by the number of hospital beds. The regressions include hospital fixed effects. 
HHI=Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; FQHC=Federally Qualified Health Center. Statistical Significance: *** 






Table 4.2: Results from Sensitivity Analyses: Coefficients for Insurance and 
Hospital Market Concentration 
 
 DV = Percent Giving a Rating of 9 or 10 





















Main Model 0.273** -0.291* 0.268** -0.350** 
 [0.127] [0.160] [0.124] [0.146] 
Alternative Dependent Variables:     
     Percent Giving a Quality Rating of 7+ 0.151 -0.227***   
 [0.097] [0.084]   
     Percent Definitely/Probably Recommending   0.101 -0.174*** 
   [0.064] [0.053] 
Alternative Sampling:     
     Drop Vertically Integrated Systems 0.253** -0.253 0.249** -0.321** 
 [0.129] [0.161] [0.125] [0.147] 
Alternative Hospital HHI Measures:      
     Uses Medicare Days for Market Share 0.264** -0.450*** 0.261** -0.444*** 
 [0.126] [0.151] [0.122] [0.142] 
     Uses Private Days for Market Shares 0.276** 0.0537 0.273** -0.0155 
 [0.128] [0.126] [0.125] [0.122] 
     Uses All Hospital Admissions for Market 
Shares 0.270** -0.559*** 0.265** -0.592*** 
 [0.126] [0.202] [0.123] [0.190] 
     Uses Counties for Geographic Areas 0.270*** -0.071 0.208 -0.103 
 [0.103] [0.083] [0.147] [0.090] 
 
Notes: The main model on the first row repeats the results shown in Table 4.1. DV=Dependent Variable. 
HHI=Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Regressions are weighted by the number of hospital beds and include 
hospital fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in brackets. 







Table 4.3: Results from Stratified Analyses by Hospital Type 
 
 DV = Percent Giving a Rating of 9 or 10 





















Main Model (Not Stratified) 0.273** -0.291* 0.268** -0.350** 
     (N=25,180) [0.127] [0.160] [0.124] [0.146] 
     
Nonprofit System Hospital Subsample 0.113 0.060 0.113 -0.053 
     (N=11,235) [0.241] [0.226] [0.223] [0.213] 
Nonprofit Independent Hospital Subsample 0.418** -0.487 0.397* -0.248 
     (N=5,440) [0.195] [0.299] [0.216] [0.292] 
For-Profit Hospital Subsample 0.652** -0.541 0.727***+ -0.733* 
     (N=4,191) [0.266] [0.419] [0.271] [0.386] 
Public Hospital Subsample 0.060 -0.504 -0.083 -0.701** 
     (N=4,314) [0.263] [0.322] [0.279] [0.348] 
     
 
Notes: The main model on the first row repeats the results shown in Table 4.1. DV=Dependent Variable. 
HHI=Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Regressions are weighted by the number of hospital beds and include 
hospital fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in brackets.  
Statistical Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. + Indicates that coefficient is significantly 
different from comparison coefficient at the 0.05 level. The coefficients for nonprofit independent 








Table 4.4: Results from Stratified Analyses by Low/Moderate Vs. High Market 
Concentration  
 
 DV = Percent Giving a Rating of 9 or 10 





















All Insurance Markets, All Hospital Markets 0.273** -0.291* 0.268** -0.350** 
     (N=25,180) [0.127] [0.160] [0.124] [0.146] 
     
All Insurance Markets, Hospital HHI < 2,500 0.106 -0.591** 0.164 -0.560** 
     (N=16,780) [0.153] [0.297] [0.153] [0.262] 
All Insurance Markets, Hospital HHI > 2,500 0.590***+ -0.125 0.469*** -0.220 
     (N=8,398) [0.187] [0.180] [0.178] [0.164] 
     
Insurance HHI < 2,500, All Hospital Markets 0.186 -0.082 0.269 -0.179 
     (N=10,050) [0.320] [0.221] [0.290] [0.213] 
Insurance HHI > 2,500, All Hospital Markets 0.151 -0.352* 0.120 -0.393** 
     (N=15,130) [0.128] [0.198] [0.132] [0.175] 
     
Insurance HHI < 2,500, Hospital HHI < 2,500 -0.276 -0.584 -0.001 -0.598 
     (N=7,061) [0.352] [0.499] [0.346] [0.463] 
Insurance HHI > 2,500, Hospital HHI < 2,500 0.0465 -0.442 0.0176 -0.330 
     (N=9,719) [0.155] [0.352] [0.160] [0.307] 
Insurance HHI < 2,500, Hospital HHI > 2,500 1.181**+ 0.102 0.799 -0.0513 
     (N=2,989) [0.540] [0.215] [0.486] [0.221] 
Insurance HHI > 2,500, Hospital HHI > 2,500 0.345* -0.206 0.282 -0.318* 
     (N=5,409) [0.189] [0.228] [0.189] [0.188] 
 
Notes: The main model on the first row repeats the results shown in Table 4.1. DV=Dependent Variable. 
HHI=Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Regressions are weighted by the number of hospital beds and include 
hospital fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in brackets. 
Statistical Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. + Indicates that coefficient is significantly 
different from comparison coefficient at the 0.05 level. The first row in each group is treated as the 
comparison (i.e., coefficients for hospital markets > 2,500 are tested against hospital markets < 2,500, and 










Figure 4.1: Predicted Patient Experience By Level of Insurance and Hospital 
Market Concentration 
 
Panel A: Percent of Patients Rating the Hospital a 9 or 10 
   
 
Panel B:  Percent of Patients Definitely Recommending the Hospital 
 
   








Appendix Table 4.1: Comparison of Characteristics between Included and Excluded 






















Percent Giving a Rating of 9 or 10 63.5 8.94 64.4 12.5 0.063 
Percent Giving a Rating of 7+ 89.5 5.15 89.4 6.61 0.841 
Percent Definitely Recommending 67.2 9.9 67.8 13.42 0.261 
Pct. Def./Probably Recommending 93.9 3.86 93.3 4.75 0.005 
Market Concentration:       
     Insurance HHI (1,000s) 3.10 1.29 3.56 1.51 <.001 
     Hospital HHI (1,000s) 2.43 1.52 2.46 1.54 0.493 
Hospital Characteristics      
     Type: Nonprofit Ind. (reference) 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42 0.021 
     Type: Nonprofit System 0.41 0.49 0.23 0.42 <.001 
     Type: For-Profit 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.39 0.013 
     Type: Government (Non-Fed) 0.18 0.39 0.36 0.48 <.001 
     Size: 6-24 beds 0.03 0.18 0.22 0.41 <.001 
     Size: 25-49 beds 0.14 0.35 0.37 0.48 <.001 
     Size: 50-99 beds 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.41 <.001 
     Size: 100-199 beds 0.26 0.44 0.13 0.33 <.001 
     Size: 200-299 beds 0.17 0.37 0.04 0.18 <.001 
     Size: 300-399 beds 0.10 0.3 0.02 0.14 <.001 
     Size: 400-499 beds 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.10 <.001 
     Size: 500+ beds 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.09 <.001 
     Percent Medicare 0.53 0.14 0.61 0.19 <.001 
     Percent Medicaid 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.001 
     Graduate Medical Education 0.22 0.42 0.04 0.20 <.001 
     Average Length of Stay 4.61 2.63 6.35 8.84 <.001 
County Characteristics      
     Rural (vs. Non-Rural) County 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.04 <.001 
     Percent Age 65+ 0.28 0.21 0.25 0.22 <.001 
     Percent Nonwhite 55.83 14.66 49.38 11.82 <.001 
     Median Income ($000s) 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.06 <.001 
     Percent Uninsured 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.018 
     Unemployment Rate 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.12 <.001 
     Medicare Advantage 
Penetration 0.27 0.16 0.21 0.16 <.001 
     HMO/POS Penetration 2.12 1.64 1.33 1.45 <.001 
     MDs per 1000 0.60 0.45 0.53 0.66 <.001 
     Inpatient Days per Capita 0.67 0.47 0.49 0.50 <.001 
     FQHC in County 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.04 <.001 
 
Notes: HHI=Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; FQHC=Federally Qualified Health Center.  







Appendix Table 4.2: Distribution of Patient Experience and Insurance and Hospital 












1st   45.0 46.0 1.388 0.706 
5th  53.0 55.0 1.651 0.849 
10th  57.0 59.0 1.820 1.093 
20th  61.0 63.0 2.004 1.293 
25th  63.0 65.0 2.090 1.395 
50th 68.0 71.0 2.429 2.066 
75th 73.0 77.0 3.118 3.009 
80th 74.0 78.0 3.332 3.439 
90th 77.0 81.0 3.967 4.618 
95th 79.0 83.0 4.623 5.274 
99th 83.0 86.0 6.397 8.605 
 








Appendix Figure 4.1: Scatter Plot of the Change in Insurance and Hospital Market 
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Appendix Figure 4.2: Unadjusted Trend in Average Patient Experience Scores from 
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Appendix Figure 4.3: Scatter Plot of Insurance and Hospital Market Concentration 







































This work presents important evidence on the relationship between insurer 
concentration and utilization and quality, two outcomes of particular importance to 
patients. The first paper found that a 1,000-point increase in insurer concentration 
increases the likelihood of an inpatient admission by 0.09 percentage points and increases 
price-adjusted professional spending by $84.22, both around 2% of the unadjusted 
average level of utilization. Consistent with expectations linked to insurer negotiation of 
provider prices, insurer concentration did not affect treatment intensity of more price-
inelastic acute admissions, but increased price-adjusted spending on more price-elastic 
planned admissions by $200.53, or 3.4% of the mean. This is suggestive evidence that 
conditional on having insurance, increases in insurer concentration on average increase 
access to care. 
However, Paper 2 indicates that, at least in some contexts, a physician’s financial 
incentives to provide more care contribute to higher utilization as insurance concentration 
increases. A 1,000-point increase in insurer concentration was predicted to increase the 
utilization of MRI imaging following a new patient visit with an orthopedist who bills for 
MRI by 11.9%, compared to 4% following a visit with an orthopedist who does not bill 






established patient visit for back pain with an orthopedist who does not bill for MRI, 
compared to a 9.5% increase among patients who visited an orthopedist who bills for 
MRI. This dynamic may exacerbate overuse and contribute to inefficiently high 
healthcare utilization. Importantly, though the effect of insurer concentration is not 
positive in every model across the patients of owners and non-owners, it is positive in all 
the models in which the effect of insurance market concentration is statistically 
significant. This is important because it suggests that supplier-induced demand 
contributes to the positive relationship between insurer concentration and utilization in 
addition to patient-driven demand, rather than instead of it. 
 Papers 1 and 3 present mixed findings related to healthcare quality. This research 
found that insurer concentration did not significantly decrease the probably of an 
unplanned readmission in the primary sample, though the point estimate was negative 
and there was a significant negative effect in a more restricted sample. Insurer 
concentration was found to improve hospital patients’ experience of care, with a 1,000-
point increase in insurer HHI increasing the percentage of patients who rated the hospital 
a 9 or 10 by an estimated 0.273 percentage points and the percentage who would 
definitely recommend the hospital by 0.268 percentage points. The magnitudes of these 
results were comparable to the harmful effect of hospital concentration, with a 1,000-
point increase in hospital concentration decreasing the respective scores by an estimated 
0.291 percentage points and 0.350 percentage points. 
 Another key contribution of this research is to explore how these results depend 
on baseline levels of market concentration, an important question for regulators and 






pursue policies aimed at increasing market competition. While there were no meaningful 
differences in the effect of insurer concentration on the likelihood of an admission 
between low/moderate and high concentration physician or insurer markets, the effect of 
insurer concentration on intensive utilization was driven by markets that had relatively 
unconcentrated insurance markets. This finding might suggest that insurers in less 
concentrated insurance markets face more competitive pressure to pass on lower prices to 
patients and to limit the use of health plan tools that limit utilization, like claims review. 
Conversely, there were no large differences in the effect on hospital patients’ experience 
of care between more and less concentrated insurance markets. One interpretation of this 
pair of findings is that, on the utilization side, the role of insurers as sellers of health 
plans modifies the extent to which patients benefit from the insurer’s role as purchaser of 
health services; on the patient experience side, however, there is no issue of pass-through 
and patients can benefit directly from the pressure placed on providers to improve 
quality. 
 The findings related to baseline levels of provider market concentration are also 
interesting. Contrary to the expectation that the effect of increases in insurer 
concentration would be larger in more concentrated physician markets, where physicians 
would have more leverage to hold prices above competitive levels, the effect on intensive 
utilization was driven by relatively unconcentrated physician markets. This result may 
suggest that the effect of a marginal increase in insurer concentration does not 
meaningfully change the bargaining relationship if physicians and hospitals are highly 
concentrated. Conversely, the beneficial effect on patient experience was driven by more 






on quality plays a larger role when there is not already enough competition from other 
hospitals to achieve higher quality. 
When synthesizing the results of this research, it is important to note that the 
underlying study population and time frame differed across the three papers. Papers 1 and 
2 both focused on commercially-insured beneficiaries receiving employer sponsored 
insurance largely from self-insured firms. Paper 3 uses patient experience measures 
randomly sampled from hospital patients, across payer categories. While Paper 1 and 
Paper 3 focused on an inpatient setting, Paper 2 focused on an outpatient setting. Each 
paper also covered a different time period, with Paper 3 estimated over 2008-2015, Paper 
1 estimated over 2013-2015, and Paper 2 over 2015. These differences in study setting 
may affect the interpretation of the results. For example, Paper 1 found no significant 
effect on readmissions, but Paper 3 found a beneficial effect on patient experience. This 
might be because improving clinical quality is simply more difficult than improving 
patient experience (which depends more on dimensions like communication and the 
comfort of the room), making hospitals less responsive to insurer pressure on measures of 
clinical quality. However, it also might be that insurer concentration and readmissions 
had a weaker relationship over 2013-2015 than they might have had over an earlier 
period, before the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program placed more pressure on 
hospitals to reduce readmissions. Likewise, it is possible that insurer concentration and a 
less-publicized clinical quality measure may have a stronger relationship than insurer 
concentration and readmissions. 
This work presents several opportunities for future research. One major area for 






baseline levels of market concentration. The interpretations outlined above are 
conceptually motivated, but not tested empirically. An understanding of why the level of 
insurer concentration modifies the effect of a change in insurer concentration would be 
strengthened by research on how insurer concentration affects underlying plan features, 
like the set of covered benefits, the out-of-pocket payment design, the size of the provider 
panel, and the likelihood of a claim being denied. An important question is how these 
relationships vary across fully-insured versus self-insured health plans, as some of these 
features may spill over from an insurer’s fully-insured plans to plans where they provide 
administrative services, while others may not. 
More work is also needed to understand whether increases in utilization related to 
increases in insurer concentration benefit the patient on any clinical dimension, or 
whether they increase inefficiency. Readmissions is an important but narrow measure of 
consumer welfare, and policy changes mentioned above may have weakened any existing 
relationship between insurer concentration and readmission. The hospital patient’s 
experience of care is likewise an important measure of quality, but a measure that is only 
weakly related to clinical outcomes. There are many other metrics by which higher 
utilization may improve a patient’s outcomes, and quality measurement continues to be 
an area of active research. Relatedly, while Paper 2 includes models predicting low-value 
imaging, this research largely focused on utilization, rather than overutilization. Testing 
for a relationship between insurer concentration and overuse in more settings would help 







Additionally, more research is needed to understand why supply-side financial 
incentives significantly affected the relationship between insurer concentration and 
imaging utilization for orthopedics, but not urology or neurology. Perhaps orthopedics is 
a medical specialty where the physician’s discretion plays a larger role, relative to 
urology or neurology. Relatedly, other work can explore how different types of supply-
side financial incentives affect the relationship between insurer concentration and 
utilization, as the focus on imaging in this research is important but narrow. 
Taken together, these three papers present evidence that insurer concentration is 
largely beneficial in its effect on utilization and quality, with the caveat that higher 
utilization is likely not entirely demand-driven and may not be clinically meaningful. 
These benefits must be weighed against the harms of insurer consolidation, 
predominantly higher administrative costs contributing to higher premiums, and perhaps 
an exacerbation of overuse. Regulators and policy-makers should consider ways to 
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